NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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No. 27

22 JANUARY 1973

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GENERAL

Director's Message

It has become increasingly clear that BNDD's role on foreign soil has changed considerably during the past two years.

Experts both within BNDD and other agencies agree that the most effective way to diminish or stop the supply of illicit drugs into this country is to work as closely as possible at the source of the drugs.

It is easier, for example, to identify and destroy an illegal opium poppy field than it is to stop a caravan of several hundred horses and men. Or, it would be more effective to immobilize a clandestine heroin processing laboratory than it would be to try to detect concealed heroin being smuggled into the United States.

Striking at the heart of the traffic, namely the source countries, poses many new challenges to BNDD and dictates that we develop and implement imaginative and effective programs and participate as integral members of numerous American foreign missions. This is what we are doing.

During the past few weeks, I have set in motion the mechanics of a major reorganization of BNDD's overseas operation to meet new challenges and take advantage of new opportunities that we never had before. My first step was to appoint George M. Belk, a veteran BNDD executive, to a new position on my staff. Mr. Belk, reporting directly to me, has sole planning and operational control over BNDD's overseas program.

Within the coming weeks, BNDD's overseas Special Agent staff—in Latin America, Europe, the Middle East and the Far East—will be increased to 123, or more than double its present strength. We are also increasing the number of our offices in these four areas of the world from 25 to 46.

At the heart of our reorganized overseas operation, however, is how we carry out our job. It is obvious that our activity will vary, if not from one country to another, certainly among definable geographical regions. With this in mind, we will develop a specifically designed program and a manager to carry it out in each country or area. In one country, it may mean working for the elimination of raw materials, in another, it may mean apprehension of processors and distributors; and in other countries, different programs.

To carry out this wide variety of activities, we are selecting management and Special Agent personnel for these positions who are considered exceptionally competent and versatile. They will be able to recognize when and where training is needed, where foreign assistance might be best tendered, the value of intelligence, the necessity for and processes of case-making or, when not to resort to traditional enforcement measures.

I think this new initiative by BNDD will have a dramatic impact at the most vulnerable part of the illicit drug traffic—the source.

JOHN E. INGERSOLL
Director

BNDD Strengthens, Expands Overseas Mission With George M. Belk To Head

On August 14, BNDD Director John E. Ingersoll announced the formation of a new Office for International Affairs. Appointed to head the Office, as Program Manager, was George M. Belk. The following story by Ron E. Moxness, staff writer for the International Press Service, is based on an interview with Mr. Belk subsequent to the announcement. The story, which was released through the United States Information Agency, is an accurate report on this important facet of BNDD's total mission.

(Washington, Sep. 2) Last June 17 President Nixon announced an increase in U.S. efforts to prevent illicit narcotics from reaching the United States from other countries.

"The drug problem crosses ideological boundaries and surmounts national differences," he said. "If we are barred in any way in our effort to deal with this matter, our efforts will be crippled, and our will subject to question. I intend to leave no room for other nations to question our commitment to this matter."

In an interview this week, a U.S. official outlined steps being taken to strengthen the investigative capacities of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs abroad. These will include the Bureau's ability "to assist host governments in the hiring, training and deployment of personnel and the procurement of necessary equipment for drug abuse control."

The "strengthening of the investigative capacities" of the Bureau has involved the creation of a new office—Program Manager for International Affairs—under the direct supervision of John E. Ingersoll, Bureau Director and Chairman of the U.S.Delegation to the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

The new office is headed by George M. Belk, a veteran of the U.S. war against the narcotics trafficker. He served as Chief of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Bureau before his current assignment.

Mr. Belk participated in a meeting of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) at Ottawa, September 7-13. At that meeting, as in others with his foreign counterparts, Mr. Belk summed up, through a Bureau memorandum, the U.S. official view of drug abuse:

"The mood of the American people, the Congress, the administration, and the President is that the United States should and will take whatever actions are necessary, both domestically and internationally, to remove this blight from our society. Internationally these actions will include, if necessary, a reassessment of our foreign policy and economic relationships with those countries which intentionally or inadvertently facilitate the traffic."

Mr. Belk does not view language such as this as blunt because, as he noted in the interview, "The people we are working with are just as dedicated, just as determined as we are to put a halt to a traffic which, in the United States alone, has produced more than 300,000 heroin addicts and in New York alone causes the deaths, annually, of more than 1,000 persons—many of them teenagers."

At the outset, U.S. Special Agents overseas worked from their own headquarters, often separated from the broad streams of diplomacy. Now, Mr. Belk said, "This office will be responsible for the coordination of the various facets of our activities relating to the foreign scene. It will also work closely with the other major U.S. agencies in foreign areas. Mr. Ingersoll has now directed that we become a part of the U.S. country teams to fight the illicit traffic in narcotics—particularly those destined for the United States."

This job, Mr. Belk noted, is the Bureau's primary mission—to interdict the flow of drugs illegally destined for the United States and to reduce drastically the availability of narcotics in the nation.

To accomplish this mission, the number of Special U. S. Narcotics Agents working overseas will be doubled during the fiscal year ending next June 30, to a total of 123 men. They will be posted in Europe, the Middle East, Latin America and Asia.

The borders of what the Bureau calls "control areas," have been shifted. The present Paris Headquarters was originally designed for a region made up of Europe, the Middle East, South Asia and North Africa. Because the number of regional headquarters is being increased, Paris now will have under its jurisdiction Europe and Northwest Africa.

Ankara, Turkey will be the regional headquarters for the Middle East and Northeast Africa and South Asia.

Bangkok, Thailand will be headquarters for Southeast Asia. Tokyo will be headquarters for operations in Japan, Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, the Philippines and points north of Okinawa. Saigon, because of its emphasis on military channels, will continue to be an independent operation reporting directly to Washington.

Mr. Belk said negotiations are under way through the State Department to broaden the number of Bureau posts in Latin America. The Bureau has offices in Mexico City and Guadalajara. New offices have been opened at Hermosillo and Monterrey. An office in Panama is responsible for part of the northern and western coast regions of Latin America and an office in Buenos Aires covers the Eastern portions of the hemisphere. The Bureau hopes to open new offices in Caracas, Quito, Ascension, Lima and Rio de Janeiro.

Mr. Belk pointed out that the new offices "will greatly increase our ability to work with the Latin American countries on mutual problems."

South America is one of the world's largest cultivators of the coca leaf, from which cocaine is made. Peru grows the coca leaf legally for the production of medicinal cocaine but it is not legal in other countries.

Mr. Belk explained that heroin from Europe enters the United States by various routes. Some of it is shipped to smugglers along the East Coast of South America and moves by various routes via Panama and Mexico to the United States. It also moves from illicit laboratories in France to Canada, and thence to the United States. And, of course, some is smuggled directly through U.S. ports from Europe.

The Bureau has had Special Agents in Montreal for a number of years. Mr. Belk said the Bureau hopes to have more agents stationed in Toronto and in Vancouver, British Columbia.

He said the Bureau has a close and harmonious working relationship with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, a relationship which became officially closer when Canada joined a Franco-American Joint Working Group in November, 1970. The last meeting of the working group was in Ottawa and the next one is scheduled for Washington.

Concentration is on technical problems involved in the legalities and machinery of narcotics operations. Mr. Belk said cooperation is equally close with the French Central National Bureau, an arm of the Surete.

Similar close working relationships exist between the United States and Mexico, with the Attorney Generals of both countries credited with creation of the Mexican-American working group. Meetings are alternately held in Mexico City and Washington, with the next meeting in Washington in October.

Mr. Belk said that, while few problems exist in Africa of direct relation to the United States, the Bureau is planning to open an office in Rabat because of the flow of hashish, the strongest form of marihuana, from Morocco to the United States.

A long-term need, in Mr. Belk's view, is treaties with foreign nations to ease extradition for prosecution of third country nationals caught in illegal narcotics activity.

This step, together with others expected to involve the United Nations Commission on Narcotics, will help bring into being the framework of international controls sought by President Nixon—a framework the President believes will help all nations participating. □

NEW YORK TIMES
6 January 1973

What Other Countries Do

A severely punitive approach to addiction is not unknown in other parts of the world, where traffickers are occasionally shot.

Since 1969, Iran, which has an estimated total of 400,000 opium and heroin addicts, has been executing smugglers, who usually slip over the porous border with Afghanistan. About 150 smugglers, many of them simple Afghan tribesmen, have been executed in Iran.

Thailand, which has a long history of official involvement in the opium business, has on occasion executed traffickers. China has provisions for three-year to life sentences for drug dealers. Taiwan has a death penalty for trafficking, even in marijuana.

The classic instance of a law enforcement crackdown on a drug epidemic was the Japanese response to the widespread abuse of amphetamine and methamphetamine after World War II.

By 1954, when the use peaked, two million Japanese were estimated to be injecting amphetamines.

Under the Awakening Drug Control Law in Japan, mandatory prison sentences were meted out. Possession of the drugs drew an automatic three-month sentence; traffickers and underground manufacturers went to jail for as long as 10 years.

In 1954, 55,664 persons were arrested. In following years, the arrests declined, down to a low of 271 in 1958.

The tough enforcement approach was universally credited with breaking the back of the use of the drugs, although studies of it have emphasized the homogenous and disciplined nature of Japanese society, which generally supported the Government's efforts.

NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 10, 1973

World Survey Shows Newsmen Faced Growing Censorship Problems in 1972

By The Associated Press

In the last year foreign correspondents have faced growing censorship problems around the world, mostly through arrest or expulsion, the threat of expulsion or the denial of entry visas. They also encountered increasing refusal by officials to provide facts and were hampered by state control or censorship of the local press on which foreign reporters often depend for news tips and background information.

The Associated Press's annual survey of the flow of news across international boundaries shows that formal censorship as such—the government man reading dispatches moving into and out of a country—grew only slightly.

This is the way Associated Press correspondents overseas describe the current international censorship situation:

AFRICA

In September, 14 foreign reporters were arrested and jailed in Uganda during an invasion by foes of the Government of President Idi Amin. Never told why they were detained, they surmised it was because they would not accept uncritically the official pronouncements on the fighting. All eventually were released and deported. A form of heavy-handed censorship continues.

There is no official censorship in Nigeria, but fear of arrest and detention without trial inhibits press freedom in black Africa's most populous nation. Foreign correspondents are free to report and comment on Nigerian affairs without restriction, but face possible deportation if officials do not like what they see published.

Several other countries in western and southern Africa do not exercise advance censorship, but the threat of expulsion is widely used against foreign newsmen.

There is no formal censorship of incoming or outgoing news in South Africa, but residence permits for foreign newsmen are carefully controlled. The Government is understood to be prepared, however, to grant more visas for visits by newsmen from publications critical of the country's policy of racial segregation.

ASIA

The imposition of martial law in the Philippines resulted in the banning of reports from abroad that were critical of the country, temporary censorship of outgoing dispatches, the suspension of about 10 major Manila daily newspapers, 30 radio stations and four television stations and the arrest without charges of 23 journalists.

Censorship of outgoing dispatches was lifted Nov. 2, but correspondents were left with the new guidelines for mass media. These guidelines, among other things, forbade correspondents to write anything "which impugns, discredits, questions or criticizes any positive effort of the Government itself or any of its duly constituted authorities."

On the whole, foreign journalists were able to report events in South Vietnam pretty much as they saw them. There was a widely held view, however, that this situation might end with the final withdrawal of American troops.

The internal Vietnamese press was subject to a crackdown under a law granting special powers to President Nguyen Van Thieu for six months. He imposed financial requirements that put more than 50 newspapers out of business.

In South Korea, President Chung Hee Park imposed martial law, including strict press censorship, late in 1972. This censorship was lifted after two months, and Seoul authorities made almost no effort to censor outgoing dispatches formally.

EUROPE

In Spain, the foreign press was not subject to censorship of outgoing news, except by the threat of expulsion. But no permanent correspondent has been expelled in four years. Spanish news media, however, continued to be censored.

Dispatches of foreign correspondents were not censored in Greece, but the Government controlled Athens News Agency censored incoming news before distributing it. The agency deleted anything that might embarrass the Government.

Britain is freer of censorship than most countries, but a Government committee urged reforms of the Official Secrets Act that would have the effect of permitting more investigative reporting similar to that done in the United States. Though the British army is battling guerrillas in Northern Ireland, no attempt was made to impose censorship.

LATIN AMERICA-CARIBBEAN

News agencies and foreign correspondents in Chile were told that they would face unspecified difficulties unless they complied with a Government order to submit copies of their dispatches to the presidential press office. Chilean authorities also admitted to the monitoring of correspondents' copy.

Chilean courts stood as a protection against many of the moves taken against the media within the country. In two years in office, the administration of President Salvador Allende Gossens has sued opposition reporters more than 20 times under the catch-all law of security, but the courts turned down most of the cases.

While internal censorship remained strict under Brazil's military Government, foreign newsmen encountered little difficulty sending news out of the country. The lack of basic civil rights for Brazilians and internal censorship, however, made it difficult for correspondents to obtain information. Local newspapers, a basic source of information for foreign correspondents in Brazil, had to contend with Government censors in their newsrooms.

Argentina's ruling military junta formally restricted news coverage from Aug. 22, the day guards at the Trelew marine base jail shot and killed 16 leftist guerrillas who were said to be trying to escape. The decree prohibits publication of news or photos "attributed or attributable to illegal associations or persons or groups notoriously dedicated to subversive or terrorist activities."

In the Caribbean, Cuba continued to censor incoming and outgoing news dispatches. Western newsmen deemed unfriendly by Premier Fidel Castro's Government could not obtain entry visas. Entry was denied two Chilean newsmen assigned by The Associated Press to cover the Chilean President's visit to Cuba.

MIDDLE EAST

In Lebanon, a free-wheeling national press demanded—and usually got—a lot of freedom. But in September, the Lebanese Government imposed censorship during Israeli attacks made in retaliation for the Olympic killings in Munich.

Censorship does not officially exist in Egypt, but every foreign correspondent knows that a censor is the first person to read his story on its way out of the country. A major problem for foreign correspondents in Cairo is the lack of access to officials.

In Israel, news concerning military security, army, oil and some stories of the occupation of Arab territory remained on the military censorship list. But there were signs that the rules were being relaxed.

SOVIET UNION

No American newsmen were expelled from the Soviet Union in 1972, perhaps an indication of Government reluctance to disturb the process of improving Soviet-American relations. A British correspondent was expelled in May and a Japanese newsman was told in October to leave "voluntarily" or be expelled. He left.

News dispatches leaving the Soviet Union were not censored. Photographs, however, [illegible]

NEW YORK TIMES
1 January 1973

PRESS INSTITUTE IS CRITICAL OF U.S.

It Charges Courts Are Used to Chip Away at Freedom

Special to The New York Times

GENEVA, Dec. 31—The International Press Institute asserted today that the Nixon Administration was "attempting to chip away at press freedom through the courts and by the threats of court action."

In its annual world review of press freedom, the institute said that the Nixon Administration apparently intended to make the "journalist timid in research for the facts and the public nervous when confronted by a reporter asking for them."

Nevertheless, the study by the institute's French director, Ernest Meyer, found that in the United States the "foundation stone of freedom of speech and the press edifice that has been built on it remains almost unscathed."

The institute, a nongovernmental organization with headquarters in Zurich, is supported by 1,700 editors and publishers in 62 countries.

More Curbs Seen

Reviewing press developments over the last year, the institute said that the trend to restrict press freedom was stronger than in 1971. Barely one-fifth of the 132 members of the United Nations "enjoy what can genuinely be called freedom of information," it reported.

The survey also cited what it termed the "continuing efforts of governments to erode freedom of expression through intimidation of journalists and manipulation of mass media."

The aim, it said, is to "give the impression that the interests of the country are necessarily identical with those of the government in power."

But the "true danger," the review continued, "lies in the fact that a growing number of governments, parliamentary representatives, citizens and even some members of the press begin to accept that attacks on freedom of expression are legitimate and justifiable."

Marcos Assailed

The most serious attack on this freedom in the last year, according to the institute, was the "silencing of the most courageous and frank press in Asia, that of the Philippines."

Actions by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, following the establishment of quasi-martial rule in the Philippines, amounted to a "deliberate dismantling of the free mass media in his country," the survey said.

The review listed what it called the "notorious decision" of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Earl Caldwel, a New York Times reporter, among last year's "threats to the freedom of the press."

In the case the Supreme Court ruled that reporters did not have the right to withhold from Federal grand juries the sources of information given in confidence or to refuse to testify about criminal acts they had been told about under a pledge of secrecy.

The institute noted an increase in press complaints of government secrecy and evasion by Government officials in the United States. But it said that there was also a growing number of Government "secrets" being given to the press by anonymous official sources.

JAPAN TIMES
27 December 1972

Arab Narcotics Smuggling Claimed

TEL AVIV (AP) — An Israeli newspaper claimed Tuesday Arab guerrilla organizations were smuggling opium and other dangerous drugs for a Lebanese Cabinet Minister in exchange for political support.

The Jerusalem Post newspaper identified the Minister as Sabr. Hamadeh, Minister of Public Works and a strong supporter of the guerrillas in the Lebanese Government.

The Post said it received its information from an American writer, Ed Hymoff, who it said was researching the flow of drugs from the Middle East for an American senator.

The guerrillas smuggled opium, morphine base and hashish into Egypt and several European countries, the Post said.

Hymoff was said to have come to Israel indirectly from Beirut to continue his research. The Post said he was "known to have good connections" with the American intelligence agencies.

WASHINGTON POST
7 JANUARY 1973

Chalmers M. Roberts

Foreign Relations' Secrets: Less Revealing Than Enriching

PROBABLY the loudest complainers about executive branch secrecy, particularly in the area of foreign affairs, are members of the Senate who serve on the Foreign Relations Committee. Yet none have guarded more sedulously its own private documents than those same committee members. Now, at long last, a change is under way and consequently a bouquet is appropriate, a small one at least.

Some years back Chairman Fulbright, himself a one-time college president, began what he calls educational hearings by his committee which were largely the product of his frustration over executive branch policy on China and Indochina. Many figures of history past testified at these hearings and while much of what they said was useful historically much of it was more useful politically as a prod to the President of the day.

Fulbright and his committee, however, never opened their own files to the public though they were dipped into from time to time for useful clues for the hearings. Now, however, for the first time the committee is printing for public distribution some of its own closed-door hearings of years past. The first ones off the press cover the Truman Doctrine and the Greek-Turkish aid program of 1947. There are no startling revelations but the words then of Dean Acheson, James Forrestal, Robert Patterson, Vice Adm. Forrest Sherman and others and those of such senators as Arthur Vandenberg and Tom Connally will enrich the history of that crucial time.

THE BIGGEST skeptic on the committee about such publication has been the Senate's senior senator, George Aiken of Vermont who came to the Senate in 1941 but who did not become a committee member until 1954. He finally agreed to publication provided any living senator or ex-senator gave his approval. In the instant case that meant only former Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. State Department clearance, as well, was required.

It is Fulbright's hope to continue the publication of such hitherto secret testimony. But the committee lacks the funds to do the job adequately; for example, to publish testimony from earlier years. If Aiken will permit it, publication of testimony from later years will gradually occur. Hopefully, the full Senate will give the committee some more money to keep this highly useful venture alive and to expedite it.

It was, of course, the row over publication of the Pentagon Papers, and the attendant argument about over-classification of executive branch documents, that has sparked this Senate move. The same row also has helped speed, at least a bit, publication of the State Department's historical series of documents.

THE STATE SERIES began back in 1861 and, unbelievable as it now seems, the documents during the rest of the 19th century were published no later than two years after they were written, including a great many sensitive papers. The first World War slowed the process so that between the wars' publication was about 15 years from current. After World War II documents fell 20 and then 25 years behind. Currently State is about to issue the last of eight volumes covering the year 1947.

After the Pentagon Papers row President Nixon asked for and got more money to speed declassification and publication of State's series. William Franklin, State's chief historian, says that "we're desperately trying to gain on chronology" and he hopes by 1976 to be exactly 20 years behind, a five year gain.

Of course, State doesn't publish everything even from a quarter century ago. Some documents are omitted because they deal with persons still in power: the Shah of Iran, Chiang Kai-shek, Franco, Mao and Chou En-lai and some Latin leaders such as the Somoza family. But the bulk of the material does get published to the benefit of history. Since 1861 some 200 volumes have been printed.

FULBRIGHT'S COMMITTEE has published several studies on Indochina extracted chiefly from the Pentagon Papers. These well annotated staff studies relate the raw evidence of the Pentagon Papers to various memoirs and other published material to provide a well balanced perspective. One staffer, Robert M. Blum, has even succeeded in dredging up some interesting old OSS documents of 1945-46 which are being published for the first time.

Whether the committee will have the courage to permit publication of its own secret hearings dealing with Indochina in the Eisenhower-Kennedy-Johnson years is an open question. What seems to worry the reluctant senators is not whether publication would embarrass the various executive branch witnesses, who presumably were speaking with more candor in a closed rather than an open session. The worry is over how senators would look today in the light of current views and knowledge of the long American involvement. Whether, in short, some of them would look foolish.

From the public record it is obvious that some senators, both the departed and some still serving, indeed would not look very good. Fulbright has publicly recanted his earlier views and Sen. Mansfield has come close to doing so. But a claim of consistency is the more usual senatorial posture.

IT IS OBVIOUS to any student of history, whether he is dealing with Indochina or Europe or almost any other problem area, that the legislative-executive relationship plays an important role, sometimes a key role. The executive often bases its plans on what it thinks will be the nature of the congressional reception, first of all that by the Foreign Relations Committee. And of course party political considerations seldom are absent though equally seldom conceded to be present. In short the historical record is not complete unless this interplay is also made public, as far as it ever was put down by a committee stenographer.

Committee hearings often are confusing, usually disjointed, frequently repetitive and frustratingly incomplete because the wrong questions were asked or even when they were they were not followed by further questions. Still, they are a very important part of history. So we award that small bouquet to Foreign Relations in hopes of awarding a big one later on.

WASHINGTON STAR
7 January 1973

Chinese Drug Smugglers Tied to 'Dutch Connection'

FRANKFURT, Germany (AP) — Two U.S. congressmen said yesterday that Chinese sailors have established a "Dutch connection" at the ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam for smuggling most of the heroin peddled to U.S. servicemen stationed in West Germany.

Reps. Morgan Murphy, D-Ill., and Robert H. Steele, R-Conn., blamed the Dutch government for laxity in narcotic enforcement resulting in a "distinct increase in heroin availability and use among U.S. soldiers in West Germany." They said the heroin came from Hong Kong.

"We urgently need the cooperation of the Netherlands to stem the flow of heroin originating in Southeast Asia," Steele told a news conference. "We cannot afford to let another Vietnam drug situation develop among our troops in West Germany."

Steele and Murphy said drug use among U.S. soldiers in West Germany increased from about 1.3 percent of those tested in December 1971 to between 4.2 and 6.3 percent in October 1972.

They classified 6,000 to 8,000 of the 195,000 army troops in West Gerrmany as "users and abusers" of narcotics, including heroin,, amphetamines and barbituates.

Another 2,000 troops have been identified as drug users and are under treatment by Army authorities, said the congressmen, who are members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Steele and Murphy said they learned the extent of the Dutch connection in heroin smuggling during talks the last three days with the West German police and government and with officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Army's Criminal Investigation Division.

Didn't Visit Holland

Although the congressmen did not visit Holland, Murphy said American officials there told him a year ago that the country was becoming a major transit point in heroin smuggling following withdrawals of U.S. troops from Vietnam.

Steele and Murphy gave this picture of the Dutch connection: Peasants in the remote and hard-to-police border regions of Laos, Burma and Thailand — the so-called "golden triangle" — harvest poppy seeds under direction of "ethnic Chinese" warlords driven out of their country by the Communists.

The poppy seeds are sent to Hong Kong, where heroin is produced and smuggled aboard ships by Chinese seamen. Deliveries then are made throughout the world with the help of Chinese living overseas.

Increasing amounts of the Asian heroin is appearing in the West Coast of the United States following crackdowns on the Turkish and French supply routes. Heroin coming into Europe arrives "primarily through the ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, although some enters through the Scandinavian countries."

The represenetatives described the European heroin traffic as a natural transfer market from Vietnam to America's largest oveseas garrison of troops in West Germany—some 212,000 soldiers and airmen.

WASHINGTON POST
11 January 1973

A Soviet's Response on Russia's Space Technology

In a report from Moscow (Dec. 13) Robert G. Kaiser writes that "despite all its scientific achievements, the Soviet Union is a second or even a third-rate technological power." As proof, he gives examples from cosmonautics, aviation, automobile industry, computing techniques and even surgery. Not being so erudite and being a specialist only in one of the listed fields, namely in cosmonautics, I will take the liberty of dwelling on Mr. Kaiser's assertions concerned with this area.

The U.S. planned its first soft landing on Mars in 1976, that is, five years later than the U.S.S.R., and its first soft landing on Venus in 1977 or seven years after the U.S.S.R. What is more, an authoritative report of several research divisions of the U.S. Library of Congress (1971) says: "While American space efforts continue winding down . . . the overall Soviet space program remains a strong and growing enterprise." For Mr. Kaiser, this document is evidently not very authoritative.

As for manned flights which are in the main considered by Mr. Kaiser, 1971 saw the creation of the world's first manned orbital station Salyut that opened up a qualitatively new stage in cosmonautics. Does Mr. Kaiser really believe that the death of the cosmonauts upon their return in any way belittles its importance? After all, the death of American astronauts in 1967 did not call in question the Apollo program that is a generally recognized achievement of the U.S.A. The U.S.S.R.'s abandonment of manned flights to the moon cannot be considered, as Mr. Kaiser does, as evidence of its lagging behind. Soviet specialists think it more expedient to explore the moon by automatic devices, with the present level of world technology. Besides, manned flights to the moon involve tremendous expenses. That was precisely the reason why the Apollo program had to be stopped at the "most interesting place" when it began acquiring not only prestige and technical importance, but also great scientific value. As for the Soviet automatic devices, they will be steadily improved as they continue their planned studies of the moon, as is evidenced from the recent launching of a craft towards the moon last Monday.

Evidently in an attempt to wound Soviet scientists, Mr. Kaiser writes: "Soviet space scientists are delighted that they now have a chance to share America's success through the joint Soviet-U.S. space flight scheduled for 1975." Dr. James Fletcher, NASA director, has a different view. He thinks that the experiment is important for both countries. It will permit the U.S.A., among other things, to fill the gap in manned flights between 1973 and 1978, not to dismiss highly trained specialists and not to mothball the facilities. James Fletcher also believes it is possible to use a Soviet orbital station and is in principle for a joint Martian expedition. (His interview with UPI, Nov. 26, 1972.)

Thus, contrary to Mr. Kaiser, the NASA head considers it worthwhile for the U.S.A. to cooperate on an equal footing with a "third-rate technical power." Or maybe for Mr. Kaiser the opinion of Dr. Fletcher is also not authoritative enough?

I do not doubt that Mr. Kaiser is equally "competent" in the other fields of Soviet technology which he is so boldly discussing in his article.

YURY MARININ,
Science Commentator V (outer space), Novosti Press Agency.
Moscow.

WASHINGTON POST
14 JANUARY 1973

Chalmers M. Roberts

Arms Control: A Bad Time For Disarray

IT NOW HAS been nearly 17 years since President Eisenhower appointed Harold Stassen to the post of Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, with Cabinet status. In 1961 the job was institutionalized with congressional creation, at President Kennedy's request, of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. William C. Foster became head of ACDA and the chief negotiator, as well, on arms control measures. In 1969 President Nixon chose Gerard C. Smith to head ACDA and later to be the chief negotiator for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Now, as the second Nixon term begins, Smith has departed by his own choice and the President has tapped U. Alexis Johnson to be the negotiator. No one has been announced as Smith's successor to head ACDA, a quasi-independent agency housed and supported by the State Department but with its own congressionally approved budget.

It is evident, in retrospect, that all the major decisions in the arms control field since the initial Baruch Plan in 1946 have been presidential decisions, but it also is evident that presidential choices have been circumscribed by the quality and extent of the bureaucratic machinery which has examined the problems and possibilities and thus, through various layers of the government, served up the options. Stassen, Foster and Smith all were effective, or ineffective, to the degree that they could establish an independent input from an office or an agency that was beholden neither to the diplomatic views of State, the military views of Defense, or the views of the White House staff.

It is for such reasons as these that the appointment of Alex Johnson has done more than raise eyebrows among those in and out of government, who concern themselves with arms control, above all with the SALT II negotiations which resume in Geneva for a second session on Feb. 27. Johnson is widely viewed as a temporary appointment. He suffered a heart attack a while back and his doctors have warned him against excessive work. For that reason, it appears, he turned down a Nixon offer to succeed Ambassador Bunker in Saigon. The top career man at State, Johnson is now 64. He has had only minimal acquaintance with the complex arms control issues.

THE ISSUES at SALT II are going to be very tough to resolve. Henry Kissinger, the generalissimo of SALT I here in Washington, has had no time for the problem because of Indochina and now his own continuation in the White House is uncertain. By all accounts, then, the U.S. is in a holding pattern on arms control and this is likely to last for some time. President Nixon's separation of the two posts of ACDA head and top negotiator adds an additional uncertainty.

It was widely believed when SALT II began that there would be no pressure from either Washington or Moscow for speedy new agreements. The interim pact on offensive weapons runs for five years and most people felt that not until about the fourth year would negotiations become intensive. But from what is now learned about the first go-round of SALT II this may not be necessarily true; indeed, a major opportunity for a key new phase in arms control just might be present, if the U.S. is prepared to grasp it.

This is because at the recent Geneva talks, all behind closed doors, the Soviet delegation expressed an interest in the control of multiple warheads, MIRVs. This came as a surprise to Smith and his delegation but there is no doubt that Moscow did indicate such an interest. It is true, however, that the other anticipated problems, notably the Moscow demand for limits on the American forward based systems (FBS) in any new agreement, were put forward by the Soviet side. But the Soviet talk of MIRV control added a new dimension to the meetings. At this first session neither side laid down any formal proposals.

Quite obviously the Kremlin interest in MIRV control must spring from the enormous American lead in such warheads though the Soviets are ahead in numbers of missile launchers and in throw weight of warheads. It would take some very difficult trade-offs to reach any form of MIRV agreement, and monitoring of such an agreement, beyond monitoring a ban on further tests, would be equally hard to achieve. But if there is no agreement, multiple warheads will be a major element in both arsenals.

THUS IT APPEARS this is a very bad moment for the American arms control establishment to be in such a state of disarray as the Johnson appointment, and the Kissinger situation, indicate it to be. Only President Nixon can change this state of affairs, although the Senate disarmament subcommittee of Foreign Relations could do some prodding.

The opportunity to control MIRVs is judged, at best, to be a long shot. But so were many other opportunities in past years that finally reached fruition through the perseverance of such men as Stassen, Foster and Smith. The U.S. can do no less than try—and there is currently no sign it is ready to do that.

BALTIMORE SUN
10 January 1973

Our Energy Needs: What Can Be Done?

News releases from the Maritime Administration have been emphasizing what has been recognized generally for some time: The country's "demands for petroleum and natural gas will progressively exceed domestic production capabilities with each passing year," this under present conditions. The news releases then point to the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 and underscore the steps which have been taken under it to improve and expand that section of the U.S. flag fleet which transports "energy imports." Reference is made to oil tankers, very large crude carriers and ships to carry liquefied natural gas (which now carries the label LNG). The impression is given that the country's maritime interests, backed by the federal government, will provide the country's share of the ships needed to transport oil and LNG from abroad. All of which is reassuring but then in one news release this paragraph catches the eye:

"Energy imports have very great ramifications on the nation—in terms of our national security and the economy. There is an understandable concern about being heavily dependent upon foreign suppliers who could turn off the spigot in the event political disagreements arose between our two countries."

As immediately noted in the news release a presidential task force is examining all aspects of the country's energy deficits and considering various alternates to alleviate shortages.

But the problems here seem immeasurable. On this score a Maritime Administration news release reports that "even if substantial increases of domestic energy supplies are brought in over the next 10 or 15 years their impact will be blunted by the fact that domestic consumption will have doubled within that same time frame." Small wonder then that some claim that our only hope for a sufficient energy supply is the sun.

NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JANUARY 14, 1973

Drug Panel Concludes 6-Nation Latin Tour; Asks Stepped Up Drive

By MARVINE HOWE
Special to The New York Times

RIO DE JANEIRO, Jan. 13—The chairman of the United States National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse said here today that the war on drugs should be stepped up on three levels—education, rehabilitation and police action.

The chairman, Raymond P. Shafer, former Governor of Pennsylvania, made his remarks in response to questions on Governor Rockefeller's proposal for increased narcotics penalties in New York.

"I have not seen the original Rockefeller recommendations and so am not prepared to say whether mandatory sentences is the answer," Mr. Shafer told a news conference in a downtown hotel. "But I am in favor of increasing the war on drugs on all three levels."

Report Due March 23

Mr. Shafer cited Latin-American and particularly Brazilian cooperation "at the highest level" in the drive on narcotics. The commission also visited Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador and talked here yesterday with a drug expert from Argentina.

The commission, which concluded today a tour of six Latin-American countries, will deliver its final report on the world drug scene to President Nixon and Congress on March 23, Mr. Shafer said. Members of the commission visited 36 nations, Brazil being the last on the list—to study the control, misuse and abuse of drugs.

A major gap in the report will be first-hand information from the Communist countries. The commission did not visit the Soviet Union, China or any other Communist country because it had been given to understand informally that it would not be welcome.

"Officially, the Soviet Union says it has no drug problem, but unofficially our sources say they do have a problem," Mr. Shafer said, adding, "I would assume they have the same problem as all of us."

The new report will maintain the same general premises as did the report in March, 1972, in which the commission recommended that a distinction be made between the private use of drugs and drug traffic, Mr. Shafer said.

"There should be a new policy in the United States to discourage the use of drugs and punish the traffickers, the mercenaries who are profiting from the situation," he said.

The commission visited South Vietnam in June and noted "a marked change for the better" in the attitude of United States military there over the last two years, Mr. Shafer said.

"At one time, the use of drugs caused dishonorable discharge; now, drugs users are treated as people who need help and are given help," he said.

All the nations of Latin America are awakening to the fact that drug control is a new national problem and want help in handling it, he said. He added that some countries, however, were unable to cooperate in the effort because their internal structures were not yet set up for the task.

He said that Latin America was important both as a drug smuggling route and a source of drugs. Organized traffickers from France and the Middle East have used Brazil as a transshipment area and are probably still trying to do so, he said. He could not confirm reports that there was a new Latin-American connection from Asia but did not exclude that possibility.

"About 90 per cent of the world's cocaine comes from the Andes Mountains—Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador—where it is legally grown, and there is nothing we can do about it—except crop substitution in the long run" Mr. Shafer said. He said that the United States imported coca from those countries for cola drinks, and that the local Indians ate coca leaves to help them to withstand the altitude, cold and hunger.

Mr. Shafer concluded, "There has definitely been an increase in the use of cocaine—the worst of all drugs—but the use of marijuana is leveling off and probably going down."

NEW YORK TIMES
10 January 1973

Sovereignty in the Skies

By Karl Loewenstein

AMHERST, Mass.—Domestic and international efforts to prevent air piracy deal with the *fait accompli* rather than with the crime in progress. So far the vast majority of hijackings have succeeded because the demands of the air pirates were not resisted, whether for ransom money, safe conduct to a willing foreign country or even the release of duly convicted compatriots. In the face of the near-ritualistic threat to blow up the airplane, humanitarian motivations to save the lives of innocent passengers and crews are given priority.

I submit that something more important than even human life is at stake. To put it bluntly: if a few armed terrorists can defy the might of the state in which the piracy is being committed, the state and its authorities forfeit their sovereignty, that priceless possession with which civilization as we know it stands and falls.

The only effective answer to this deadly threat to human civilization is to fight fire with fire: Instead of honoring the Sermon on the Mount the society under attack must become militant, and this even at the risk of endangering the lives of innocent bystanders or the loss of airline property (that is insured, anyway).

Are we totally incapable of learning from history? Once before the United States had to face humiliation by Arab terrorists. For more than thirty years, from the Continental Congress to the aftermath of the war of 1812, the rascally potentates of the Barbary States—Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli—had preyed on American merchant shipping in the Mediterranean with impunity. There was no protecting navy. They forced our Goverment to pay annual tribute, called "presents," and to ransom captured Americans.

Neither our threat to declare war nor naval demonstrations proved effective until a naval expedition under Commodore Decatur enforced peace without tribute or ransom.

To resist blackmail by force seems a tremendously hard decision for all conterned. However, experience shows that in reality the dilemma is considerably lessened. A terrorist who demands ransom money and safe conduct abroad is hardly ever prepared to die himself by blowing up the plane. He wants to live and enjoy the loot. Hence the ground rules are: No ransom must be paid. The victimized plane must not be flown abroad.

Far more difficult to deal with are the piracies staged by the Arab terrorists and foreign associates, such as the Japanese kamikaze, who are prepared and willing to die for their cause. But even in such case their demands must be denied, particularly if aimed at the release of convicted criminals of their own stripe. Since no self-respecting state can be expected to bend its neck to foreign blackmail, the humanitarian considerations must be subordinated to the higher end of the self-preservation of state and society.

Karl Loewenstein is Professor Emeritus of Jurisprudence at Amherst College.

SAIGON POST
1 December 1972

Conduit For Drugs

'Bridge Of Living Death'

There is nothing impressive about the bridge. It is what it represents that demands attention-this two-lane bridge which joinsthe border of Thailand and Burma at Mae Sai district and Tachilek.

It is called the Mae Nok bridge. «They Bridge of Living Death» would be a more appropriate name. For through this bridge Opium, heroin and morphine are transported from the notorious «Golden Triangle» through Thailand to the underground markets of Indochina, Hong Kong, Europe and America.

As the cargo of death on the shoulders of dozens of coolies makes its way to trucks parked nearby, a thirtyish, dapper man watches with seeming curiosity or unobstrusive innocence.

«Ah, Lo Hsing-han carries more opium today,» whisper men in a stupor as they sit and look across the bank of the river on the Burmese side. There is gladness, almost reverence, in the toices of these heroin addicts who speak of the man with the air of innocence.

The others keep inhaling heroin, awaiting flight of the mind to the realm of fantasy. They do not know Lo Hsing-han nor his brother, Lo Hsing-min, heroin «kings» of the Golden Triangle, the tri-border area straddling Thailand, Laos and Burma.

A silent witness to the Lo brothers' shipment of destruction is a boy not quite 10 years old. Near the bridge on the Burmese side he sits in the shade with grownup addicts after puffing at heroin cigarettes.

One looks at this boy floating in a heady, giddy world of dreams and wonders how long it will take him to waste away in body and mind.

One also wonders how many more like him are doomed to painful, meaningless existence and eventual death wherever the Lo brothers' demonic drugs find their way.

NEW YORK TIMES
14 January 1973

Soviets on Disarmament

To the Editor:

N. Loginov of the Soviet Mission to the U.N. criticized (letter Jan. 7) your editorial for omitting "for some reason or other one of the key items on the Assembly's agenda."

Mr. Loginov claims that this item—"nonuse of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons"—was adopted as a result of "vigorous and constructive discussion." This item, and the two weeks of discussion in November, was, in the words of Dutch Ambassador Fack, "a nonstarter."

In the first four meetings (of eight), only eleven states talked, and of these six were socialist. Whole meetings were canceled for lack of speakers. When a revised resolution was adopted, the vote was 73 to 4, with 46 abstentions. This divided vote scarcely fulfills Ambassador Malik's prediction that the adoption of this resolution will enable the 27th session to "go down in history as the Assembly that liberated mankind from the threat of nuclear war."

Of the five nuclear powers, only the Soviet Union voted in favor of the resolution, with China voting against and France, the U.K., and the U.S. abstaining. Some of the nuclear powers might be expected to resist giving up use of their expensive nuclear armory, but two states which have led U.N. disarmament efforts—Sweden and Mexico—also abstained.

It is a tragedy that, 27 years into the atomic era, the use of nuclear weapons still is not prohibited by international law. However, there appears no easy route to this process and negotiations must include all nuclear powers. An expanded Geneva Disarmament Conference would seem the best forum. Two weeks of debate in a General Assembly cannot perform this task, for closely associated with banning the use of nuclear weapons is a ban on their development, production and stockpiling and the destruction of existing stockpiles. A second forum might be current efforts to draft additional protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions which would prohibit the use of certain weapons.

The Soviet Union has taken important initiatives for disarmament in the past. This item was not one, since it served no purpose except to isolate China on this issue, with the latter voting against the resolution with such strange bedfellows as Portugal and South Africa. This item caused the Chinese at the end of the debate to accuse the Russians of having "honey on lips and dagger in heart," passing "fish eyes for pearls." After stimulating this rhetoric, this resolution is hardly, as Mr. Loginov suggests, "a significant contribution of the U.N. to the cause of further détente."

HOMER A. JACK
Secretary General
World Conference of
Religion for Peace
New York, Jan. 8, 1973

Far East

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London
7 January 1973

One man's long war

by Denis Warner

On the eve of the new peace talks, due to begin in Paris tomorrow, a correspondent with unique experience of Vietnam looks at the truth to be distilled from almost 25 years of reporting the war there. The record, he finds, emphasises for him a fundamental aspect of the savage tragedy: Vietnam's future rests finally in Vietnamese hands.

MY Vietnam War notebooks date back to 1949. Piled in boxes in my study, they are filled, like the forgotten diaries of childhood, with faint and sometimes unintelligible writing but also with the tinder to fire old memories.

I have been going through them, trying to find some scene or incident that might in itself illuminate the past and help to explain the present. Friends dimly remembered have stepped from the pages, along with many of the events, credible and incredible, that went to make the war.

"I hope so," I have General Henri Navarre saying in 1954 on the eve of the battle of Dien Bien Phu in answer to my question whether he thought the Viet Minh would attack. And at the other end of the scale, the chilling remark of a young Viet Minh soldier whose name I asked the day the Communists took over in Hanoi. "Sir," he replied, "I have no name. I am a soldier in the People's Liberation Army."

That was a day to remember. No one who was there is ever likely to forget it. The victors came in their sandshoes, trudging through the mud with their ammunition slung on bamboo poles, their signals wire on tricycles, their dispatch riders on pushbikes. The vanquished went in tanks and armoured cars and half-tracks and trucks, trailing their howitzers and other weapons of conventional war, humiliated and beaten by an enemy they never really did understand.

The coup that overthrew Diem. . . . Tet, 1968, and the awful scene I saw with Sir Robert Thompson and Michael Charlton when, after the curfew had closed us in, we watched a policeman drive a naked and hysterical infant from the steps of the National Assembly building with a lighted newspaper. . . . Bad operations with ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) . . . . Good operations with ARVN. . . . Days of compassion among the refugees with that best of men, Dr. Phan Quang Dan. . . . Stories late at night from defectors. . . .

There is no end to it, but nothing, I find, so relevant to much of what has happened since, than the first action I saw with the French in the Red River delta in the spring of 1952. On too many occasions it was repeated in South Vietnam, and every time it helped the Viet Cong to find recruits among the peasants.

The death of General de Lattre de Tassigny had brought General Raoul Salan, a veteran of too many years in Indo-China, to command the French forces. His Tongking subordinate was General Gonzales de Linares, who had established his field headquarters in the southern delta for an operation designed to throw the Viet Minh infiltrators into the sea.

For the task de Linares had five mobile groups, each a baby division of about regimental strength, with ancillary armour and artillery. The axis of the advance was along a road headed east to the coast from the town of Thai Binh, where battered mud-and-plaster houses, roughly thatched with rice straw, clustered around an immense, barn-like, Roman Catholic church.

The artillery was sited within a stone's throw of de Linares's headquarters, and at all hours of the night and day it pumped shells into the rice-fields and villages ahead. The advance itself was painfully slow. Where the Viet Minh had not cut the road into sections and dumped it far off among the rice-fields, they had split it with trenches. Troops could make their way along it with some difficulty, but it was impassable even for the most agile of jeeps, and unrepairable since quarries were non-existent in the flat rice-plains of the delta and the Viet Minh held the hills beyond.

The French crept forward, using the debris of villages knocked down in the advance and steel matting to make a new road alongside the old. In the course of one morning they demolished a complete village, loaded it into lorries and rolled everything from kitchen utensils to iron bedsteads into the mud to make a path for the tanks and armoured cars.

Every now and then from the rice-fields a single shot hissed among the troops. Young lieutenants from St. Cyr with their map cases and binoculars and badges of rank were the snipers' primary target. Occasionally a spotter plane saw movement in a village ahead, and fighter-bombers and artillery would begin work again, perhaps killing a few Viet Minh but doing nothing to win friends among the local people, who in this area were almost all Roman Catholics.

The relief of a French fort ten miles east of Thai Binh added its own chapter to the story of delta despair. It was one of hundreds of forts, differing in no essential detail from all the others, which stretched like pylons across the delta. From its brick tower the lookout could see his neighbouring forts, the one behind and the one in front, and what remained of the road that linked the two. Beyond these were others and others again.

The fort was commanded by a young French officer who had completed his two-year tour of duty in Indo-China and was overdue to sail for France. Under him he had French and Vietnamese sergeants and corporals, and a total garrison strength, mostly Vietnamese, of 35.

All around him the Viet Minh dribbled in. His daytime patrols, linking up with those from neighbouring forts, were fired on by snipers, then by regular formations of Viet Minh troops. At first the Viet Minh had just a few guerrillas. Then they had sections, platoons, companies, battalions and finally regiments. They brought bazookas and some 75-millimetre mountain guns. They wanted rice, recruits, salt and the machines and consumer goods that the French had to provide to maintain the economic life of the delta. But above all they wanted to establish bases in the enemy's rear and to extend their political grasp.

The fort commander knew it would be something of a miracle if he ever left alive. The telephone lines with his neighbouring forts were cut. He could no longer travel by road to Thai Binh. For a time he maintained communication with his neighbours by radio, but that also ceased to function. A fort close to the east coast was the first to fall. The Viet Minh crept through the ring at night and blasted its tower with

a bazooka. The walls crumbled and collapsed. With sub-machine-guns and grenades, the Viet Minh followed up.

Next morning the red flag of the Viet Minh replaced the Tricolour.

A week later another, nearer fort fell. This time the Viet Minh used one of their mountain guns. They wheeled it into position in the adjoining hamlet and, over open sights and at almost zero range, blew a hole in the fort through which the assault party forced its way. One by one the other forts fell until only this one remained, an island in a hostile sea, a lonely outpost with zero life expectancy.

Each night Viet Minh closed in

The attack opened from a village eight hundred yards to the south. Machine-guns raked the fort and drew heavy fire in return. The commander thought his fort was well designed, but it was no better, if no worse, than others whose fate he had seen marked by smouldering piles of rubble.

It stood on an island in a narrow stream, joined to the banks by two bridges heavily protected by booms and blocks. The rushing waters served as a moat. On both banks and on the island itself were rows of barbed wire festooned with tin cans to give warning of the intruder's approach. The tower was vulnerable. Its bricks were not stout enough to withstand artillery or bazooka fire. But the thick bunkers underneath were well provided with ammunition and food. Each dawn the Tricolour waved defiantly from the tower. Each night the Viet Minh came closer. They fired at any sign of movement, chipping the walls of the fort with their bullets. The climax could not be long delayed.

But in March, 1952, the big French military convoys began to move towards Thai Binh. The Viet Minh mined the main road, sniped at the forces moving by day and kept them off the road altogether at night.

Operation Mercury pushed off from Thai Binh in the last week of March: 16 infantry battalions with tank, artillery and air support, moving in a great semi-circle extending from the swollen Red River to the coast. On its main axis of advance was the fort, its Tricolour still flying.

The French relieved the fort on the third day of the advance. The bearded commander, with bloodshot eyes, rushed to kiss the advancing infantry captain on both cheeks. Everybody shook hands with everybody, congratulations, tears, stories, smiles. "I had a boat to catch in January," the commander kept saying. "I am very late."

He left next morning and his place was taken by another young lieutenant. "We shall pull down the tower and put more concrete, much more concrete, round the sides," he told me. "We have cleared the delta before, you know. Perhaps we shall have to do it again."

But the delta was never cleared, and by October of that year French reverses here and elsewhere had so changed the military and political situation in Indo-China that the shadow of defeat was everywhere. I cabled *The Daily Telegraph*: "Neither the French people nor their Government will tolerate for ever such losses as are now being suffered in a war which holds out no promise of victory and no prospect of reward."

I had no idea that I would be writing very much the same lines 15 years later of a much greater power, the United States.

At the beginning in 1946, when the French bombarded Haiphong and Ho Chi Minh took to the hills, the Americans were ambivalent towards the war. Secretary of State George C. Marshall had scant regard for what he regarded as France's "dangerously outmoded colonial concepts." At the same time, he was not interested in "seeing colonial empire administrations replaced by a philosophy and political organisation directed from and controlled by the Kremlin."

I doubt that anyone born after the year 1940 will ever really understand the Indo-China War or the Vietnam War, or why the Americans moved in when the French retired in defeat. It is not easy to explain in this era of disillusion and *détente* that the generation which fought and prevailed in the Second World War against the Nazi tyranny had no intention of surrendering to the tyranny of the paranoid Stalin. Indeed, because of the rewriting of history that is now going on in America, things have reached the ridiculous stage where Marshall and Truman and Acheson are blamed for the Cold War.

This is, of course, preposterous rubbish. No Tsarist leader could have been more demanding, or more imperialistic, than Stalin at Yalta. He wanted the railways and the window to the east at Port Arthur and Dalny that had so blinded the vision of Nicholas II. He clamped down the iron curtain along the 38th parallel in Korea. Two years later a Russian sponsored conference in Calcutta decided that the indigenous Communist parties of South and South-East Asia should attempt to seize power by armed uprisings. They tried in countries that were still colonised and in those that had won their independence as well.

China was already aflame when Ho Chi Minh launched his campaign against the French. There were revolts in Burma, in India, in the Philippines, in Indonesia and, of course, in Malaya. Then came the direct challenge in Korea. This was the era of the Communist utopia and a Communist monolith seemed as attractive to the true believers as it was terrifying to its foes. China believed in Stalin's Russia. Ho Chi Minh was allied to both. Against its wishes, but to protect what it regarded as its vital interests, the United States became involved, but not before it had refused French requests for American planes and ships to transport troops to Indo-China.

In the final 18 months of the Indo-China War, however, when the need for Communist containment seemed more urgently necessary than the disbandment of colonial empires, the United States delivered two million tons of war material to the French at a cost of more than 1,000 million dollars, and came perilously close to intervening when the entrenched camp at Dien Bien Phu was seen to be on the point of collapse. Thereafter, its aid to whichever Government promised to hold the line in South Vietnam was inevitable, and, in the context of the times, desirable and necessary.

I find it difficult even with hindsight to decide whether the United States was well or ill served by President Ngo Dinh Diem, around whom American hopes centred for nine years. In many ways Diem did perform miracles in the South, but that period of quiet that lasted from 1954 until the end of 1959 was not just his doing, but conscious decision on the part of Hanoi. The second Indo-China War when it began showed only the tip of the iceberg. Unseen was the vast programme of political preparation that had taken place in both the Laotian and South Vietnamese countryside, the organisation of the cadre system and all the rest of the detailed and careful planning that Ho Chi Minh always insisted on.

Diem was dedicated, selfless and hard-working. No one, certainly not the Americans, understood the nature of the Viet Cong political tactics better than he. Yet he was so narrow, so pessimistic, so deeply suspicious of men of goodwill that he surrounded himself with his abominable family, who were driven on by the madness that led in August, 1963, to the attack on the Buddhist pagodas. A deep personal regret of this period is that I knew long in advance of the detailed planning for the attacks, but because of the bland denials of Ngo Dinh Nhu, Diem's brother, I could persuade no one in the official American community to pay any attention.

Some of the things that happened in those days would not be credible in fiction. I arrived back in Saigon after a brief absence to find that the first draft page of a long article I had written in the home of a senior American official with whom I was staying had been photocopied and found in thousands in the Xa Loi pagoda, and reproduced in the *Times* of Vietnam as evidence of a foreign conspiracy against Diem. It had been "borrowed," we learned later, by my friend's servants, who were running a Buddhist printing press in one of his spare rooms.

That Vietnam was headed for disaster at this time was apparent. Nothing could have stopped a coup or a counter coup. But the American involvment, one would have expected, would have taken note of what might happen after Diem and brother Nhu were removed from the scene. This omission must go down as one of the major blunders of the war. It was not a case of the king is dead, long live the king. The king was dead—and there was no other.

With the whole apparatus of government in ruins, it was no cause for surprise that the situation fell to bits in 1964, or that by the beginning of 1965 the war was all but lost. The Americans either had to opt out or to opt in. They opted in—and promptly committed two more major blunders.

The Kennedy confrontation with Cuba had convinced many senior officials in the State Department and the Pentagon that Vietnam could be handled to the Cuba formula. "If we can show without an ounce of bluff that Vietnam is as important to us as Cuba and that we are prepared to risk a major war in its defence, then we shall succeed," I was told by U. Alexis Johnson, who had gone to Saigon with Henry Cabot Lodge as deputy ambassador.

But the trouble was that Vietnam was not Cuba. What Washington hoped would appear as a full hand proved to be a pair of twos. It was prepared to abandon all restraint to prevent Cuba from becoming a Russian missile base. To the end it was restrained in Vietnam. Cuba was vital: Vietnam was not.

But in trying to bluff Hanoi, the United States succeeded in bluffing itself, and this led to the second of the major blunders to which I have re-

ferred—the conviction that prevailed until the Tet offensive in 1968 that the United States could shoulder aside the Vietnamese and successfully take on the war by itself. The idea that it might not be successful was an almost treasonable notion to the U.S. Army in those days.

Yet, after the sudden shock caused by the massive American intrusion of forces, Hanoi showed remarkable confidence in the outcome. Pham Van Dong, the North Vietnamese Prime Minister, in a talk with a Japanese newspaper editor in April, 1967, said he believed the Americans would lose because they had failed to achieve their two main objectives: the destruction of the National Liberation Front, and the expansion of the pacified areas in South Vietnam.

As Hanoi saw it, Saigon had failed to achieve the strong rear that General Vo Nguyen Giap always regarded as the decisive factor in a revolutionary war. Other things were going for them, the North Vietnamese reckoned: better and more experienced leadership and training for this type of war; the advantages of fighting on one's own terrain among one's own people; morale; the too rapid rotation of U.S. forces and their lack of familiarity with local and tropical conditions; political and other problems encountered by the Americans in pouring large numbers of troops into Vietnam; the strain on the U.S. economy in supplying forces fighting thousands of miles from the home base; and the excessive proportion of rear-line American troops.

General Nguyen Chi Thanh, who commanded the Communist forces in the field until his death in 1967, set out to force the Americans to split and scatter their forces and to fight in areas where there was no clear-cut line and no targets. He hoped to prevent them from bringing their full combat efficiency into operation and to deny them the opportunity to gain strategic advantage. By the tactic of hitting the Americans in many places while keeping sufficient forces in reserve to mass heavy fighting power in key areas, by concentrating and dispersing quickly, by fighting big battles or combining big battles with small battles, and by avoiding at all cost the normal set-piece action, he believed that victory could be denied to the United States, however large the force it committed, until at last it tired of the war.

Then came the Tet offensive. It shattered the indigenous Viet Cong forces and their vital cadre system in the hamlets, caused fearful casualties among the North Vietnamese ranks, and dismayed Hanoi when the general uprising failed to materialise. But it also had the much-sought-after effect of causing the war-weary Americans to demand an end.

Everything that happened thereafter—the declaration of personal surrender by President Johnson, the protracted halt in the bombing, the Paris talks, the Guam Doctrine, Vietnamisation, and all the rest—represented the signal lowering of American sights, the abandonment of American hopes of winning a military victory and of reinstating South Vietnam as a "pearl in the crown of the free world," to borrow one of the lyrical descriptions of the official American propagandists in the late 1950s.

Despite all these unfortunate consequences, however, Tet put the emphasis where it should have been all the time—on the Vietnamese people. If they could not win the war themselves the United States was no longer willing to try to do it for them.

Without American air support and the blockade of the North Vietnamese ports, it is improbable that the South could have held the Northern *blitzkreig* that Giap launched with his Easter offensive in 1972. After a poor beginning, ARVN, and especially the élite marines, paratroopers and Rangers, fought extremely well.

Whether it could do well enough to hold South Vietnam without American fire-power we may know only if a ceasefire eventually collapses, and a third Indo-China war emerges from the second as the second emerged from the first. Certainly, nothing has yet been decided. There will be no decision until one side or the other is in undisputed control of Saigon.

Whether the war has held the line long enough for the rest of South-East Asia to put its fences in order also remains to be shown. "If we all gear in with each other, we may get something akin to what has happened in Western Europe with the Marshall Plan," Lee Kuan Yew said to me in Singapore in 1967. "Finally, you got there a Western Europe that was so independent, as represented by de Gaulle, that it could do without the Americans. While we can't hope at this stage to create that kind of non-Communist Asia, that must be the direction in which we have to go."

That is the direction South-East Asia has been going. In assessing future prospects, changing times must also be taken into account. The Vietnam War began when Russian and Chinese relations were close and cordial. It ends—if the peace talks are successful—with 44 Russian divisions on China's northern borders—and demonstrably they are not there because of mutual trust and friendship.

Obliged to choose between a non-Communist South-East Asia and continued tensions that the Russians would certainly attempt to exploit there, Peking may be disposed to forget its evangelical mission to help create new wars of national liberation. If, hopefully, this is the case, the Vietnam War will not have been without positive value for those who have lived so long in its shadow.

WASHINGTON POST
16 JANUARY 1973

• A leading member of Amnesty International's Korean section, the Rev. On Myung-ki, has been arrested by South Korean authorities, Amnesty International announced in London.

NEW YORK TIMES
14 January 1973

Vietnam

Quest for Peace

A World Waits— In Hope And Fear

Henry A. Kissinger, arriving in Paris aboard a special Air Force plane, said: "President Nixon has sent me back to make one more major effort to conclude the negotiations."

Le Duc Tho, arriving from Hanoi by way of Peking and Moscow, said: "The decisive moment has come either to sign the agreed-upon accord or to continue the war."

Once again the White House adviser and the Communist revolutionary plunged last week into the intricacies of the draft agreement that seemed last October to offer the United States a way out of Vietnam. This time there was a sense that their new round of meetings would either rescue the accord and bring it to fruition or lead to a final collapse.

As the talks, begun Monday, wore on, the North Vietnamese Communist party newspaper Nhan Dan reported "bad signs" of American intransigence. But there was no real news, and few clues, as to what really was going on behind the closed doors in Paris.

Yesterday evening Mr. Kissinger flew back to report to President Nixon at the Florida White House at Key Biscayne, amid indications that the talks had made at least some progress. From Washington; Bernard Gwertzman of The New York Times supplied the following assessment:

'That's His Message'

One Republican Senator who attended a White House breakfast meeting on the eve of the new round of talks in Paris was impressed by Mr. Nixon's determination not to be deterred by Congressional or public criticism in his pursuit of what he called "the proper kind of settlement." "The President obviously sees himself thrust into a critical moment in history," the Senator said. "He believes he is doing the right thing and believes that history will bear him out. That was his message as I saw it."

Many thought, in fact, that the situation was producing for Mr. Nixon another of the personal crises that have been a feature of his political life. Nothing would please him more than to surprise the world once again—this time with a Vietnam settlement on the eve of his inauguration. Not only would such an announcement clear the capital's streets of the war protesters who are gathering their forces for Jan. 20, but it would purge the atmosphere of the poison that has reappeared on the political scene.

Text of Mr. Kissinger's return from Paris

yesterday mean that Mr. Nixon would be able to offer some welcome news on the eve of his inauguration? No hard information was yet available, but Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, clearly intended to leave an optimistic impression when he told newsmen early yesterday morning that the negotiations in Paris had been "serious."

In the White House jargon, "serious" has taken on a meaning of its own. It has been used to signify progress. When the White House has wanted to signify the opposite, it has charged Hanoi with a lack of "seriousness" at the negotiating table. Moreover, the Administration has said the bombing raids north of the 20th parallel would remain suspended as long as the negotiations were conducted in a "serious" manner.

Mr. Kissinger, talking briefly with reporters at Orly airport before boarding his plane, said he had had "very extensive and very useful negotiations" with Mr. Tho. Hanoi's special envoy will remain in Paris, Mr. Kissinger said, and the two will keep in touch through diplomatic channels. The North Vietnamese delegation issued a brief statement of its own, saying the secret talks "have made progress."

Mr. Kissinger's remarks implied that the final decision was now President Nixon's. He said he will meet with Mr. Nixon, and "the President will then decide what steps should be taken to speed a peace of justice and conciliation."

What are the issues Mr. Nixon deems crucial to that kind of accord?

Mr. Nixon, at the breakfast meeting, named three: the release of American prisoners, an effective cease-fire and the right of all South Vietnamese to decide their own future. These points have been at the heart of the negotiating process ever since it began.

PRISONERS — On what terms should the American prisoners be returned? In return for the withdrawal of the remaining American forces, as specified in the nine-point October accord, or in return for the release of all military and political prisoners held by the Saigon Government, as suggested subsequently by the North Vietnamese?

CEASE-FIRE — Should the cease-fire be limited to the two Vietnams, as stated in the October accord, or broadened, as sought now by the United States, to include Laos and Cambodia? Should the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam be re-established, as urged by Washington, even though Hanoi does not want to recognize a permanent division of the country? What kind of international supervision? The 5,000-man force wanted by Washington or the small 250-man team proposed by Hanoi?

SOUTH VIETMAN—No question has proven more difficult to solve than this one. What should be the scope of the Council for National Reconciliation provided for by the October accord? Should the agreement recognize the Vietcong's claims to being a government in South Vietnam, or recognize only the Saigon Government, or both, or none? What about North Vietnam's troops in South Vietnam? Should they have legal status?

In Paris, observers could find little to go on about just where matters stood. After six days of talks, Flora Lewis of The New York Times had this to say:

'Squaring the Circle'

Still the negotiators raced across Paris behind their motorcycle escorts to and from their alternating meeting places. Still the bombers dropped their loads on North Vietnam below the 20th parallel and Hanoi kept strengthening its air defenses for the day when, perhaps, that line will again be breached. Still officials spoke anonymously about the current "sticking point" which, with a little more effort, might soon be hurdled with a compromise that would bring peace.

It was a repetition, in many respects, of October and November and December, when the same people had expressed the same hope for a cease-fire—by Election Day, they thought at first, then by Thanksgiving, then by Christmas, then before the opening of the new Congress. And the "sticking point" has shifted from the presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South to the Saigon Government's sovereignty over all South Vietnam to the precise definition of the demilitarized zone that cuts Vietnam in two.

These are different ways of defining the same issue — whether the peace accord is to divide the Vietnamese nation into two states with conflicting social systems or whether it is to permit the South to be moved gradually into Hanoi's orbit and eventually absorbed. That is the political issue over which the war has been fought from the beginning.

The permanent delegates of the three Vietnamese delegations—Hanoi, the Provisional Revolutionary Government (Vietcong) and Saigon—set aside all the lesser questions at the public meetings that continued last week parallel to the secret Kissinger-Tho talks. All three delegations restated the central political issue—firmly, to make clear that their positions had not changed. Only the American delegate urged "moderation" in language.

Therein, experienced diplomatic observers believe, has been the negotiating problem. Mr. Kissinger has been seeking language that would permit the United States to get out of the war without appearing to have fought in vain and to have abandoned its ally —language that each side can interpret to its own satisfaction. He needs Saigon's assent to get the kind of neatly packaged settlement he wants from Hanoi. He needs concessions from Hanoi to get Saigon's assent.

The October draft satisfied Hanoi because it undermined Saigon's goal of an independent, insulated, anti-Communist South Vietnam. The negotiations since then have been an attempt to win equal satisfaction for Saigon. The formula for squaring the circle has been the tough job confronting the Paris negotiators.

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If President Nixon does reach an agreement with Hanoi, he will doubtless try to obtain Saigon's acceptance of its terms, in line with his promise not to "impose" a settlement on the South Vietnamese ally. And from Saigon yesterday Craig R. Whitney of The New York Times reported on a certain shift of attitude:

President Nguyen Van Thieu has concluded that he has won the most he could hope to get in the way of concessions from the Americans—and, even more important, that he won three months' breathing space by stalling on the draft accord of last October. That is the word now among Government officials close to the Presidential Palace.

Mr. Thieu, according to these men, is now confident enough of the American bargaining position to expect that any final agreement will include guarantees of a relatively leak-free demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam and a strong international force to supervise the cease-fire and keep an eye on the 145,000 North Vietnamese troops scattered about the South.

That, and a statement of some kind about the legitimacy of the Saigon Government below the 17th parallel, will probaby make it easier for him to accept an agreement that does not call for the withdrawal of the Communist troops. The best estimate here is that he will not raise new objections if Mr. Kissinger obtains that kind of agreement from Hanoi.

Acceptance of Saigon as the legitimate government of the South, however, looks from here like a confession of defeat by the North Vietnamese, and few realists believe the Communists have been defeated. There's the catch: Is a formula possible that will satisfy both sides? Mr. Thieu's aides apparently are dubious.

What it boils down to is that President Thieu now feels the Americans are not going to compromise his position as drastically as they would have if the October agreement had been signed. So he's resigned to a cease-fire —if the Americans can get it.

The Government, at any rate, is preparing either for success or failure of the Paris talks.

If there is no peace fairly soon, Mr. Thieu is afraid the United States Congress may cut off all military and economic aid to South Vietnam as a way of forcing President Nixon to withdraw from the war. That worries the South Vietnamese leaders almost as much as the possibility of an unfavorable agreement.

It is for that reason that Mr. Thieu is sending 20 pro-Government legislators and official escorts to Washington to lay his pleas for continued support before individual American Senators and Congressmen. As one of the envoys put it, "We will try to explain to them how complicated things are in South Vietnam and why it isn't that easy to end the war."

On the other hand, if there is a cease-fire, Mr. Thieu will be up against stiff Communist political competition. The Government is laying plans to clap Communist sympathizers in prison, impose strict controls on the domestic press and foreign correspondents, and maintain a strong military posture against any Communist violations of the cease-fire. The Government is even turning back bolts of blue and red cloth at the Saigon docks because they can be made into Vietcong flags.

WASHINGTON POST
16 JANUARY 1973

Hanoi: Only Balk by U.S. or South Vietnam Could Halt Cease-Fire, Reports Say

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

HANOI, Jan. 16 (Tuesday)—Even before President Nixon announced the halt in offensive action against North Vietnam, this capital had begun churning out a sudden flood of reports apparently intended to accelerate a full cease-fire accord.

The message being put out here by various sources is that only a last minute balk by either the United States or the Saigon government could once again frustrate an agreement.

Officially the North Vietnamese government has said nothing so far except that there has been "progress" in the Paris talks, but that it is maintaining its "vigilance."

With Gen. Alexander M. Haig's trip to Saigon, North Vietnam's concern has mounted that South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu may again seek to block an accord unless world pressure is brought to bear on him.

That pressure has been greatly stimulated from here since Saturday, the day U.S. envoy Henry A. Kissinger left Paris to consult with President Nixon.

Three antiwar delegations now here have issued statements appealing for a peace accord. The visiting delegations represent the Stockholm Peace Conference, the World Peace Council and a Japan-Vietnam friendship association that includes members of the Japanese Communist Party.

The Stockholm group said in a statement last night that it was informed by a member of the Central Committee of North Vietnam's Workers (Communist) Party that the Paris talks are at "a new crucial phase" that will produce peace or intensified war.

The Swedish delegation is led by a member of Sweden's Parliament, Bertil Zachrisson. The group also includes another Swedish parliamentarian, Ola Ullsten, and a Canadian member of Parliament, Andrew Brewin.

They met with Hoang Tung, editor of the party newspaper Nhan Dan, and reported that he told them that in Paris the United States and North Vietnam "had been able to agree on a draft treaty which mainly was based on the principles and points elaborated on Oct. 20, 1972.

The group's statement said that Hoang Tung added "that the agreement had been able to eliminate some remaining doubts and ambiguities in the previous draft agreement."

The Stockholm group concluded: "It is our conviction that the North Vietnamese side is serious when saying it is prepared to achieve peace on the principles of the agreement reached in Paris. Therefore, time has come for the whole of world opinion to turn to the American side in urging the American government to make use of this opportunity of peace unbroken."

The whole thrust of the North Vienamese position is that the decision is up to President Nixon and North Vietnam wants the world to know in advance where it will place the blame if there is another failure.

In a delayed dispatch sent from Hanoi Sunday, Marder reported the following:

Despite the halt in the American bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong region, throughout the nation a continuing state of siege is maintained regardless of day-to-day prospects for a cease-fire accord.

"We have had too many bitter experiences to relax our vigilance now," said a North Vietnamese official. "Our antiaircraft are constantly prepared to shoot.

The news of U.S. negotiator Henry A. Kissinger's departure from Paris with new talk of progress on both sides of the negotiations and Kissinger's consultations in Florida and President Nixon re-echoed here only among those with independent access to the world outside. This includes North Vietnamese with short-wave radios.

But whatever hope or skepticism the news aroused was kept invisible in this determinedly disciplined society. To this moment, the North Vietnamese government has held off telling its own people even what its own delegation spokesman said in Paris when talks recessed.

The response here today to all inquiries is, "It is all up to Nixon."

To a newly arrived visitor, however, Hanoi outwardly appears more placid than any capital would be expected to be after a generation of war.

On this Sunday afternoon, the streets are lively with thousands of cyclists, the markets are crowded, the vegetables plump and the meat, chicken and other foodstuffs seem ample. The people by no means look undernourished, and now that the bombing is suspended, there are children rolling hoops on the sidewalks, pretty girls strolling and flower stands in the center of the city.

children rolling hoops on the sidewalks, pretty girls strolling and flower stands in the center of the city.

There is also a remarkable silence. It is punctuated only by the rumble of army trucks, usually hauling road-building supplies, or the occasional horn of a car or truck weaving a path through the omnipresent bicyclists.

Even the presently infrequent interruption of an air-alert warning produces no break in the pattern. Because the announcement identified only a reconnaissance flight, no one even broke stride over it. The people in the streets seemingly have complete confidence in the ability of the alert system to distinguish between a reconnaissance flight and an attack. The system is said to be refined enough to advise if a reconnaissance flight is by a piloted plane or a drone.

War has by no means scarred all of this city or even the major portion of it, one can quickly see even while awaiting a closer inspection of the air raid damage.

Much of Hanoi's city center is still lined with stately trees in full foliage, although the weather is gray and chilly in this season. The bomb damage is in pockets or strips where American B-52s dropped an unprecedented tonnage of destruction on this capital between Dec. 18 and 29.

Nevertheless, the immediate impact on the arriving visitor is a scene of devastation on landing at Gialam airport on the weekly Soviet Aeroflot flight. For the Gialam area in general, on the east bank of the muddy Red River opposite Hanoi, was a prime target with its industry, railroad repair yards and other installations, some of them near or virtually surrounded by the poorest residential sections. Here, casualties were reportedly high.

Men and women workers methodically are picking through the ruins of crumbled buildings and residences on that side of the river salvaging everything possible, brick by brick.

Desolation continues to the water's edge where the broken skeleton of the famous Longbien Bridge (formerly the Paul Doumer Bridge) looms in the distance, once North Vietnam's prized artery to the east and north. It withstood "Johnson," the interpreter wryly notes referring to the war years of President Johnson. "But not Nixon. But we have many pontoons."

Soon you are on the pontoon bridge after a line of trucks perhaps half a mile long allows your passenger car to squeeze through, zigzagging perilously across the remnants of a roadway.

Improvised Bridge

The improvised bridge across the Red River is a hazard itself for a passenger car, even if it is a punishable Soviet-built Volga. No longer straight under the jarring truck traffic, the pontoon bridge, held by cables anchored to the river bed, presents an obstacle at each joined section where heavy planks tie it together. The passenger car mounts each section as a new challenge.

On the Hanoi side of the river, the roadbed is still pocked with craters being filled with dirt and gravel. As the river area recedes, however, so does the scene of continuing bomb damage.

Hanoi is officially displaying its wounds far more than it is cringing from them. No outsides, especially a non-Vietnamese speaker, can know what the Vietnamese people really think about their war plight.

The official presentation portrays the bomb scars as battle ribbons for heroism under fire. The people act as if they agree. Glancing away from their roadbuilding, they look at the passing foreign visitor, unable to French, Rus-

sian, Swedish, East German—or a rarer American—with an expression of calmness rather than misery, as if they were saying "Look what we survived." All they can read or hear in the official media tells them they are heroic.

By official invitation, peace delegations are now coming into North Vietnam at an increased pace to inspect the American war damage, to deplore and condemn the strategy that inflicted it and to extoll the fortitude of those who survived.

Billboards and banners across Hanoi's wide, shaded streets hail "Victory" over the 12 days of American B-52 raids and exhort the population to "Sacrifice All, But Never Submit" To "American aggressors."

North Vietnam's statistical claims to victory in this period, about double the acknowledged American count, abound in signs and posters across the city: "Planes down 81, including 34 B-52s, 5 F-111s and 42 others."

Across the front of the city's closed theater a red banner about 50 feet high proclaims: "The people and army of Hanoi have won great exploits to be worthy of the people of the heroic capital of the whole country."

The reference to the "whole country" means North and South Vietnam, the unity of which is of course Hanoi's ultimate objective.

As Kissinger conferred with President Nixon, one of North Vietnam's leading exponents of national unity talked of the ability of North Vietnam to persevere in war or peace to achieve the goal of unity. He was Luu Quy Ky, who bears the disarming title of secretary general of the Association of Vietnamese Journalists. Ky, among other things, is the author of 16 books about Vietnam.

The "secret of Vietnam," he said, is "how to endure."

Ky, a southerner by birth, relished recounting the history of Vietnam's repulsion of foreign invaders during two millenia. "We will not talk optimism about the Paris talks", he said. "But we are optimistic about eventual victory. If you conceive that to fight for freedom is a happiness, then you can fight for a very long time.

"How can we fight a nation that can send men to the moon when we are still using buffalos to plow?" He asked rhetorically. "We are not producing one gram of steel," he said, but "we win victories because of our courage and our intelligence. We have studied the limits of human endurance," he said, and have practiced it.

During a two-and-a-half-hour conversation, Marxism went unmentioned except once indirectly in answer to a question about outside aid to Communist North Vietnam, which he maintained is now adequately supplied by its socialist allies.

Questions about North Vietnam's extraordinary protests last summer that "big powers" (meaning the Soviet Union and China) were succumbing to President Nixon's attempt to make them abandon the "National Liberation Movement" were met by the disclaimer today that "Nixon has been defeated" in that strategy.

His themes, instead, were nationalism, endurance, perseverance and the conviction that no one can determine North Vietnam's destiny for it.

The population of metropolitan Hanoi, normally about 1.2 million, is still only a third of that size. This is a result of the evacuation of residents during the B-52 bombardment.

But even though the bombing halted two weeks ago, North Vietnam is constantly preparing for a possible resumption.

The people see and hear nothing but victorious war claims or reports of world acclaim for North Vietnam's tenacity. If there are skeptics or doubters, they were informed by today's official government newspaper Nhan Dan that "all the youths of Hanoi are very happy to be chosen as soldiers. The leaders of their street councils encourage them to join the army. Many write letters to the army command expressing their willingness to fight."

What has been the toll for the last generation of war, including what North Vietnam calls 13 years of continuous war with the United States? Ky gently replies that "We have not calculated this figure."

The population of North Vietnam, however, has nevertheless increased, despite the toll, from about 17 million people in 1960 to an estimated 21 million today as the result of a high birth rate.

"We eagerly want peace," the assertion comes. "But we also are prepared for indefinite war if necessary."

The first glimpse of this underdeveloped, battered, but somehow still functioning, country indicates that this contention of endurance—a vital ingredient in the nation's psychological warfare, both for its own population and for its bargaining in the world outside—is widely believed by the populace.

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
9 January 1973

Is the bombing to return?

Dr Kissinger's "one more major effort" to negotiate a settlement to the Vietnam war has a ring of "or else" about it. The terms in which President Nixon finally talked to the Congressional leaders — after apparently consulting nobody for some weeks — suggests that he has sent Dr Kissinger to negotiate along lines predetermined in Washington. This must increase the chances that the talks will again fail Obscurity clouds the reasons why the murderous bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong was stopped on December 30. For the sake of face, President Nixon has to believe publicly that the B52s blasted the Vietnamese back to the negotiating table. This in turn increases the temptation to use the same tactics again. Statements from the White House suggest that renewed bombing north of the twentieth parallel is a certainty if the talks fail.

The damage inflicted by the B52s has been appalling. Their use is a lasting stain on President Nixon's record. Their devastating power may well have forced the North Vietnamese to call for a breather, since there is a limit to the amount of material punishment that even they can absorb. The frightening aspect is that, if the B52s are used again, it could be from a greater height and with no concern for the nature of the targets below Some reports suggest that part of the high loss rate came because the B52s were flying lower to achieve (with tragically little success) accuracy in hitting strategic targets.

By ordering a mass evacuation of the city populations, the North Vietnamese have indicated that they are taking this possibility seriously. It shows too that, battered as they are, they will be unlikely to buckle to American demands at the negotiating table for a settlement which, to North Vietnamese eyes, is meant to leave President Thieu inaccessibly in place. To support this reasoning, they can invoke the extraordinary conduct of Mr Nixon during the period of the bombing.

President Nixon's deliberate isolation from the press, from all but a handful of his own advisers and, until recently, from the leaders of Congress lends weight to the belief that his order to unleash the B52s stemmed from tantrums of disappointment when Dr Kissinger failed to bring about a settlement. It is possible that his secrecy was a cover for truly secret talks with Hanoi, but his behaviour encourages no confidence in that. It looks merely as if President Nixon was shutting himself off from both advice and criticism. As a result he appears increasingly as a man who has worked only to make the war acceptable at home by withdrawing a large number of US troops from the ground He still appears to think a victory can be salvaged. It is a dangerously mistaken approach to delicate talks, and it has hideous implications for what may follow if the talks fail.

THE ECONOMIST JANUARY 6, 1973

Scandinavia

Northern lights

Sharp reactions to last month's resumption of full-scale American bombing of North Vietnam were widespread in Scandinavia. Shortly after the new B-52 attacks began on December 18th, the Danish prime minister, Mr Anker Joergensen, issued a strongly critical comment and added that he might press for a discussion in Nato of Mr Nixon's actions. The Finnish foreign minister, Mr Ahti Karjalainen, declared that the case for the bombing raids was "especially difficult to understand." The Swedish foreign minister, Mr Krister Wickman, condemned the bombing as "blind and brutal." The chairman of the Danish trade union federation, Mr Thomas Nielsen, called for a Europe-wide boycott of American products. The Norwegian foreign minister, Mr Dagfinn Vaarvik, served warning that his government would have to consider what action it should take if the bombing went on. But it was the remarks made on December 23rd by Mr Olof Palme, the prime minister of Sweden, that echoed loudest.

The first press reports made Mr Palme appear to have directly likened the American action to such notorious atrocities of the past as those linked with the names of Guernica, Oradour, Lidice, Babi Yar, Katyn and Sharpeville. The State Department made a strong protest to the Swedish ambassador in Washington, and announced that the chargé d'affaires who now heads the American embassy in Stockholm (there has been no ambassador there since August) would not, for the present, return to his post from home leave. Although fuller versions of Mr Palme's words showed that his references to past atrocities had been somewhat oblique, Washington followed through with the request, described by Mr Wickman as astonishing, that no new Swedish ambassador should be sent there to succeed Mr Hubert de Besche, who is due to retire on January 8th.

Mr Palme has a reputation for outspokenness, but the bad feeling that has now brought Washington and Stockholm close to a breach of diplomatic relations had set in before he became prime minister three years ago, and indeed before Mr Nixon became President. The solidarity of Swedish feeling about Vietnam was demonstrated on December 28th when an appeal for an immediate bombing halt and a peace settlement was issued jointly by the leaders of all the five parties represented in the Riksdag ; two days later, 275,000 Swedes had added their signatures to this appeal. A similar appeal was made on January 2nd by the heads of all Norway's political parties.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 January 1973

'What Can We Do?'

By Vercors

PARIS — Where is the difference? Between the devastation of Guernica by the planes of Hitler and the devastation of Hanoi by those of Mr. Nixon, where is the difference? Between the raids of terror over Hanoi to force the Vietnamese to surrender and the raids of terror over Warsaw to force the Polish, over Rotterdam to force the Dutch to surrender, over Coventry to force the British (but Churchill did not surrender and the Vietnamese do not) where is the difference? Between the shredded infants of Spain and the shredded infants of Hanoi? At the time of Guernica, Warsaw, Rotterdam and Coventry what raised the world's conscience with a sacred horror was the recurrence, by the will of one man and his military advisers, of the most barbarous, the cruelest, the most horrifying, the most homicidal means to win a political design. It was the return to Sardanapalus and to Nero multiplied by ten, multiplied by a hundred. The world fought five years against that, against the incredible return of forgotten practices, that one thought had disappeared forever. America was not the least fierce nor the least sincere in that struggle to establish between nations a minimum of civilized relations. It was America which by its initiative (the creation of the U.N.) showed most visibly that will of healing. And now it is America today that brings back Guernica, Warsaw, Rotterdam—that brings us the equivalent of Hiroshima. In order to make an adversary surrender and to make a political design succeed.

During more than twenty years, how many have not been able to return to Germany because they would not know what hands would be offered there to grasp, if those that would be held out to shake would not be stained by the blood of the innocent. For a whole people were silenced by Hitler, had submitted at first, then accepted and covered up his crimes. A courageous resistance had struggled there in the beginning, a few months and then there was no more resistance. And that is recurring—this time in America! There have been without doubt a few beautiful and courageous movements of protest, of opposition—but now? One listens closely, but if anything remains it is very weak, and in spite of the few brave ones still left, they are obliterated in the soft silence of a consenting population. And will it happen that we will not be able to shake the hand of one of these Americans as we could no longer shake the hand of a German not so very long ago?

But if this is true for us what can we do? We weep and I weep, that comforts. You will say to me what else can we do? I don't know, I don't know. Seeing that Russia doesn't dare anything, that China can't, that Europe doesn't want to, Mr. Nixon and his Pentagon feel themselves all-powerful, and this power intoxicates them. They feel they are masters of the world. They know they can, if they want, do ten times worse than Hitler without risking the same fate, and this power intoxicates them. And we know that at least for the near future they will do what they want without anyone opposing it. For the moment they are content with transposing an entire land into a lunar landscape and an entire people into deadmen from out of the Stone Age. And perhaps before having totally arrived to that point, they will have in effect, by means of blood and suffering, imposed their political design on Indochina, as Hitler did on the Spanish, the Polish, the Dutch. And if that ever happens it will be more horrible. Because the Nero-like shadow of Nixon will hover over all of us who will have done nothing to have stopped him. And we will believe we are free when it will no longer be but the surveillant freedom of vassals.

Vercors is a pen name for Jean Bruller, author and engraver. This originally appeared in the French paper, Le Monde.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 January 1973

In yesterday's Times, James Reston implied incorrectly that Secretary of State Rogers refused to invite Francis Sayre, dean of the Washington cathedral, to an official luncheon because the dean had led an antiwar march to the White House. Mr. Rogers says he did not even know that Dean Sayre had participated in such a demonstration. Mr. Reston regrets the error.

HINDUSTAN TIMES
5 January 1973

The World And Vietnam

By S. Sharawadjy

HANOI has been in flames from the flagitious bombardment by American aircraft and death-dealing weapons. There is no comparison in all history for this kind of savagery in war. Even the eighteen-day annihilation of Carthage by the Romans was done in a struggle between equals and there was perhaps more honour in that carnage than in what has been happening in Vietnam.

Salvage Operation

The Vietnam war is one between the elephant and the ant—between the electro-dynamic-mechanical might of a super-power and the indomitable will-power of a small undeveloped nation. In the long and dismal history of violent conflicts, it is the nearest one could get to the Gandhian type of confrontation between soul-force and brute-force. And the war is not over any great issue of power or ideology, but over the pride and prestige of the President of the greatest power on earth. Western writers have written so much on oriental face, but has there ever been in history an example of face-saving carried to such enormous and tragic proportions.

The Americans first went into Vietnam in what they proclaimed to be a glorious crusade against Communism represented by the monolithic Sino-Soviet bloc, though at bottom it was really even then, a dirty pro-colonial salvage operation. Later when they found that the Soviet Union was interested in a peaceful settlement in Vietnam, they said that the crusade was against Chinese Communist expansionism. Later still when they discovered that the Chinese devils were only too eager to parley and make peace with them, they have come to the conclusion that what they have been fighting against was Vietnamese Communism and its imperialist urge to dominate Indo-China! One may safely predict that soon, and not too late, they will find out that what they have been and are up against is Vietnamese nationalism, passionate and unconquerable.

There in Vietnam, political nationalism has been converted into an incandescent spiritual force. Nothing else can explain the extraordinary fact that after all this overmastering application of military pressure, this callous suspension of effective supporting action by the divided and the so-called Socialist camp, the weak-kneed mumblings of the once loud and eloquent non-aligned and the Afro-Asians, and the growing irrelevance of the United Nations as an instrument of peace and justice in the world, the little Democratic Republic of Vietnam is still fighting valiantly and is bound to come out of this cruel conflict "bloody but unbowed."

World reaction to the resumption of bombing of North Vietnam is a mirror of the temper of our times. A few years ago there were massive demonstrations and protest marches of youth all over the United States which nearly brought the administration to its knees, at least psychologically. Where are the protest marchers and the flower-children of yesterday, when today even more horrible and unjustifiable crimes are committed against a heroic people simply because they will not surrender? No doubt the New York Times has made an appeal to Americans "in the name of conscience and country" to "speak out for sanity in Washington and peace in Indo-China." But the sad fact of the matter is that American public opinion is a weak reed indeed to lean upon. Once American boys are not dying in the battlefields, but only Vietnamese are massacred from the air, there is no swell of humanitarian mass opinion in the United States against the Vietnam war as before. One is forced to question fundamentally the liberal core in American life and politics.

Supine China

The behaviour of the rest of the world in this crisis is not very admirable either. The Chinese used to proclaim their unbreakable solidarity with their Vietnamese brethren. Their favourite simile for solidarity was "the lip and teeth" relationship between the Chinese and the Vietnamese. Some lip, some teeth! Certainly, Mao Tse-tung and his great warriors of national liberation struggles are today doing nothing more than lip-service and even that in a very subdued measure.

The root cause of Vietnam's helplessness and the apparent triumph of the bullying tactics of President Nixon is the Sino-Soviet conflict and the all-too-supine willingness of China to allow Washington to exploit this split. From 1963 onwards Hanoi has been advocating united Socialist action on Vietnam. The Soviet Union had supported this move, but Peking stood adamantly against the idea.

Not that the Soviet Union would have embarked upon an adventurous confrontation with Washington over Vietnam, (that might have been welcomed by China). But a minimum of Sino-Soviet unity over Vietnam would have rendered it impossible for Mr Nixon to exploit the Peking-Moscow conflict to the extent that he is doing in Vietnam. Though Mr Brezhnev has spoken out a little more strongly than Mao or Mr Chou En-lai in this crisis, there has not been popular or governmental reactions from the Soviet Union to fit the outrage that is being perpetrated on Vietnam.

Mesmerised Nations

Great powers are always moved mainly by power considerations. The smaller ones need not be. That was the value of the Asian-African and non-aligned nations in the past in international relations. Today, however, even this vast intermediate group is not only amorphous but divided by rivalries and jealousies and dominated by parochial issues so that they are unable to express their protest in unison against what is happening in Vietnam. One recalls how Nehru reacted in 1954 to the crisis in Indo-China and put forward proposals which found acceptance in the Geneva agreements.

Times have changed, of course, but what are the other fathers of non-alignment, if one may use such a phrase, doing in the present crisis? Have the non-aligned nations been so mesmerised by the fear of American might that they have not so far concerted any serious efforts to arouse and organise world opinion over this pre-eminent moral and political issue of our times? Or, are some or other of this group of nations so pre-occupied with not embarrassing Washington or Moscow or Peking that they have considered discretion to be the better part of non-alignment and not audacity which distinguished it in its effective days? Or, is it that some of them find the diplomatic leverage provided by the Sino-Soviet rift much too valuable in their national interests to do anything for Vietnam that might upset that happy state of affairs?

If the Asians, the Africans and the non-aligned are not powerfully stirred by the Vietnam tragedy, then it cannot be expected that other peoples and governments will be. It concerns them more vitally than the European and the American powers. What is involved is the principle of the right of a small nation to resist dictation and bullying by a super-power, apart from the utterly human aspects of the Vietnam situation. Some of the smaller countries of South East Asia who are afraid of Hanoi's expansionism and are eagerly trying to play up to Peking or Moscow or Washington might remember that they have more at stake in this principle than any other countries in the world. One most unfortunate feature of world reaction to the Vietnam crisis is that Asia has not taken a stand as Asia on this poignant and predominantly Asian issue.

The nations of this continent have preferred to be ruled by mutual fears of their own weak neighbours than of those Great Powers who really pose the potential threat to their freedom and independence. The absence of Asian consultations on Vietnam is conspicuous evidence of this. Australia and New Zealand under their new Governments appear to have done a little better in their outspoken stand.

World Opinion

The Vietnam issue has so far evaded the attention of that august international forum, the United Nations. Hitherto one could have argued that intervention by the United Nations would have only complicated the problem rather than helping to solve it. None of the parties concerned, including the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, was in favour of taking the matter to the United Nations. But had not the moment come, when the world had no other choice, for a simple and massive demonstration of world public opinion against the American bombings, spontaneously and powerfully expressed in the forum of the UN General Assembly?

That might have provided that extra little push necessary to make the parties move on to the final act of settlement in Vietnam, and might also have had the effect of giving a shot in the arm to the United Nations which has been fast becoming a pedestrian debating society where pale bureaucrats from all the corners of the earth come to perform as pompous international diplomats.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 January 1973

Canadian sadness

The Canadian Parliament's unanimous resolution deploring the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong was an expression of national sadness over recent developments in Vietnam.

All parties in the House of Commons supported the government-sponsored resolution.

This mark of disapproval of American policy does not constitute a precedent. In 1971 the Canadian House unanimously adopted a resolution condemning the American nuclear test at Amchitka island in the Aleutians.

None of the Canadian parties has supported the American administration over the war in Vietnam, and the Trudeau government has privately expressed its regret over continuation of the war to Washington.

If the Parliament's Vietnam resolution was no great surprise, its adoption assumes greater impact when added to the wave of denunciations of the bombing of Hanoi coming from friends and allies of the United States around the world, and particularly from Europe, and from Australia and New Zealand.

It is part of a worldwide sadness at seeing a great power like the United States get caught up in a situation where it finds it necessary to use its bombers against civilian centers at a stage in the war when peace seems within its grasp.

WASHINGTON POST
14 JANUARY 1973

WHAT WE'VE LOST IN VIETNAM

By George F. Kennan

THERE ARE, I AM SURE, many besides myself who, aware of the inadequacy of their own knowledge of what is going on, have remained silent thus far in the face of the renewed heavy bombings in Vietnam, hoping that the President and his advisers had some good reason, invisible to us, for supposing that these procedures would bring the war to an early conclusion. Beyond this, there was little reason to expect that an administration so plainly unconcerned for domestic opinion about the war, not to mention the opinion of friends and well-wishers in other parts of the globe, would be appreciably moved by one more critical voice, and particularly that of a politically inactive person, from within this country. But there are times, and this would seem to be one of them, when one has to make a view known, if for no other reason than for the sake of clarity of the record.

The adverse effects of these bombings are obvious. A number of arguments have been offered, or suggested, for their pursuance. None of these arguments strikes me as even remotely persuasive. It is said that only by these means can we bring our adversary to engage in serious negotiations and to accept a "reasonable" settlement, by which is meant, apparently, one which would commit Hanoi to the assurance of the future political security of the Saigon regime. Aside from the fact that some of us, considering the nature of Communist regimes generally, as well as the customary processes of political change in that part of the world, have doubted from the start the feasibility of any such undertaking, it is hard to believe that this sort of bombing would in any case be adequately conducive to its achievement.

If anything has ever been amply demonstrated in military experience, it is the extreme inefficiency and relative ineffectiveness of the strategic bombing weapon as a means of military and political pressure. If, in particular, one wishes to influence the behavior of an adversary at the negotiating table, the bombing of residential centers, aside from being dreadfully offensive to world opinion, is surely the most expensive and unpromising way to do it. If it were really necessary for us to make war upon the North Vietnamese, which many of us emphatically disbelieve, then we should have the conviction and consistency to apply a balanced employment of all branches of our conventional armed forces. In the attempt to achieve by this single arm the aims we are concerned to achieve, there is a serious incongruity of means and ends.

An End to the Slaughter

IT IS ARGUED that our opponents, the North Vietnamese, are not nice people, that they are cruel and unreasonable. I do not question this fact: I question its relevance. The world has no lack of cruel and unreasonable people. It is not our business to put them all in their place, nor would it be in our power to do so. And if the argument be that unreasoning cruelty on their part justifies the same on ours, then it must be asked: Since when have our standards of conduct been defined for us by our enemies? Surely, it is to our own standards and traditions that our obligation lies—not to theirs.

We must, it is claimed, be loyal to our allies. What would the world think of us if we were not? One could, perhaps, answer this with another question: What does the world think of us as it is?

But more central to our problem is the fact that our South Vietnamese "allies" have already had from us, many times over, all that any government could reasonably expect from a political associate on the other side of the globe; to which must be added the reflection that outside help can never be effective beyond the limits defined by the vitality and resolution and effectiveness of the regime to which it is addressed. The world is well aware of what we have done for the South Vietnamese. It does not believe that alliances are an end in themselves. Its main concern, at this point, is to see this dreary slaughter brought promptly to a halt. What it would welcome on our part is not the continued blind pursuit of an obligation already amply satisfied but a little more discrimination in the selection of alliances in the first place and a higher sense of the fitness of things in our manner of honoring such as we have.

A Sense of Shame

THERE IS, FINALLY, not so often advanced publicly but presumably present in a number of governmental minds, the fear of being accused of "losing" a war. One wonders how much real meaning the terms "victory" and "defeat" have in the face of modern weaponry and contemporary political developments. There can be wars so unpromising that they had better be "lost," if this means "terminated," than continued in the vain pursuit of something called "victory." Gen. de Gaulle did not worry about these semantic symbols when he wisely put an end to the French involvement in Algeria.

I can only repeat what I said seven years ago in the course of a full day's testimony before a troubled Senate Foreign Relations Committee: that "there is more respect to be won in the opinion of this world by a resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound positions than by the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or unpromising objectives."

One has a great sense of futility in stating such views. One cannot hope, I reiterate, that they will affect the dispositions of a government to which so many more important and authoritative critical voices (one need mention only the unanimous disapproval of the bombing by the Canadian House of Commons) appear to mean so little. One can hope only that they may serve to remind some of our friends in other countries that these bombings, for which the recent election certainly did not give a mandate, are not proceeding without arousing the deepest sort of unhappiness, and even shame, among thoughtful people in this country, and that there is here, for the future if not for the present, something more to build on than just the official outlooks and approaches that have shaped American policy in Vietnam at this very strange and unusual juncture in the nation's political life.

NEW YORK TIMES
9 January 1973

120 Dutch Celebrities Ask Recall of Envoy to the U.S.

AMSTERDAM, the Netherlands, Jan. 8 (AP)—One hundred twenty prominent Dutch scholars, artists, writers, journalists and broadcast personalities asked today that the Dutch Ambassador in Washington be recalled if the United States did not stop its participation in the war in Indochina.

In letters to Premier Barend Biesheuvel and to the presidents of the two chambers of Parliament, they said:

"As long as the United States carries on a war in Indochina in which nothing and nobody is spared," the Netherlands should not be represented in Washington at the ambassadorial level.

LONDON, Jan. 7 (AP)—A group of American religious figures appealed to British churches and politicians today to pres the United States for peace in Indochina.

The group, headed by Dr. Harvey Cox, a professor of theology at Harvard University, is touring European capitals, including Rome, where it hopes to see Pope Paul VI. Today, the mission saw the Bishop of London, Dr. Robert Stopford, and talked with a British Council of Churches representative.

WASHINGTON POST
15 JANUARY 1973

Australia-U.S. Viet Raids Rift Eases

By H. D. S. Greenway
Washington Post Staff Writer

Last week Australia's maritime unions ended a 12-day boycott of American shipping, which had been imposed in protest of U.S. Christmas bombing of Hanoi, and American longshoremen ended their counter boycott, which had tied up some $20 million worth of Australian goods in U.S. ports.

The renewed bombing precipitated the closest thing to a crisis in Australian-American relations that diplomats could remember—but by last week both sides were tying to restore the atmosphere of good will which the two countries have so long enjoyed.

Three ministers in Australia's new Labor government, which came to power last month after 23 years in opposition, had publicly criticized U.S. bombing policy. Tom Uren, Australia's new minister for urban and regional development, accused President Nixon of "arrogance and hypocrisy."

In the United States, where the Australians had been hoping to get in on a bonanza created by a temporary increase in the import quota for dried milk, it was announced on Dec. 30 that the increased imports would be bought on a first-come-first-serve basis only until Feb. 15.

Since it takes about six weeks to ship goods from Australia to the United States, the ruling seemed tailor-made by the Nixon administration to shut the Australians out.

The State Department, however, went out of its way to play down the difficulties. The State Department's official spokeman was instructed to express only "concern," rather than protest over the boycott, and he spoke of the long and "exceedingly close" relationships between Australia and the United States that was based on "respect and even admiration" between the two countries.

Last week Australia's new prime minister, Gough Whitlam, also went out of his way to disassociate himself from personal attacks on President Nixon, and said that had it not been for the renewed bombing, "relations between the present Australian government and the United States government would be better than they have ever been since the Second World War."

Beyond the bombing and the boycott, there were clear indications that Australia was planning a new and more independent role in world affairs.

Since the Labor government came to power in December, Australia has ended conscription, pulled completely out of the Vietnam war and cut off all military aid to both South Vietnam and Cambodia.

Prime Minister Whitlam also said that the Australian battalion of troops in Singapore would not be replaced when it becomes due for rotation at the end of 1973. The troops are there under a five-power defense agreement between Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia.

Whitlam left his options open, however, and said nothing about the Australian squadron of Mirage jets in Malaysia.

On the diplomatic front the new government has recognized China and ended relations with Taiwan, recognized East Germany and taken a much tougher stand against Rhodesia in the United Nations.

But when Australia's ambassador, Sir James Plimsoll, returned here last week from consultations with the new Australian government, he told Secretary of State William P. Rogers that the "Anzus" defense treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States still remains the cornerstone of Australia's defense planning, and that the new government had no immediate plans for withdrawing from the now moribund Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

There have been two distinct periods in Australian foreign policy since the Australian states were federated in 1901, and the coming to power of the Labor Party last month may signal the beginning of a third.

The first dates from April 25, 1915 when Australian and New Zealand forces landed on the Gallipoli peninsula of Turkey as part of the allied Dardenelles campaign in World War I. The date, "Anzac Day," is a national holiday in Australia.

The campaign ended up a disaster for the allies, but the Australians and New Zealanders fought well and, as in the case of the Light Brigade in the Crimea and Dunkirk in World War II, plucky defeats are often found more worthy of commemoration than mere victory.

To Australians, participation in World War I meant coming of age in world affairs. But foreign policy was still closely linked to British policy.

Thus when World War II broke out in Europe, Australia sent her divisions to the North African desert to fight alongside the British.

With the coming of the Pacific war and the fall of Singapore, Australia found herself with her armies half a world away and the military might of Japan sweeping down upon her.

Against Winston Churchill's wishes, Australia ordered her troops home. The Battle of the Coral Sea in May, 1942, marked the beginning of a new era in Australian foreign policy.

In that battle, American naval air power turned back the Japanese fleet off the Queensland Coast, and Australia decided then and there that her best defense lay in the closest possible alliance with the United States.

It has been said that President Lyndon B. Johnson collected on the Coral Sea debt when he asked Australia to join in his Vietnam enterprise. But at the time there was popular support for the Vietnam war in Australia.

In the early 1960s Australia had been watching the growing Communist influence in Indonesia—Australia's closest neighbor with 10 times her population. The Peking-Djakarta axis had convinced Australia that Asian communism was a direct threat.

Mr. Johnson was a popular figure in Australia, and his visit in 1966 was greeted with more popular enthusiasm than most royal visits.

The most unpopular aspect of the Vietnam war for Australians was conscription. Until Vietnam, Australia had never drafted soldiers to fight overseas, not even in both World Wars.

By the mid '60s, however, the Indonesian Communists had been crushed by the Indonesian army, and Indonesia has maintained a pro-Western neutrality ever since.

The dragon of monolithic communism that the United States and Australia thought so menacing is no longer apparant. The Sino-Soviet split has replaced the Cold War as the dominant big power confrontation in Asia.

In the 1970s Australian foreign policy will no longer so closely follow Washington's lead, but Australia's new independence merely reflects new realities in Asia.

The measures that the new Labor government has taken so far are basically in line with the Nixon Doctrine and new age of detente.

The renewed bombing of Hanoi clearly offended public opinion in Australia, as it did in many other countries. But in the long haul Washington hopes Australia will remain, as James Michener wrote 20 years ago, "an ally that can be trusted, a splendid people that can be relied upon."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
6 January 1973

Americans' aid for Hanoi hospital: unique

By Trudy Rubin
Staff writer of
The Christian Science Monitor

Boston

The recently announced campaign by U.S. antiwar activists to raise $3 million to rebuild the shattered Bach Mai Hospital in Hanoi is the latest and most dramatic episode in a small but growing phenomenon:

Sending humanitarian aid by American organizations to a country with which the United States is engaged in battle.

Moreover, some of this aid has been officially licensed by the United States Treasury Department with the approval of the State Department, Department of Defense, and the White House, creating a situation without known precedent, according to Treasury and other government sources.

These sources make quite clear that the major purpose of granting the licenses is the hope of gaining information on prisoners of war via the organizations transporting the aid — mainly medical supplies — into North Vietnam.

$90,000 in equipment

The Bach Mai campaign is being run by Medical Aid to Indo-China (MAI), A Cambridge, Mass.-based group formed about 18 months ago by a group of Boston doctors, health workers, and antiwar activists to send medical supplies to the civilian health services of North Vietnam and the Communist-controlled areas of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

MAI says it has sent nearly $90,000 of equipment to these areas, including pacemakers and electrocardiograph machines. MAI requested information from the Treasury Department on licenses, but never applied for them, and has sent its material without them.

This renders the group liable for prosecution under the 1917 Trading With the Enemy Act. (There has been no indication of possible prosecution, but MAI sources say the Department of Commerce has requested specific details about two shipments of American-made medical supplies to North Vietnam.)

$3 million sought

MAI hopes to raise $3 million to rebuild Bach Mai, including more than $250,000 raised over the past two weeks. But the spokesmen also say no decision has been reached about applying for licenses for the Bach Mai materials.

The other principal group sending medical supplies, however, has applied for, and been granted, three licenses totaling $115,000 by the Treasury and Commerce Departments (one in 1969, two in 1971, and a renewal in 1972), after being refused a license in 1968. (Treasury issues licenses for monetary remittances to hostile countries; Commerce issues them for American-made goods.)

The American Friends Service Committee (Quaker), with a tradition of humaitarian giving on both sides of a conflict that includes the Spanish Civil War and the Chinese civil war, has delivered open-heart-surgery materials and electrocardiographs to the Viet Duc hospital in Hanoi and to the North Vietnamese Red Cross Society. (The AFSC also runs a rehabilitation center in South Vietnam.)

Funneling via Geneva

In addition, the United Presbyterian Church and the Episcopal Church of America have begun fund drives, starting in late 1972, specifically aimed at medical aid for North Vietnam.

This money, in addition to funds raised by the National Council of Churches, is funneled through the Geneva-based World Council of Churches, thus avoiding the need for U.S. licenses. The U.S. contribution since 1965 by the National Council has amounted to $75,000; the Presbyterians in their 1972 drive have so far raised $18,000; and the Episcopalians, $1,000 so far.

A combination of stringent U.S. regulations and lack of access to Germany made humanitarian giving impossible during World War II, while North Korea, according to State Department sources, would not grant access to U.S. voluntary agencies during the Korean war.

Two conditions posed

Granting licenses during the current conflict, however, is not without some strings, which MAI has so far declined to accept. According to Stanley Summerfield, acting director of the Foreign Assets Control Program of the Treasury Department, which licenses remittances to North Vietnam (with specific time and dollar limits), the basic requirements are two:

First licenses are issued on a "humanitarian basis," he says, provided there is "satisfactory assurance that an impartial observer will be able to witness the distribution" of the supplies.

The second request (Mr. Summerfield says that "requirement is not the correct word — it might be a hope") is that "the shipment will increase our information about the POWs." He adds vigorously, "We're not interested in helping North Vietnam for the sake of helping North Vietnam. We want something out of it."

Only AFSC has applied

So far only the AFSC has applied for a North Vietnam license. Mr. Summerfield declined to comment on whether a license might be granted if applied for to a group like MAI, which identifies itself more openly with the North Vietnamese cause. "I would have to look at the case," he said.

Until 1971 the Quakers carried letters for POWs on their visits with the knowledge of the State Department. But since the formation of the New York-based Committee of Liaison, the antiwar group that is recognized

by the North Vietnamese as the only U.S. group dealing with POWs, they have ceased to carry mail.

Though some antiwar groups argue, as do some Quakers, that there should be no cooperation with the U.S. Government in sending humanitarian aid, Martin Teitel, Asian program director of the AFSC, says, "We think we can withstand being co-opted by the State Department."

Attempting to witness deliveries has proved troublesome to some would-be donors who say the North Vietnamese have been reluctant to allow Americans to accompany the donated supplies. According to Mr. Teitel, the Quakers were refused permission to accompany their first – unlicensed – shipment to National Liberation Front territory.

But since then they have insisted successfully – as part of their emphasis on "a concern for people" – that they send Quaker representatives with their medical supplies to Hanoi.

North Vietnamese objections, he says, centered on claims that it would be too dangerous for civilians to accompany the goods.

THE ECONOMIST JANUARY 6, 1973

The cost of the bombing

They say that it takes between 50 and 60 of the Russian-made Sam-2 rockets to hit one of the high-flying B-52 bombers that the Americans are still sending from Guam and northern Thailand to attack North Vietnam. If so, Hanoi must now have better air defences than most other capitals, since American losses during the raids north of the 20th parallel, which were called off last Saturday, came as a shock to the Pentagon. According to American official figures, the North Vietnamese knocked out 15 B-52s, and a further six or seven are said to have been made unflightworthy.

Whether these figures are entirely reliable is open to doubt; American spokesmen fumbled their statistics several times after the bombing of Hanoi began on December 18th. Hanoi radio claims that 81 American aircraft were brought down over Hanoi and Haiphong between December 18th and December 29th, of which 34 were B-52s. Those figures should be taken with an even bigger pinch of salt. But the financial cost to the Americans is not to be sneezed at, since the B-52s cost about £3m apiece. And it has now been established that they are no longer invulnerable in the skies over Indochina.

Nor, it seems, are they particularly accurate. It is hard to gauge the effects of the missions flown over Hanoi and Haiphong, since Pentagon sources have been reticent and the only reasonably objective sources in Hanoi were the reporters of the Agence France Presse. But the B-52s were apparently not accurate enough to single out their "strategic targets" (mostly, communications and supply centres such as warehouses and port facilities) without inflicting serious damage on residential areas and civilian installations such as the Bach-Mai hospital, which is reported to have been completely destroyed during the attack on the neighbouring airfield, or the embassies not far from the main fuel depot, which was also destroyed.

Instead of using the remote-controlled "smart bombs," the Americans appear to have relied mainly on carpet-pattern bombing. Under these conditions, it was inevitable that many civilian casualties would result, as a Pentagon spokesman conceded just after Christmas. The only estimate of total civilian casualties provided so far came from the director of a Hanoi hospital, who claimed that, on average, 200 civilians had been killed and 200 injured during each day of the raids north of the 20th parallel. The North Vietnamese also say that during the 12 days, 1,318 people died in Hanoi alone.

These raids were suspended on December 30th, and on New Year's Day the North Vietnamese announced that they were ready to return to high-level peace talks with the Americans. President Nixon's decision to suspend the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong was probably influenced both by the protests from many prominent Europeans and by the declaration from the North Vietnamese that they would not resume talks—even at a purely technical level—until the raids were stopped. Mr Kissinger is expected to meet Le Duc Tho in Paris next week.

The military effects of the Hanoi raids will be tested only in the event of a new communist offensive in the south, but American official sources have suggested privately that their cumulative effect had been to set the country back two years. On Tuesday the communist daily Nhan Dan urged the evacuation of the cities by all North Vietnamese whose services were not "essential to combat or production." But North Vietnam's arms and ammunition, and an increasing proportion of its food, are brought in from Russia and China. So the destruction of local industry will count for less than the American attempts to stop supplies being shipped in by planting more mines in Haiphong harbour, and to stop supplies reaching the North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam by disrupting land communications.

NEW YORK TIMES
15 January 1973

While Thousands Weep

By Anthony Lewis

PARIS—In the Vietnamese way, his voice remained soft and conversational despite the emotion of his thoughts.

"This time something has to change," he said. "There has been too much suffering—now there must be reconciliation. The people in Saigon see it, the Provisional Revolutionary Government sees it, Hanoi sees it. They have all suffered. If the Vietnamese do not reconcile themselves, the Americans can do nothing for real peace no matter how long they stay."

It was one of Paris' many Vietnamese political exiles speaking: Ho Thong Minh, minister of defense in Ngo Diem's first Government, way back in 1954-55. He resigned because, as he puts it, "I found that Diem was a backward, reactionary man, and I saw no hope for Vietnam." He slipped out of Saigon, past Diem's security men, and came to Paris.

In his person Ho Thong reflects the tragedy of his country and of America's involvement in it. His aim is the one that Vietnamese political figures of all views avow: an independent Vietnam, free of foreign control. But in a lifetime of working with this force and that he has not found the means to the end.

He was 19 years old, in 1939, when he first joined the struggle against the colonial French. After World War II, when the French returned, he was on the general staff of the resistance movement in the far south of Vietnam. But he found "the Communists wanted to take all power for themselves," so he left the movement for civilian life as an engineer.

Diem made him deputy defense minister in 1954. After a month, he says, "The Americans urged Diem to

put me in full charge, and he did." So there is special irony in what has happened to his view of the United States.

"In 1954," Minh says, "I had great hope in America—a great anticolonial country. But as time went on, I saw that that was not so.

"In Washington in 1963 one of your generals told me that all the Americans would be out of Vietnam by the end of 1965. Then in 1965, the day the first American bombs fell on North Vietnam, I heard that the Pentagon said they would be on their knees in six or eight weeks. But I knew that would not be so, then or ever.

"After that my confidence in the Americans went. I told my friends that we would have to do it by ourselves."

Ho Thong Minh has made one visit to Saigon since 1955, in 1968. The Thieu Government allowed him in because his father had died. But when the Tet offensive started, he was put in jail and kept there until he went on a hunger strike two months later.

Today, like so many of the exiles in Paris, he is in the middle. He is one of the neutralists who might be serving now with Saigon and P.R.G. members in the Council of National Reconciliation if President Nixon had carried out the terms negotiated by Henry Kissinger last October.

"Certainly the people of South Vietnam do not want Communism," he says, "but neither do they want an army dictatorship. Our way of life has drifted from our origins. We must be more ourselves. We cannot live an American way of life.

"It all tells in our economic and military and social strength. The occidental eye looks at us now and says that Saigon can stand up against the North. But it is a strength from outside—artificial."

He believes that only a "third-force Government" led by neutrals can save South Vietnam from more suffering. He says, "The only way to have peace in Southeast Asia is reconciliation among the Vietnamese—first in the South, then between South and North."

It is always so sad to meet the neutralist Vietnamese politicians in Paris. They are naturally appealing to Americans, who mostly dislike the extremist politics of ideology and go for the middle of the road. But there is no middle of the road in Vietnam now.

The American Government decided long ago to oppose any move toward neutralism or political accommodation in South Vietnam, staking all on the survival of Nguyen Van Thieu and his autocracy. It did so not for the sake of the Vietnamese but out of concern for its own face. That is why the destruction has had to go on for so long, North and South.

Now the signs are that a cease-fire may really be at hand. The decision is up to Richard Nixon, and this time the approach of Inauguration Day may concentrate his mind. But whatever peace there may be is not likely to create Ho Thong Minh's vision of a reconciled Vietnam, free of suffering at last.

AT HOME ABROAD

The way to peace is reconciliation of the Vietnamese.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
5 January 1973

PETER GILL, in Saigon, considers the political and military consequences of America's air raids on North Vietnam

Has the B-52 bought peace?

PRESIDENT NIXON'S bombing offensive against the industrial heartland of North Vietnam rapidly achieved its diplomatic purpose. When Hanoi last week signalled its willingness to return to the conference table in Paris, the United States was satisfied that this time the Vietnamese Communist leadership was in earnest.

What remains at issue after the 10-day air war over the Red River delta is whether the destruction has materially altered the political and military balance between the Communists and their opponents in Vietnam itself.

In strict military terms, the objective of the campaign was clear. From April to October last year, American fighter-bombers equipped with electronically guided bombs were sent into North Vietnam to destroy bridges, sever pipelines and cut railway lines. On occasions, they took on larger military installations. But when Mr Nixon ordered the resumption of bombing north of the 20th parallel on Dec. 18, American commanders in Saigon were told to deploy more than half America's entire strategic bomber force against the intractable North Vietnamese.

It was a decision entirely in keeping with a long—some would say great—American Presidential tradition. President Truman ordered the dropping of the atom bomb on two Japanese cities, and the Japanese surrendered: President Eisenhower ordered intensified bombing of North Korea to include the dykes, and a ceasefire was arranged: Mr Nixon himself ordered the mining of North Vietnamese harbours last May, and the Communist spring offensive against the South was at least slowed down.

This time, formations of green-and-brown B-52 bombers, originally built to deliver the atom bomb, flew against targets within a mile or so of the centre of Hanoi and over Haiphong and other cities. They struck at marshalling yards, docks, power plants, radio transmitters, barracks and airfields—the very vitals of an apparently already sagging war economy.

"To witness a B-52 raid," a recent American university study of the Indo-China air war coolly observed, "is to witness a disaster of major proportions."

When the bombing stopped last Saturday morning, North Vietnam's industrial and conventional military capacity lay in ruins. The relief with which the halt was greeted around the world was itself ironic. There is strong evidence to indicate that the campaign was in fact planned from the beginning to end when it did because there was then nothing else of military consequence to hit.

The North Vietnamese leadership reacted predictably to the renewed bombing, as well as to its cessation. They fulminated against American "terror." They vowed never to be bombed into submission and finally laid claim to "a victory of strategic significance" in forcing America to call off its bombers for fear of inviting unacceptable losses.

Much of this can be dismissed as propaganda. It is, for instance, certain that American commanders anticipated considerable losses in the B-52 force, and that sending more than 70 professional airmen to their death or to internment in Communist prisoner-of-war camps was considered a risk worth taking. The real outcome of the bombing—victory, defeat or continuing stalemate—will be gauged only from the fine print of the document that finally emerges from the secret peace talks in Paris which begin

again on Monday. But it is quite possible that the North Vietnamese claim to be in the stronger bargaining position will be vindicated.

The public stance of the Hanoi leadership continues to be that America should sign a peace agreement on the terms—unfavourable to the Saigon Government — originally worked out last October. Washington now considers these terms neither fair nor just, and threatens that renewed persistence on Hanoi's part will be met by renewed bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. But that threat appears increasingly hollow, and, if implemented, would certainly be difficult to justify in military terms.

The privately-stated view of the American command in Saigon is that the bombing over Christmas set North Vietnam back two years, and that there is no chance of the North mounting any major offensive against the South for months.

Washington has stuck to the view that bombing was a military necessity and that the raids were not punitive.

Facts of war

Mr Nixon is also aware of the huge civilian casualties involved in sending heavy bombers over densely-populated areas. That they are not intentional is a fact: but they are also inevitable. The euphemisms employed among American officers in Saigon bear eloquent testament to this. To kill civilians is unacceptable: but "collateral damage" or, in the case of B-52s, "circular error probable," are facts of war.

So when Dr Kissinger sits down on Monday in Paris with Mr Le Duc Tho to settle the remaining issues preventing peace in Vietnam, he will not be a victor facing the vanquished. Unless Mr Nixon is indeed prepared to use yet more frightful weapons of war to force a settlement, and his action so far is mild in comparison with allied and enemy air tactics in the Second World War, America can more easily be cast in the role of the enchained and impotent giant.

It is this view of things that is uppermost in the mind of Saigon officials. President Thieu of South Vietnam was kept closely informed of the developing air offensive against the North, but there is little evidence to suggest that he was particularly impressed by the likely political outcome.

In his New Year messages to diplomats in Saigon and to his people, there was no reference to the bombing having brought a favourable peace any nearer. The old objections remain: that the North Vietnamese should withdraw their "300,000 troops" from the South before an honourable peace can be concluded and that a ceasefire "in place," leaving the North Vietnamese invaders in occupation of parts of the South, can at best be considered a temporary affair.

A few weeks before the bombing began over Hanoi and Haiphong, the Americans completed a frantic programme to ship fresh war supplies to Saigon. They included 400 M-41 and M-48 tanks, 350 warplanes and more than 30 Hercules transport aircraft. With an air force of more than 2,000 aircraft, South Vietnam now has the doubtful distinction of being an Asian superPower.

Then came the bombing. In 10 days of air raids North Vietnam's capacity to wage conventional war was destroyed. In Western terms, and that is the rub, Hanoi could no longer be considered a military power. But the coming battles in South Vietnam will not be fought in Western terms. A Communist assassin — or his Government counterpart — does not need the backing of an industrialised Power to do his work. Political indoctrination teams—on both sides—need only an ideology and willpower. The Communists have already demonstrated their greater strength in both fields.

If South Vietnam is obliged to continue the ground war, its numerical superiority in the field will count for little. Even a one-million-man Army, supported by its own armour and aircraft, can be paralysed by a large and determined guerrilla force. The North Vietnamese and their Viet Cong allies, in the South, who unwisely chose last March to launch a conventional war, can just as easily revert to the guerrilla tactics which have cost South Vietnam dear in the past.

A South Vietnam under predominantly military leadership remains afraid of the consequences of peace—and more wary still, after the bombing, of America's willingness to impose an unfavourable agreement on her.

Reluctantly, President Thieu will probably follow his ally into a peace of American manufacture. But he will know that the bombing of the North and the arms supplies to the South have done little to shore up his régime. They will have simply, and perhaps finally, demonstrated two basic facts about the current phase of the Vietnam war: that America remains for the time being the most powerful nation directly involved in the conflict and that she no longer wants to be a party to it.

THE ECONOMIST DECEMBER 2, 1972

Cambodia

The new force

FROM OUR INDOCHINA CORRESPONDENT

Whatever the North Vietnamese have done, or failed to do, in South Vietnam this year, they have certainly managed to organise a genuine local insurgency in Cambodia. A year ago the Cambodian government could argue with some justification that Cambodia's troubles would fade away when the Vietnamese communists withdrew from the country. It is now accepted, however, that most of the fighting on the roads leading into Phnom Penh since the late summer has been the work of communist-led Cambodian guerrillas.

The North Vietnamese seem to have decided to build up the Khmer Rouge forces, and help them to acquire more territory, during the rainy season in the summer and autumn of 1971. This may have been connected with the offensive they were planning in Vietnam for 1972, which was going to use most of their own troops in Cambodia. Anyway, by late this summer intelligence reports put the Khmer Rouge's strength at 40,000 men —not all front-line soldiers, but including 40 to 60 battalions of 200 or more men each, with Cambodian commanders.

The big question is whether these amount to an organised movement. Certainly the rebels in the maquis got there by very different routes. The majority are probably peasants impressed by the North Vietnamese as coolies. Others are remnants of the old anti-Sihanouk Khmer Rouges. There are villagers who took to arms after suffering at the hands of the South Vietnamese army, and some common or garden bandits. But the available intelligence points to North Vietnamese-trained communists as the chief force among the guerrillas.

Since Prince Sihanouk's overthrow in 1970 some 2,000-3,000 of these men have come back from North Vietnam, where they went in 1954 or soon afterwards. They and like-minded later converts, including some intellectuals who rebelled against Prince Sihanouk, together with the North Vietnamese, have organised the aggressive Khmer Rouge units that went into action this summer.

It is hard to get a clear idea of how much of the country they control. Much of Cambodia is no man's land, and has been for two years. But there is evidence from some areas of well organised villages with their own home guard. The relationship between the Cambodian guerrillas and the North Vietnamese will be very important if there is a ceasefire in Vietnam. Will North Vietnam want the guerrillas to stop fighting and try for a compromise political solution, with or without Sihanouk ? They are a new factor in the situation, which the Cambodian government cannot ignore.

THE SUNDAY STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., January 14, 1973

The Blitzkrieg in Southeast Asia

By I. F. STONE

Almost everything Nixon has done since his re-election, whether at home or abroad, in small ways as well as large, fits the portrait of a crafty, suspicious and vindictive man: Isolated and distrustful of those around him, and with that touch of megalomania virtually inescapable when one sits at the buttons which can unleash thermonuclear thunderbolts.

The real problem, as the coming weeks will make clearer, is not just to disengage America from Southeast Asia but from the increasingly one-man rule of Richard Nixon. He can undo with one plunge of his bombers months of slow progress toward detente. He can unite the world against us in hate and fear.

HOW RAPIDLY the scene has changed! It was only seven days before Nixon ordered the B-52s over Hanoi—but it seems a vanished age—when Sen. Edward Kennedy told a Los Angeles audience, "There is more good will in Congress now toward Mr. Nixon than perhaps at any time in his career" and offered Democratic cooperation "in launching a new and effective era of progress. . . ."

A day later, six days before the bombing began, Sen. Humphrey told a Washington press conference on his return from a 15-day trip to Moscow, Warsaw, Bonn, and London that nowhere had he been asked a single question about Vietnam—except by one stray American reporter.

The absence of questions even then indicated an appalling absence of astuteness on the part of Humphrey and his interlocutors. He had had three hours with Kosygin in Moscow, and talked with Prime Minister Jaroszewicz in Warsaw, Willy Brandt and his rival Barzel in Bonn, and both Heath and Harold Wilson in London. That none of them asked about Vietnam shows how easily taken in they were. So was Teddy Kennedy with his lightheaded reference in his Los Angeles speech, "Now that peace is near in Indochina . . . America as a nation has a new horizon of unparalleled opportunity."

In a world that spends billions on intelligence, these statesmen don't even seem to read the newspapers. They had only to skim the Washington dispatches of the past few months to see that the U.S. has been making long-term military and economic aid commitments to South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, and that American air and seapower were being repositioned for intervention from Thai bases and by the Seventh Fleet. Preparatons for a new and prolonged stage of Nixon Doctrine warfare were already visible even before the renewed bombings.

THE MYOPIA is not limited to foreign policy. Kennedy's references to the domestic front in that same Los Angeles speech were downright schoolgirl gushy. "We can find new directions for old approaches," he said, whatever that means. "Already bringing new faces into old agencies, at a time when the glow of his almost incredible election victory is still bright, President Nixon has shown that he knows the opportunity is there. . . ."

What new faces in what old agencies? The promotion of Roy Ash, wonder boy of the Litton roller coaster, leading casualty of the Great Conglomerate Bubble of the Sixties, to oversee through OMB (Office of Management and the Budget) the biggest conglomerate in the world, the U.S. government?

The shift of Nixon's sharpest cost-cutter, "Cap the Knife" Weinberger, to HEW, where he can pare social welfare, and of the administration's softest liberal patsy Richardson to the Pentagon, where he can front for the $4 billion increase already announced in military expenditures?

The replacement at Commerce of the administration's ablest new figure Peterson by a nonentity out of Southern textiles? The packing of sub-Cabinet jobs with plastic men out of the White House staff, all tried and true one-dimensionals?

Neither in the reshufflings nor in Nixon's rhetorical inanities about the Protestant work ethic was anything visible but an effort to reinstitute for the Seventies a Coolidge-type government inadequate even a half century ago, as the stock market crash of 1929 proved.

How easily Nixon could have kept the Democrats quiet. If only he had proceeded softly, it he hadn't—in his own favorite phrase—blown his cool and resumed the bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong. Thanks to the B52s, that proved the shortest era of good feeling in American politics.

THE BOMBING ENDED with the strangest White House press conference of all time. What the newspapers failed to explain is that the presidential announcement for which correspondents were hurriedly summoned to the White House Saturday morning, Dec. 30, never mentioned the end of the bombing. This came out only in response to questions from startled correspondents. Only readers of the New York Times, which ran the transcript, could realize this. The announcement by Gerald Warren, the deputy presidential press secretary, simply said:

"The President has asked me to announce this morning that negotiations between presidential adviser Dr. Kissinger and special adviser Le Duc Tho, and Minister Xuan Thuy, will be resumed in Paris on Jan. 8. Technical talks between the experts of the two sides will be resumed on Jan. 2. That is the extent of the announcement."

Nothing was said about any suspension of the bombing. The very first question seemed to assume that, since no stoppage had been announced, it must be going on—

Q. "Senator Saxbe has said and been quoted quite widely that the President 'appears to have left his senses.' And he described the sort of bombing going on in Hanoi as an act of 'arrogance and irresponsibility.' Gerry, can you reply

to that? Is there any reaction from the President?"

A. "No, I wouldn't reply to that."

It was only then that somebody though to ask the question and drew these stingy responses—

Q. "Will there be a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam?"

A. "The President has ordered that all bombing will be discontinued above the 20th Parallel as long as serious negotiations are underway."

Q. "Effective when?"

A. "I can't discuss the timing of military operations."

Q. "Are we bombing right now, this minute?"

A. "I really can't discuss military operations from here."

The press was still in the dark, and tried a new tack—

Q. "Did you say 'effective negotiations'?"

A. "No, 'serious negotiations.' "

Q. "You are implying then that it wouldn't halt until they actually start and we decide that they are serious?"

To this Mr. Warren finally replied, "No, as soon as it was clear that serious negotiations could be resumed at both the technical level and between the principals, the President ordered that all bombing be discontinued above the 20th Parallel." But the sparring continued, and after three more questions and answers we had this—

Q. "So the order has been made. In other words the bombing halt is in effect?"

A. "The order has been made."

* * * *

Q. "Has the order taken effect?"

A. "I cannot discuss that."

Q. "But it has gone out?"

A. "That is correct. . . ."

And after 13 more questions, which still shed no further light on what had happened, the briefing ended with this—

Q. "Gerry, since you won't discuss the military aspects, is it possible the Pentagon can tell us whether, like, from midnnight on, there was no more bombing?

A. "It is possible. I just don't know."

With the whole world waiting and on edge, that is all the White House woulld say. The bare record seems to reflect an arrogant contempt for the press and for world opinion.

GERALD WARREN did not claim that the bombings had forced North Vietnam to the negotiating table. The North Vietnamese walked out on the negotiations because of the bombing, but said all along they woulld return when it stopped. On the other hand when it did stop, Vo Van Sung, their representative in Paris, declared that the result of the large-scale bombing had been "a military and political defeat" for the United States and "a strategic victory for our people." The bombing was undoubtedly a moral and military defeat for Nixon. He not only succeeded in making the United States look like a bully in the eyes of the world but a bully who had suffered a well-deserved bloody nose.

Like so much else about this disgraceful episode in our national history, most of what led up to the bombing is still secret. When the North Vietnamese and the PRG delegations walked out of the Paris talks on Dec. 21 to protest the bombings, they charged that ever since the talks resumed in November the United States had threatened "two or three times daily" to break off talks and resume bombing north of the 20th Parallel.

The North Vietnamese spokesman, Nguyen Thanh Le, told a press conference that day, "The more good will we showed, the more the Nixon Administration adopted an unreasonable attitude; the more we proved our flexibility, the more it demanded fundamental modifications (of the agreed text) and the more the Nixon Administration used military pressure to (try to) subjugate us."

If the other side's account is correct, these threats explain North Vietnam's order of Dec. 3 to begin evacuating all schoolchildren from Hanoi. The United States has not denied that threats were made, but its propagandists have twisted the evacuation order to prove that "as of Dec. 3, Hanoi already was planning to scuttle the negotiation."

This is on a par with Pentagon claims that if civilians were hurt in Hanoi it must have been their own fault because (a) Hanoi had shot down American planes and the debris had hit civilians or (b) they were hit by debris from all those SAM missiles. As the mugger said, if the victim hadn't resisted, he wouldn't have been hurt.

IT IS HARD to decide which is worse—the vindictive cruelty of the air raids or the lies told to excuse them. The most transparent of these lies was that the attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong were needed to disrupt a new offensive. When Nixon suspended the bombing above the 20th Parallel in October to express his satisfaction (then) with the agreement disclosed October 26, Aviation Week (October 30) carried a two-page summary of the results. It said the seven months of "Operation Linebacker," which Nixon launched last May 8, had "proven more effective, more crippling than the years of the Rolling Thunder operation" that Lyndon Johnson ended in October 1968.

"Even should the cease-fire efforts fail," Aviation Week reported, "they (i.e., U.S. military officials) believe the Communist supply network has been so severely crippled that it will require months to repair." Similarly Michael Getler, Pentagon correspondent of the *Washington Post*, reported in that paper (Dec. 24), "Prior to the renewed bombing no U.S. military commanders were expressing any fears of a new North Vietnamese assault." Intelligence reported that the other side was preparing for political rather than military action.

No doubt great suffering was imposed on the civilian population and great damage on communications and transport as well as on remaining industrial and power facilities. But the price was high enough to be humbling to the world's strongest military power.

To see the losses in perspective one must recall that the B-52s were intended for the nuclear bombardment of the Soviet Union. Air Force sources said the average losses over Hanoi were no greater than expected—from 2 to 3 percent of the planes participating. But reporters could not find out whether this was the margin of loss expected in all-out nuclear war or in conventional bombardment over the heavily defended Hanoi-Haiphong area.

In nuclear war, even if only 2 to 3 percent get through the results would be terrible. One B-52 can carry enough nuclear weapons to wreck a moderate-sized city. But in conventional war, a 2 to 3 percent rate loss is high, particularly when you are talking of a virtually irreplaceable aircraft like the B-52. A 2 percent rate means that in fifty days of concentrated bombing the entire fleet would be lost; a 3 percent rate would eat up a B-52 fleet in 33 days or a little more than

a month.

IN THE 11 days of concentrated bombing over Hanoi and Haiphong, the Air Force admitted to 15 B-52s shot down and later added that six more B-52s made it back but landed as wrecks. That is 10 percent of the 200 B-52s supposed to be assigned to the Far East theater and 20 percent of the 100 B52s supposed to have been used daily. No definite and final official figures have been given.

The loss in pilots was worse. When Johnson called off the air war in October 1968, the Pentagon said "more than" 450 airmen had been killed, captured, or were missing since the air war began in 1961. In 11 days of bombing Nixon lost 93 airmen, or 20 percent as many in 11 days as were lost in the first eight years.

It would be most enlightening if a congressional committee could learn what exactly was gained in strictly military terms for all this expenditure. A Saigon dispatch in the New York Times, Dec. 31, noted reports that a textile factory and a noodle factory in Hanoi had both been heavily bombed in one of the final raids. The complaint in the Korean war was that "we were trading B-26s (the predecessor of the B-52) for trucks in a most uneconomical manner." We wonder how many noodles Nixon got per lost pilot.

WITH US AMERICANS aerial bombardment is more than tactical or strategic: it has become a disease; it is downright maniacal, a compulsive twitch. The year-end compilation out of the Pentagon says we have showered about 7 million tons of bombs and rockets on Southeast Asia since we set out to make it safe for something or other on Jan. 1, 1961. This is more than 2 million tons greater than all the bombs we dropped on Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Pacific in World War II, and more than 10 times the 635,000, tons dropped on Korea.

If victory-by-airpower were more than a delusion, Korea long ago would have been united in desolation. We literally left nothing standing above the 38th Parallel. We had overwhelming air superiority yet we were pushed back to the parallel and North Korea was re-established. Bombing surveys after World War II showed that in industrial countries output expanded and morale rose as the bombs fell. But delusions are not cured by rational demonstration.

In underdeveloped countries like Indochina's, the cost of every peasant killed is by now many times his weight in gold, but life—and the war—goes on.

NOW BOTH SIDES are back at the negotiating table, but there is no sign that either has changed. My guess is that Nixon is more frustrated, Hanoi more determined. Nixon has shot another bolt. He is unlikely soon again to risk B-52s over Hanoi, not with conventional weapons at least. So far he has bought every military recipe for victory-by-demolition except wholesale destruction of the dikes—and "nukes." How much more will our gambler gamble, and how much more can his new friends in Moscow and Peking take before they begin to think their own security endangered?

NIXON'S FRUSTRATION must be all the greater because he began calling in 1965 for the mining of Haiphong and the bombing of Hanoi as sure ways "to win the war in Vietnam and to end it," as he said on "Meet the Press" in December of that year. We now know from the Pentagon Papers that this was what the Air Force asked for in March 1968, in a last attempt to stave off the bombing halt that year by Lyndon Johnson.

Never was barbarity put forward more suavely. Dr. Harold Brown, then Secretary of the Air Force, now the "liberal" member of our SALT negotiating team, argued in a memorandum in March 1968, that intensified bombing of the "remaining important targets" (already few) around Hanoi and "neutralization of the port of Haiphong by bombing and mining" would "permit bombing of military targets without the present scrupulous concern for collateral civilian damage and casualties." And just in case anyone missed the point so antiseptically suggested, or thought these civilian casualties were merely tangential and accidental, Dr. Brown's concluding paragraph on the objective of this exercise began, "The aims of this alternative campaign would be to erode the will of the population by exposing a wider area of NVN to casualties and destruction. . . ."

"Erode the will"—what stylistic delicacies are cultivated by these Pentagon Flauberts. This erosion, plus the destruction of import and transit facilities, Dr. Brown argued, "would be expected to bring NVN to negotiation of a compromise settlement, or to abandonment of the fight in SVN." That's the blueprint Nixon has been following for the last eight months, and in his final fierce spasm of terror-for-Christmas.

Just what happened to the earlier compromise announced in October nobody, outside of an ever smaller circle, knows. Nixon's is becoming government-by-soliloquy. In the two weeks before the Christmas bombing, the visitors' record at the White House showed only three persons who had conferred with Nixon—Kissinger, Kissinger's aide Haig, and the Republican Senate Majority Leader Scott, who later said he had been urging the White House for days to end the bombing.

Despite the momentous gambles Nixon has been taking, there has not been a meeting of the National Security Council since May 8, of the Cabinet since Nov. 8, no press conference at which he allowed questions since Oct. 5. He came out of isolation only for the Truman funeral and to see the Redskins' coach after their victory, an event he seemed to consider earth-shaking. The free press in the capital of the free world has been largely dependent on Hanoi radio and Thieu's personal newspaper in Saigon, *Tin Song*, for news of what's going on.

All we know is that on Oct. 26, Kissinger said "peace is at hand" and that Nixon in a series of pre-election barnstorming speeches in various small towns around the country repeated the same theme. At Huntington W. Va., Oct. 26, he spoke of "a significant breakthrough" in the peace talks.

In Ashland, Ky., the same day, he even compared this with the Armistice in 1918. At Saginaw, Mich., two days later, he said, "Vietnam being over, we are proud of the fact that our trips to Peking and to Moscow have paved the way not just for ending this war but for a generation of peace."

In a nationwide radio broadcast on Nov. 2, he said the "major breakthrough" would "accomplish the basic objectives" he set forth last May 8, when he ordered the mining and bombing. These were the return of all POWs, a ceasefire

throughout Indochina, and the right for South Vietnam to determine its own future "without having a Communist government or a coalition government" imposed upon it. No mention, of course, of the one-man dictatorship we have been helping Thieu to fasten on its 17 million people.

Even on Dec. 16, the day Kissinger appeared to let it be known, though as opaquely as possible, that peace was no longer at hand, Herbert G. Klein, Nixon's top PR man, released for publication a lengthy survey of "Nixon's Four Years —Change That Works," which repeated the same theme that peace was at hand, except for a few final details. "Peace"—Nixon told Garnett Horner of the *Washington Star* in an interview released just after the election—was near: "You can bank on it."

If Kissinger's deliberately obscure and one-sided presentation is read side by side with Xuan Thuy's appearance on ABC's "Issues and Answers" on Dec. 24, what has happened seems reasonably clear. Hanoi and the PRG were willing to swallow a bitter compromise in October which enabled Nixon to appear as a peace candidate.

The other side then accepted what until last October it had always said was unacceptable—the "two-track approach" by which Nixon would get the POWs in return for a ceasefire, while leaving Hanoi to negotiate a political settlement with Thieu "on the other track." That track, as I have argued, is made for more collisions, not for U.S. disengagement.

But now, with the election over, Nixon is going for more. Now he wants a one-track settlement, a cease-fire *and* a political settlement in one package, which will force Hanoi to accept a divided country permanently, under pain of renewed U.S. bombing and shelling. This would mean that many more years of involvement in Indochina are "at hand."

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I. F. Stone is a contributing editor of The New York Review of Books.

WASHINGTON STAR
7 January 1973

CROSBY S. NOYES

Nixon Keeps Us Guessing—and Maybe He Should

My friends are all furious about the way that democracy is going to the dogs in this country. A good many of them are paid to know what's going on. And when they can't find out, it gets them very upset about the people who aren't telling them.

You really can't blame them. A good many things are obviously going on that people are interested in, and President Nixon hasn't been willing to give them the time of day. Apart from George Allen, the only person he seems to be talking to these days is Henry Kissinger. And Kissinger is a genius at talking to people at great length without telling them anything that they want to know.

Congress, apparently, feels the same way—sort of left out of things.

Naturally it makes people frustrated and annoyed, and there is a lot of talk going around about how the system is being perverted by one-man rule.

The only trouble is, of course, that the presidency has been the dominant force in the government for close to 200 years now and there isn't very much that Carl Albert or anybody else is likely to be able to do about it.

Nixon may be somewhat more secretive than some of our presidents in the past and he doesn't seem to care very much about his relations with Capitol Hill, but he hardly can be accused of inventing the idea of an independent executive.

Come to think of it, quite a lot of things have happened that we weren't much consulted about beforehand. I don't recall being asked, for instance, what I thought about invading Normandy, or dropping an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, or sending troops to Korea, or invading the Bay of Pigs.

It could be that the notion that this country normally operates by a system of unrestricted information, consultation and consensus is something of a myth. Most of our recent presidents, at any rate, have had a way of acting first and consulting afterward in matters of primary importance to the country.

It may be that Nixon is more susceptible to this use —or abuse—of presidential authority, being at the beginning of his last term and therefore less "accountable" to the Congress and public opinion for what he does. One suspects, however, that this supposed non-accountability is more impressive to the anxious critics of Nixon's policies than it is to the President himself.

Any president, including this one, is ultimately accountable for everything that he does. If his policies fail, no amount of prior consultation and public relations will redeem his reputation and historical standing. If they succeed, it will probably make very little difference that the country was largely in the dark about what he was up to at the time.

The people's much-asserted "right to know," furthermore, has never been fully subscribed to by any government that ever existed. What the people don't know much of the time is a lot. And quite often there are perfectly valid reasons, aside from the natural furtiveness of chief executives, that make it imperative to leave them in ignorance.

Something of the sort may be the case today. What everybody is so worked up about, of course, are the negotiations on Vietnam and the chances of reaching a settlement of the war in the near future. Among other things, they want to know whether and why it was necessary to bomb the hell out of Hanoi and Haiphong at such a high cost in lives and public anguish. They are asking what or who it was that blocked the settlement that Kissinger said was at hand and what the real prospects are today.

The questions are pertinent and so, perhaps, are the reasons for not answering them. The most detailed knowledge by the public and the Congress on the state of the negotiations probably would not bring a settlement nearer. And indeed, it might foreclose the possibility of arriving at any settlement at all.

It is hard to ask people to live with their frustrations and their ignorance, but for the time being it may be necessary. Because the simple fact is that Nixon and Kissinger are not negotiating with the White House press corps or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee but with the North Vietnamese.

Everything that has been said and left unsaid so far is a part of that negotiation. Until it is concluded, the President has the right—and perhaps the duty—to keep the country guessing.

WASHINGTON POST
14 JANUARY 1973

'Fight Till Death'

No Peace in Sight for Hamlet

By Thomas W. Lippman
Washington Post Foreign Service

BAHA, South Vietnam—The struggle for control of this cheerless hamlet is a grim and vengeful feud that has been going on with sporadic violence for over a decade. As in so many of South Vietnam's rural backwaters, the conflict seems unlikely to be ended by any international agreement.

It resembles a vendetta of mountain clans more than war, and has created a bitterness likely to linger long after the mechanized divisions have fought their last big battle.

"I personally must fight against the Vietcong till death," one of the hamlet's prominent residents said. "And as for the VC—if they capture me, they will kill me."

Life has been like that for a long time in Baha, one of the seven hamlets of Ninhdiem Village, an isolated fishing and salt-producing community nestled against the coast of the South China Sea 25 miles north of Nhatrang.

Palm and pine trees wave in the cooling breezes, but the sandy soil yields little and the villagers take their living from the sea. The boat is to Ninhdiem what the water buffalo is to most of the country, and the air is rancid with the odor of tens of thousands of tiny shrimp drying in the sun.

The entire village, which has 6,630 residents, was under Vietcong control in the early 1960s. Government troops fought their way into the village in 1965, but the local government and security set up at gunpoint still appear to be tenuous at best.

Vietcong Propaganda

Last spring, during the North Vietnamese offensive, Vietcong pamphleteers moved freely through Ninhdiem, distributing propaganda leaflets. Samples can still be seen at the village office.

The two southernmost hamlets, at the foot of a forbidding chain of hills that intersect the beach, have been all but abandoned under continuing Vietcong harassment. In the other five, as an American with years of experience in the area said, "It only takes one incursion a month to keep up the psychological pressure."

The rough road that links Ninhdiem to the district capital of Ninhhoa and the rest of Khanhhoa Province intersects Highway 1, the country's main North-South road, about five miles inland. At that intersection is the headquarters of South Korea's Tiger Division, whose troops occupy firebases throughout the district.

It was a Korean unit that captured a document 10 months ago that caught the eye of U.S. officials when it was forwarded through channels to Saigon.

It bore names of 81 Ninhdiem residents identified as "puppet government and army officials," listing each of them by name, age, place of birth, occupation, social class, present position in the government, criminal acts committed, and "measures proposed." A typical example was the description of one Nguyen Van Co.: Age 35, born in Baha, tailor, petty bourgeois, special intelligence agent.

Twenty-two of the names were from Baha. For 20 of them, the entry under "measures proposed" was "to be killed." For the other two, it was "to be submitted to long-term thought-reform."

Two of the 22 had already been killed at the time the list was captured. One more, the hamlet chief, has been assassinated since, as has the wife of his successor, and another on the list has been wounded in an ambush. Six have fled to the district headquarters town. Three of those who stayed sleep elsewhere at night.

No argument in Vietnam is more threadbare than that over whether there would or would not be mass executions if the Vietcong took over, and the bottomless well of "captured enemy documents" is often scorned as a source of worthwhile information.

For the people whose names are on the Baha list, however, or at least for those who could be found for interviews, those questions are irrelevant. The issue for them is one of survival, of an unending struggle with "them," devoid of ideology but no less threatening to themselves and their families.

The Saigon government, of course, has its own lists, and thousands of persons have been rounded up on the merest suspicion of disloyalty. In a place like Baha, where neither side is strong enough to achieve complete domination, the continuing struggle breeds fear and resentment on both sides.

The first name on the Vietcong's Baha list was that of Nguyen Tot, who was hamlet chief for several years. He was slain last March. The man who holds that post is Nguyen Bon, a sad-eyed man of 36 whose name was fourth on the list. A former Vietcong, he was deputy hamlet chief for security from 1967 to 1971.

Death of Bon's Wife

He said—and sources at the district headquarters confirmed—that shortly after he became hamlet chief last fall, his wife was killed one night while he was out on patrol with the local militia. Bon is a civilian but carries a carbine even during the day, and says he seldom sleeps at home. He was left with six children when his wife died; a sister cares for them.

"Any time the Vietcong come into my hamlet they can kill anybody they like," Bon said. "I don't know exactly the people they'll attempt to kill, but I am hamlet official and a nationalist, so I must take precautions for myself."

Bon said he had not seen the Vietcong list previously, and noted with surprise that it contained names of persons who he believed "live in neutralism or are pro-Communist and supply food for the Vietcong. Thanks to that document you have shown me," he said, "I think I have a better understanding of what needs to be done."

Bon was asked why the houses of Baha have neither the pictures of President Thieu nor South Vietnamese flags which are found in most government-controlled areas.

"We only have enough to distribute them to village cadres and officials," he said. "But even if He had enough to give to each family, I don't think it would be useful, because the hamlet is insecure at night. A few days ago, the VC came in and tore down Thieu's picture and some paper government flags. So we don't have any more."

Bon said that if there is a cease-fire, "Vietcong who understand government policy and return to live in peace" will be welcome, but "the others, who do not know or understand the policy, should live separately." After that, he said, "I do my job, the Vietcong do their job."

A hundred yards away is the house of Huynh Phan, an unsmiling man of 50 denounced on the Vietcong list as a "special secret security agent" who "opposes the revolution."

As is accurately noted under "remarks," Phan is a Cham, one of the few surviving descendants of the Cham Empire that ruled much of what is now Vietnam centuries ago. He is also a fomer government tax collector.

Phan said that he takes his wife and the three of his four daughters who live at home to one of the other hamlets at night.

"The VC have said they would like to kill me," he said. "In December they came to the gate of my house, and when no one answered they jumped the fence and came into my house. We were not there, but I know that means they wanted to kill me."

He knew from neighbors that the intruders were Vietcong and not North Vietnamese, he said, because they spoke with the familiar local accent.

Phan's wife was mentioned by several local officials as a Vietcong sympathizer because she has provided burial services for Communist soldiers.

"If they find anything to show my wife is on the other side," Phan said, "I'll let them come in and take all I have, and burn my house. She is a kind woman. She buries the corpses, she burns the incense over them, she doesn't care whether the soldier is government or VC."

Doan Hut is a 57-year-old fisherman marked for death by the Vietcong because he is believed to be a "special security agent." A former village chief, he said that he had been dodging the VC for years and finally fled to a nearby island after Tot was slain.

Only the inability to make enough money from fishing on the island brought him back, he said, and "I do not stay at home at night."

Hut said his younger brother and three other relatives had been killed by the Vietcong, and "I don't dare to live in this hamlet any more. I have to find some secure place to live."

Six Move Away

It is not easy for the ordinary Vietnamese peasant or fisherman to leave his native hamlet and move to a city, especially if he is not an official refugee entitled to some government assistance. But six of those named on the list have gone

to Ninhhoa district town to live.

One of them is Nguyen Tin, the young deputy hamlet chief who was attacked by the Vietcong while out in his boat on Jan. 20, 1972. The date is clearly marked on the x-rays he proudly exhibits to show the bullets.

One of them broke his right leg, and he is still bedridden with a cast over the break, but he acknowledged with a grin that the leg had healed once, only to be refractured when he fell off his motorbike.

"I'm riding the back of the tiger," he said of his dealings with the Vietcong. "I've served the government, so I've no choice but to go on with it. If I can't do the big jobs I'll have to do the small ones."

Another who has moved to Ninhhoa is Nguyen Tro, the deputy hamlet chief of Baha and government information officer.

"I still have those jobs," he said, "but I only go to Baha from time to time. I don't like to let the Vietcong know what time I'm coming so they can't set up an ambush."

Tro said that he, like hamlet chief Bon, had been mentioned specifically on Vietcong leaflets that had been circulated in the hamlet.

"Their leaflet listed my name, my birthday, my number of children, and said I was accused by the Revolutionary Committee because I support the government." His opposition to the VC, he said, is not really political. They kidnapped his wife briefly in 1965.

Tro was scornful of the methods by which the Vietcong select those they believe to be cooperating with the government.

"Let me tell you how the VC work," he said.

"Suppose you're a hamlet chief and I'm just a villager and you come to my house. Of course I must receive you, but in reality I'm very reluctant to welcome you into my home. If you only come once then nothing happens. But if you visit me more than three times, the Vietcong will accuse me of working with you. The Vietcong are stupid — innocent people will hate them."

The district chief of Ninhhoa, a tennis-playing lieutenant colonel named Do Huu Nhan, said Baha was one of the places the Vietcong were planning to seize when they were operating under an Oct. 31 deadline for cease-fire last year.

Since then, according to American sources in the province, the threat to the little hamlet has been eased by the death of five of the local Communist troops who were caught in an ambush in December.

"What I think is going to happen if there's a cease-fire," said one American familiar with the area, "is that there will be a night of the long knives," a phrase that is heard often in Saigon these days. "It will be very brief, and I think the government will win."

What will happen if the period of bloodshed is not brief, or if the Saigon government does not win, is far from clear.

Authoritative U.S. sources in Saigon have made it clear that the United States is prepared to tolerate the occasional assassinations of hamlet officials after a cease-fire, but it is not known how the United States will react if it goes beyond that—or how North Vietnam will react if Saigon's forces try to move against the Vietcong.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 January 1973

Helms Reported to Say China Nears Status of 'Superpower'

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 9 — Richard Helms, the director of Central Intelligence, has reportedly told Congress that China may be approaching the status of a "superpower" because of advances in weapons technology.

His statement came to light after a session of the Senate Armed Services Committee today. Senator Stuart Symington, a committee member, when speaking to newsmen, referred to Mr. Helm's testimony yesterday.

The committee is considering the nomination of Elliot L. Richardson as Secretary of Defense.

Senator Symington, Democrat of Missouri, said that he had been "surprised—shocked, I believe is a better word" to learn from the Helms testimony "how close another power is to becoming a superpower."

Thurmond Also 'Surprised'

After the hearing today another committee member, Senator Strom Thurmond, Republican of South Carolina, told newsmen that the reference had been to China. He said that he, too, had been "surprised that Red China is making progress as fast as they are" in the development of both nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

According to Mr. Symington, the disclosure by Mr. Helms "reduces the practical effect" of the strategic-arms limitation negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Neither Senator would specify details of the briefing. Mr. Helms declined to describe his testimony after the hearing yesterday.

A Pentagon spokesman said that the Department of Defense would not elaborate on the assertion yesterday by the outgoing Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, that "the Chinese are moving forward rapidly" with development of liquid-fueled missile systems.

Mr. Laird made the statement in a report to the House Armed Services Committee.

NEW YORK TIMES
12 January 1973

Brutal Politics of War

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By C. L. Sulzberger

PARIS—It may prove historically correct that the Communist Tet offensive of 1968, a military failure, was indeed North Vietnam's first real victory over the United States in the Indochina war, and that the American bombing attack on Hanoi and Haiphong in December, 1972, despite demonstrable Communist losses in striking power, provided them a second major triumph.

Neither conjectural assessment can yet be regarded as conclusive, yet, in both cases, it is apparent that purely material aspects of strategic actions turned out to be secondary in importance to psychological and political aspects.

The Tet offensive was disastrous to the Communists from a battlefield viewpoint. After their initial successes and repression in the temporarily captured South Vietnamese city of Hue, the Communist forces were defeated with immense casualties. Saigon's army and regime proved they could fight.

But incalculable damage done in the crucial sector of U.S. public opinion and criticism of President Lyndon Johnson set in motion an intense reaction that favored Hanoi, starting with intellectuals and university students. This ended with Mr. Johnson's political retirement.

President Nixon subsequently initiated U.S. bombing of the northern centers after an original tough response to Hanoi's March, 1972, offensive and also after attacks on Communist positions in Cambodia and Laos which had kept alive the savage opposition of those who detested the war's impact on America itself.

The bombers struck following a breakdown in Paris peace negotiations and during a lapse in Congressional sessions. But, just as the defeat of Communist forces in 1968 was politically counter-productive, the December, 1972, air raids also were politically counterproductive.

The American and West European press filled swiftly with stories about "murder bombing" and "terror bombing." Since most humans laudably favor any underdog, within little time emotional adversaries began to compare Mr. Nixon with Hitler and the raids wth Nazi slaughtehouses.

Hanoi's official figures, according to the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris, say that 1,318 people were Killed in Hanoi by the December B-52 raids. Haiphong municipal authorities, according to Agence France Presse, say 305 were killed in Haiphong. Blood cannot be measured; nor can the exquisite and precious gift of life.

Nevertheless, certan comparsons must be made. North Vietnam's official statistics of 1,623 persons killed in the "murder bombing" ow December compares with Saigon's official statistics of 5,800 persons slaughtered, principally by throat-cutting or bural alve, durng the Communst occupation of the South Vietnamese city of Hue in February, 1968.

The second point in this coldly dreadful numbers game is in terms of comparison with other bombardments. During World War II, 135,000 deaths were caused by Allied bombing of Dresden on Feb. 14 and 16, 1945, and 83,000 in Tokyo on one firebomb raid in March, 1945. This does not mention the ghastly results of atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

There are certain dismal deductions to be made. U.S. raids on North Vietnam obviously avoided use of those incendiary bombs which so easily destroy Asiatic cities like Tokyo—or Hanoi. Secondly, although the enormous tonnage dropped by B-52's blatantly exceeded World War II airloads, they produced relatively lesser results. They certainly weren't aimed at North Vietnam's vulnerable dikes.

These subjects have not been adequately discussed in the angry Western press. One has enormous distaste for quantifying pain. Yet the fact remains that, in contrast with spirited criticism published in democratic organs, the Soviet and Chinese expressions have seemed relatively restrained.

All this having been said, there isn't the slightest doubt that the United States is eager to end this unfortunate war, so tarnishing to its image. It seems doomed to the distasteful choice between accepting an unhappy compromise—even less palatable than that hoped for before the bombing started—or an even unhappier fallback strategy.

The North Vietnamese have employed all kinds of devices such as mistranslations of the word "mien" or "zone" of Vietnam to obfuscate even the implication of a South Vietnamese authority in Saigon, in order to confuse any agreement.

They have guilefully used U.S. prisoners to blackmail Washington into exercising pressure on Saigon—preferring to press for a United States role of open hostility to President Thieu rather than a mere U.S. withdrawal.

At this moment, the American people seem stuck with an awful choice of conditions. They possess immense military power to impose their national policy, and they possess little political will or moral desire to use this power.

BALTIMORE SUN
16 January 1973

Peace blueprint has altered little

By JAMES S. KEAT
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—If peace is again "at hand" in Vietnam, its framework appears to be in most essentials the aborted October draft agreement.

The guardedly optimistic reports from United States and Vietnamese officials indicate that Henry A. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho have worked out a tentative pact very much along the same lines as the draft that raised such high hopes little more than two months ago.

Not wholly clear

Precisely how the October draft has been changed in detail is not yet wholly clear. In at least one respect the very heart of the peace plan was involved.

The October draft never was made public in full. The North Vietnamese broadcast a nine-point summary of the long document October 26 that the United States agreed was essentially accurate. It prompted Dr. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, to announce that "peace is at hand."

The nine points, in Hanoi's summary, were:

1. The United States recognizes the sovereignty, unification and territorial integrity of Vietnam as provided in the 1954 Geneva agreements that ended the French-Indochinese war.

Pullout within 60 days

2. A cease-fire will be proclaimed, and 24 hours later the United States will end all military activities against North Vietnam. U.S. forces will be withdrawn from South Vietnam within 60 days. No advisers or war materiel can be sent either to government or to rebel forces in South Vietnam, except for replacement of worn-out equipment on an equivalent basis. The United States will not intervene in South Vietnamese internal affairs.

3. All captured personnel will be returned while the U.S. troops are leaving.

4. The South Vietnamese people will decide their own political future through free, internationally supervised elections. A Council of National Conciliation and Concord, consisting of representatives from the Saigon government, the Viet Cong, and neutralists will organize the elections and oversee the implementations of the agreements. The Saigon regime and Viet Cong will discuss the formation of similar councils at lower layers of the government structure.

A reduction in the size of Vietnamese armed forces in the South will be negotiated by the two South Vietnamese parties. The two South Vietnamese parties will try to settle the country's internal affairs within six months.

5. The unification of Vietnam will be achieved peacefully.

6. Military committees, composed of just the two South Vietnamese parties in some cases and joined by U.S. and North Vietnamese officers in other instances, will oversee the cease-fire along with an international supervisory body. An international conference on Vietnam will be convened in 30 days.

7. All parties will respect the sovereignty of Laos and Cambodia, as provided in the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements, and pledge not to use their territories for hostile activities against any other nation. All foreign forces will be withdrawn from Cambodia and Laos. There will be no further foreign interference there.

8. The end of the war will mark the beginning of a new relationship between the United States and North Vietnam. The United States will contribute to the rehabilitation of North Vietnam and the other Indochinese nations.

9. The agreement will become effective after it is signed.

Although the draft quickly became known as the nine-point agreement, U.S. officials say the nine points are simply Hanoi's summary of a text that contains far more articles. They also have remarked that the summary is skewed a bit to favor Hanoi's views.

Hardly had the draft been completed about the middle of October than differences arose over the meaning of some provisions. Each side accused the other of trying to modify points already agreed upon. President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam bitterly opposed some features.

Three long negotiating sessions and two weeks of intensive bombing later, Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Tho, a member of the North Vietnamese Politburo, again appeared to have negotiated the framework of an agreement, subject perhaps to acquiescence in Saigon and to some final tidying up in Paris.

In one form or another, the central dispute since the end of October seems to have involved the crucial element of the agreement—in fact, of the whole tragic conflict: who will retain how much political authority in South Vietnam.

The October draft left the political future of the South a calculated ambiguity. It was to be resolved by the South Vietnamese government and the Viet Cong's provisional revolutionary government. This Mr. Thieu would not accept.

Some support

While Dr. Kissinger continues to insist that the United States does not intend to settle the South's political future in the agreement, he has indicated some support of objections by Mr. Thieu that underlie that fundamental point.

In his last news conference December 16, when the negotiations seemed to have broken down, Dr. Kissinger said a major stumbling block was Hanoi's insistence on its right to intervene in the South after a cease-fire. He said the United States wanted some provision that the two Vietnams would live in peace with each other, eschewing the use of force.

This issue has surfaced in recent weeks in several forms. One has been the so-called sovereignty issue, in which the two sides are purported to be arguing who is sovereign over what in the South. Another is the sanctity of the old demilitarized zone along the 17th Parallel and whether it constitutes a permanent boundary or a temporary demarcation line.

Goes back to 1954

These questions raise the issue that first was posed in 1954, when the French agreed to leave their colony and divide it temporarily into two zones, to be reunited two years later after elections were held. South Vietnamese leaders have insisted from the start that their part of the old colony is distinct and independent, while Hanoi has insisted that all Vietnam is one, eventually to be re-unified.

If the demilitarized zone is re-established, Hanoi's ability to intervene in the South would be severely limited and to maintain its troops for very long impossible, regardless of what agreements in principle are reached on these points.

If the line at the 17th Parallel is temporary, all Vietnam is an entity, artificially sundered. If the line is a permanent political boundary, all Vietnam is divided in two parts for as long as one can foresee.

Other issues

Other issues have been identified as troublesome points, but each loomed less large than the dispute over Vietnam as a polity. One is the nature of the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord, which Mr. Thieu feared would become the coalition government that he has vowed he will not accept.

Will the council make political decisions, or will it simply be an administrative organ? Will councils be set up at local levels, giving the Viet Cong political footholds in areas that they do not now control? What freedom to move around in government-controlled territory will the Viet Cong officials have?

Another stumbling block, according to Dr. Kissinger, was the size of the truce supervisory force that will be provided by four nations—Canada, Indonesia, Hungary and Poland. The United States wanted 5,000 men with their own means of traveling throughout the country to investigate truce violations. Hanoi reportedly wanted only 250 men with no independent facilities. Obviously the real issue was whether there would be effective policing of the cease-fire or a bobtailed operation that would be unable to cope with widespread violations.

Hanoi's troops in the South

Intertwined at one point in the negotiations were the fate of North Vietnamese troops in the South—125,000 of them by U.S. count, 300,000 of them by Saigon's reckoning—the 577 known U.S. prisoners in Indochina and 1,339 missing and, finally, the uncounted thousands of civilian prisoners in South Vietnamese jails.

The October draft, according to Dr. Kissinger, left the fate

of Saigon's prisoners, mostly suspected Viet Cong agents but including some non-Communist dissidents, to be worked out with the Viet Cong after a cease-fire. The U.S. prisoners were not linked to them.

When Dr. Kissinger returned to Paris in November with his proposed revisions in the draft, he apparently was met with a refusal to free the U.S. prisoners conditional only on the withdrawal of the 24,000 U.S. troops remaining in South Vietnam. This may have been a gambit to counter Saigon's demand for a reduction of North Vietnamese power in the South or to assuage Viet Cong anger over the neglect of their cadres in the October deal.

Finally, there was another calculated ambiguity about the fates of Laos and Cambodia. While each presents special problems, essentially they are side issues in the Vietnam conflict. The October draft did not provide, as far as is publicly known, for a cease-fire in those two countries. All that was required was the withdrawal of foreign troops and neutralization of their territory from outside interference.

However, Mr. Nixon said in late October that a cease-fire must be effective throughout Indochina, which would include Hanoi's indigenous allies in Laos and Cambodia. Both could continue fighting for a while if deprived of outside support, but not indefinitely. The issue here would appear to be one of an eventual cease-fire in fact versus a proclaimed truce simultaneous with the larger conflict.

WASHINGTON POST
10 JANUARY 1973

Secretary Laird and the Star-News Are Right

Not a week has gone by since the President had a minion lash Congress for daring to suggest that the time to get out of the Vietnam war is now. And yet Melvin R. Laird, who has been Mr. Nixon's own Defense Secretary the last four years, reports that the success of "Vietnamization" makes possible "today . . . the complete termination of American involvement in the war." Like those in Congress supporting a war-fund cutoff, Mr. Laird adds only one condition: the safe return of American prisoners of war and an accounting of the missing.

Listening to Mr. Laird, House Armed Services chairman F. Edward Hebert, entirely an administration loyalist on the war, replied, "we have got to get that honorable peace." And what is that? "The honorable peace," Chairman Hebert explained, "depends solely on the return of those POWs and an account of the missing and I think you share that opinion."

"I do," answered Mr. Laird.

We have not heard the White House lash Mr. Laird or Mr. Hebert for undercutting the Paris talks by their suggestion that, as the Secretary put it, the United States has done "the most any ally could reasonably expect, for no nation can provide to another the will and determination to survive." Nor do we expect to. (Mr. Laird's prepared remarks on Vietnam are excerpted elsewhere on this page.)

Look elsewhere, at, for instance, newspapers which have been sympathetic to Mr. Nixon on the war. Last Friday, the Wall Street Journal said that "the one thing the Americans ought to insist on" at Paris is "a bare minimum of good faith in Hanoi . . . In blunt terms, the barest minimum of good faith means first we get the prisoners back, then, if they [Hanoi] like, they have their offensive . . . By now the United States has done everything that could reasonably be expected of an ally; if Saigon does not in fact survive the fault clearly will be its own."

On Sunday the Washington Star-News declared: "we would urge that, if an acceptable and honorable political settlement appears impossible, both parties [at Paris] abandon the search and secure what is in their power to achieve: the end, now and forever, of U.S. air and naval attacks against North Vietnam and the withdrawal of the remaining U.S. forces in South Vietnam in return for repatriation of the American prisoners of war."

Is not the point clear that it is not simply policy critics or political rivals of the President, but friends and supporters who are urging on him a course he apparently resists. Consider the list: the Secretary of Defense, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Star-News? These are not parties which can be easily accused of being "irresponsible," the designation put on Congressional Democrats last Sunday by the President's *communications director*, Herbert Klein. (That by his uncommunicativeness, Mr. Nixon has earned italics for that title, appears incontestable. Last Saturday, for instance, another editorially friendly newspaper, the Chicago Tribune, said: "The situation cries for candor on the part of the President, and for explanations which have been lacking.")

Mr. Klein went on to claim that the President's 61 per cent victory in the November elections had given him "a very clear mandate to proceed the way he has on Vietnam." It is a claim so flimsy and specious we question whether Mr. Nixon would dare make it for himself, should he deign to appear in public. For a good deal more than a judgment on Mr. Nixon's Vietnam policy went into that 61 per cent. In so far as such a judgment did enter in, the vote was in our view a mandate for the "peace" which the electorate has just been assured was "at hand." It was not a mandate to level downtown Hanoi, or to continue putting American blood, treasure and, yes, honor at risk to a questionable political outcome in Saigon. Certainly it was not a mandate for Mr. Nixon to heed again, as he evidently did last month, the pleas of the wily President Thieu and let go of the agreement that his and Hanoi's negotiators had put within his reach.

Mr. Nixon said last year that the war is no longer an issue among the American people. He is right: they all want out. For ourselves, we'll stand with Secretary Laird and the Star-News and, this time around, we fervently hope Mr. Nixon will too.

THE ECONOMIST JANUARY 13, 1973

The use of air power

The smoke over Hanoi should not obscure the attempt to work out rational rules for when bombing is, and is not, justified

It looks as if both President Nixon and the people who have been lambasting his bombing policy may have to take another look at the morality of air power. By Thursday, the first four days of the new round of Paris talks had brought no clear sign of change in North Vietnam's negotiating position. No doubt the North Vietnamese want to make sure that any concession they do eventually produce will not look too obviously like the result of the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. But until and unless they do produce a concession, Mr Nixon's main argument in defence of the bombing will not be valid ; and the second argument on which the Americans have now fallen back, that the bombing has further damaged North Vietnam's war-making capacity, will hold good only to the extent that Mr Nixon can persuade the Russians to go slow with aid to make the damage good.

On the other hand, even if the bombing has not yet done what Mr Nixon probably hoped it would, it has also become clear that it was much less bloody than most people thought it was while it was going on, and than some of the wilder comparisons with the second world war are still making it sound. Air power remains almost the only means left to the United States to influence the outcome of the Vietnam war. It is therefore useful to repeat a number of things about the ways in which it is legitimate to use air power, and about the relationship between ends and means in such a war as this.

There is no difference in principle between a bomb dropped from an aircraft and a shell fired from a gun. They are both methods of putting high explosive on to a target too far away to reach by other means ; and in fact even the highest-flying bomber is closer to its target, and likelier to be able to see it, than the longer-range sort of artillery is. The fact that the gun is stationary, and the plane is moving, makes people assume the gun is more accurate ; but modern methods of aiming bombs have removed most of the difference, and anyone who has worked with artillery knows that there is a fair amount of hit and miss before a gun can be brought on to its target. It is not reasonable to regard one as an acceptable instrument of war and not the other. The questions that have to be asked about both guns and bombers are whether the target itself is a legitimate one, and whether it can be attacked with an acceptable degree of precision.

The dividing line

It has come to be accepted by most people in the twentieth century that a target is legitimate if it can be shown to have a direct bearing on a country's ability to make war ; that includes the harbours and railway systems that bring in war supplies, and the factories that directly or indirectly produce the materials of war, as well as the men in uniform who use these things. The eighteenth century did not see things that way, but then the wars of the eighteenth century did not involve anything like as much of a country's total economic capacity as today's wars do. It may be wrong that the range of permissible targets has been allowed to grow as wide as it has ; but it has been allowed to, by pretty general acquiescence, and the point is that nobody who would accept something as a legitimate target for artillery shells or mortar bombs can argue that the same place is out of bounds for attack from the air. It has also come to be accepted that there is such a thing as excusable inaccuracy, when the airman is honestly trying to hit the target but misses because his instruments let him down, or his finger prods the button a moment too soon, or he is just too frightened by his own quite possibly imminent death to get the calculations right. That applies particularly when the targets lie within a populated area, as many of them do. It is not generally held that the accidental killing of civilians in such circumstances makes it wrong to have attempted to hit the target at all.

So far as any line can be drawn in the fighting of a war, it is drawn for most people at the moment when the killing of large numbers of civilians is done deliberately, or when the methods used make it inevitable. Of course, not even that distinction would be accepted by everybody, or even by all those who have condemned the bombing of Hanoi. It would have ruled out the Royal Air Force's whole area-bombing policy against Germany in the second world war, and although the Americans did try to use precision bombing in Germany it would also have ruled out what the United States did to Japan's cities, including the nuclear obliteration of two of them, in 1944 and 1945. It is by no means universally accepted that those British and American bombing campaigns were unjustifiable as a means of winning, or shortening, that war. And those people who would say even today that the bombing of Germany and Japan was justifiable cannot now say the opposite about North Vietnam—unless they also say that they do not believe North Vietnam's war aims to be worth opposing, which means it is not only the bombing they should object to, or unless they are certain that the bombing has failed the effectiveness test by doing nothing to shorten the war.

But for many people there is still a feeling that the bombing of Germany and Japan went too far ; and it is this feeling that has coloured most of the reactions to what Mr Nixon did at the end of the old year. The raids on Hanoi and Haiphong were compatible with most of the accepted rules of what can be done with air power. There are legitimate targets in both cities ; the bombing orders seem to have been confined to those targets ; some of the bombers were apparently even instructed to fly lower than usual, and face a bigger risk of being shot down, in order that they should be as accurate as possible. The real objection, for most people, lies in the fact that the attacking force included one particular kind of plane, the B-52. The trouble with the B-52 is that even when it is being used with maximum care it flies so high and so fast that the bombs it drops fall in a long sprawling line that spills over the edges of all but the biggest targets. It is what this built-in overspill does in cities that has caused most of the criticism of Mr Nixon's decision to attack Hanoi and Haiphong.

Even so, the number of casualties the B-52s caused does not seem to fit in with the widespread belief that this was just plain terror bombing. One of Hanoi's leading doctors said on December 29th—the day before the raids

ended—that about 2,000 people had been killed in the city. Other reports from Hanoi since then put the total at between 1,300 and 1,600 in the whole fortnight of bombing. For between a thousand and two thousand people to die in great pain, or in sudden numbing horror, is not something that can be shunted out of the mind with the argument that worse things happen in war. But it is worth remembering that the German air force killed almost as many in a single night in what now seems to be the relatively mild bombing of Britain in 1940 and 1941. The British themselves killed 20 and 40 times as many in a single night's firestorm bombing of Hamburg and Dresden and other German cities. As it happens, the Hanoi death roll is smaller than the number of civilians killed by the North Vietnamese in their artillery bombardment of An Loc in April, or the toll of refugees ambushed when trying to escape from Quang Tri at the beginning of May. That is what makes the denunciations of Mr Nixon as another Hitler sound so unreal. There are proportions to be kept, even in tallying the horrors of war.

The issue that hasn't changed

Of course, a sense of proportion alone does not answer all the questions. But even if Mr Nixon was wrong to use B-52s over Hanoi and Haiphong, because they were inevitably going to kill too many people, there is still something that needs to be said about the relationship between means and ends in the policy he is trying to follow. A mistake of this sort cannot be explained away by saying that the purpose it was intended to serve is a good one: the end does not justify any and every means, although it justifies a good many. But the argument works the other way round too. The use of an unjustified means does not by itself invalidate the end. That seems to have been forgotten by a good many people who do not believe either that North Vietnam is in the right in this war, or that it does not matter whether it is right or wrong. For those who do not believe either of those things, it is fair to say that Mr Nixon ought not to have used this particular weapon in this way. It is not fair to say that, by using it, he has destroyed the reasons for believing that North Vietnam should leave the politics of South Vietnam to the people of the south, and that it should be constrained to put its army in the south under effective supervision. So long as the Paris talks, and the war, go on, that is still the heart of the matter.

NEW YORK TIMES
9 January 1973

One Man's War

By Warren D. Manshel

Vietnam has become one man's war. Whether it is his crusade to prove that he, personally, cannot be "pushed around," or that our inevitable eventual departure is "honorable" does not matter. What matters, aside from the supreme consideration of the human losses and suffering caused, is that the President used the period of Congressional adjournment and preoccupation with the holiday season to intensify the war far above any previous level.

He has been able to do this without the encumbrance of Congressional advice; he did not need to consult anyone outside of his own staff and of the military.

The malaise begun during World War II with the belief that politics should end at the water's edge, the concept of bipartisanship in foreign policy, has now reached its fever point in the absolute power of the President to make total war. All the requisite powers to do so were delegated long ago. Now politics is not even involved: neither party shares in the responsibility of this purely Presidential decision.

In four years in office, Mr. Nixon has shown a persistent taste for personal diplomacy. Summit meetings with the heads of the Communist hierarchies in Peking and Moscow are a central ingredient in his style and sign of an overwhelming confidence in his personal abilities and influence. The Constitution assigns to the President predominance in the direction and conduct of foreign policy and they necessarily reflect his temperament and character as well as his view of our national interest. This is probably no more true of Mr. Nixon than of either of his immediate predecessors although he seems to have made fuller use of his prerogatives for personal initiative in the context of foreign policy that did Mr. Johnson, and at least as much as did Mr. Kennedy.

Control over foreign policy has been concentrated in the White House to an extent probably unprecedented in this century except during the Presidency of John Kennedy and the wartime days of Franklin Roosevelt. Only a few members of Mr. Nixon's official family appear in a position of full Presidential confidence. It would be hard to imagine the Nixon Cabinet as a forum for a general discussion or deliberation of the major Nixon initiatives relating to Vietnam: the "incursions" into Laos and Cambodia (decided upon in the Rose Garden of the White House), the mining of North Vietnamese waters (announced dramatically by the President on TV), and the bombing.

Mr. Nixon seems far too conscious of his vast prerogatives and too confident of his ability to discharge them, to share them. He has taken literally Truman's dictum that the Oval Room of the White House is where the buck stops. Far from evading responsibility, he seems to enjoy it and to glory in his reputation as a man of tough fiber, a man who cannot be pushed around, an unpredictable man. And that is where the ultimate danger rests: in the conflict between restraint and unpredictability.

As a matter of constitutional principle, the management of foreign policy, while largely a Presidential prerogative, should at every point involve the express or tacit approval of Congress and the support of public opinion. When the President, dissatisfied with the achievements of his negotiator at the conference table in Paris, evidently decided to bomb North Vietnam into submission, he timed his decision shrewdly: with Congress adjourned, he could not be hampered by possible Congressional reaction. His decision to send Henry Kissinger back to Paris and stop his awesome bombing campaign neatly undercut incipient moves to legislate an end to the war. Although it is hard, after these many years and the broad powers already delegated to the President by Congress in this conflict, to believe that Congress might take some definitive action now to end this war, that possibility is far more real today than before. U.S. military activity in Vietnam no longer involves ground troops, and the argument that we should not cut off support of American troops in the field consequently holds much less meaning.

If legislative restrictions seem no threat to the President's initiative in undertaking whatever military measures he wants in Vietnam, neither do the normal requirements of practical politics. Of course, neither Mr. Nixon nor his two predecessors have felt obliged in the course of this conflict to keep domestic reaction to our Vietnamese policy constantly in view. The American people have never shared in the decisions that committed our nation to war in Vietnam. To the contrary, it seems far more reasonable to assume that the majority of those who voted for Mr. Nixon last Nov. 7 voted as much to end the war as did those who voted against him. But it is now January and Mr. Nixon is his own man, and he cannot be held to account for quite some time. In the meantime, the bombing halt will continue, or it will be resumed, as Mr. Nixon alone determines.

Warren D. Manshel is co-editor of Foreign Policy.

Swedish Chilliness Toward U.S. Is Limited to Vietnam

By ALVIN SHUSTER
Special to The New York Times

STOCKHOLM, Jan. 6 — Swedes are out this weekend enjoying the mildest winter in 300 years and gathering signatures on a petition backed by all political parties calling for an end to the Vietnam war.

There is rare January sunshine on Stockholm's rivers and canals and no snow, and the ski dealers are unhappy. There is also an unusual diplomatic chill in the air—Swedish-American relations have fallen to a new low as another casualty of the Vietnam war.

As of Monday, neither country will be represented by an ambassador. The Americans have not had one since August and the Swedes have been told to hold back in sending a replacement for their envoy, who is departing this weekend.

This latest and most severe strain in diplomatic relations between Washington and Stockholm, long at odds over the war, developed quickly after the resumption of American bombing of the Hanoi and Haiphong areas, with the collapse of peace talks last month. The reaction of the Swedes, among the most vocal and active opponents of the war in the West, was one of revulsion and shock.

Shocked by Hospital Damage

Their anger intensified shortly before Christmas, with the news of the damage to a hospital in Hanoi that had been partly equipped by Sweden. And that night, after 9 P.M., with his sons in bed upstairs, Premier Olof Palme sat down at the kitchen table and wrote out a statement that linked the American bombing of North Vietnam with Nazi massacres in World War II. He set it aside, reread it in the morning, consulted a few associates—but not his Foreign Ministry—and then issued it to the press. The result was a violent reaction from Washington and a sharp diplomatic slap.

President Nixon heard of Mr. Palme's words just after they moved on news agency wires on Dec. 23 and ordered diplomatic retaliation. The Swedes were told that their new Ambassador, Yngve Möller, would not be welcome for the present and that the American chargé d' affaires, John C. Guthrie, would not be returning to Stockholm.

'Not an Instant Reaction'

Premier Palme reflected on the crisis in an interview in his office as he smoked his favorite American cigarettes. "It was not an instant reaction," he said. "It was building up inside of me since the bombing resumed. We had many discussions on it over a period of five days or so. And then, that evening, I knew what I had to say about it.

"I don't regret it because in this world you have to speak out fairly loud to make anyone listen. I can't keep silent on this issue and won't be pressurized into silence.

"I would prefer if the United States would recognize the fact that one can have a deep-seated difference of opinion with Washington that calls for arguments rather than diplomatic rebuffs. They serve no useful purpose.

Mr. Palme, who has not been a favorite politician in Washington's eyes since he walked with the North Vietnamese envoy in an antiwar demonstration here five years ago, sought to remove some of the sting from his controversial statement, which called the bombing a "form of torture" reminiscent of atrocities committed at Katyn, Lidice and Treblinka.

He said that the list represented "symbols of meaningless human suffering and violence" and did not intend to imply "literal comparison" between the bombing and those past events and the politicians responsible.

The 45-year-old Premier, who traveled widely in the United States as a student and attended Kenyon College in Ohio, insisted in his excellent English that Sweden was not anti-American but anti-Vietnam war.

In his view, close and friendly ties would be resumed once the war was over because Sweden was "probably the most pro-American country in Europe."

Many Swedes, stopped on the streets or in casual conversation in bars and shops, make the same point. They talk of three million Swedes who emigrated to America, of the similarity in life-styles, and of the heavy injection of American culture into films, television, music and other areas.

But they are strong opponents of the American role in Indochina, with the depth of feeling depending largely on their age. The young here are active and vociferous, raise money for the "liberation front" in South Vietnam and applaud Mr. Palme's positions. Many in the older generation are more reserved, largely because of their memories.

"I think Palme was too strong, although I am against the war," said Lars Hansson, a 59-year-old who was strolling along the banks of one of the many fingers of the Baltic Sea. "I don't think we should be so tough on the United States. I remember what it did during the Second World War, what it did for Europe afterwards. It's a good country."

Several Opposition politicians took the view that Mr. Palme had gone too far in the reference to Nazi atrocities, and his Foreign Ministry probably agrees. But they also feel, as does Mr. Palme, that the American reaction to his criticisms went too far, as well.

All Parties Oppose Bombing

There is, however, a generally unified position on Vietnam within the political parties. All five parties, from the Conservatives to the Communists, agreed to support the petition now circulating, calling on the United States to stop all bombing in Vietnam and on "all parties" in the conflict to sign a peace agreement. Mr. Palme hopes that two million of Sweden's eight million people will sign the petition.

One result of the present dispute has been to strengthen Mr. Palme's political position. His Social Democratic party, in power for 40 years, is in some trouble now because of inflation, running at up to 7 per cent a year—coupled with virtual economic stagnation, with a growth rate last year of about 2 per cent, one of the lowest in Europe.

The polls show that an election today—it is scheduled for September—would oust the Social Democrats. Mr. Palme needs all the support he can muster, and as a long-standing critic of United States war policy, he clearly reflects what most Swedes feel.

U.S. Helps Palme

"Most of us did feel that the bombing was an outrage," said Lars Eric Thunholm, president of the Scandinavian Private Bank, one of the largest in Europe. "Many also think that Palme's wording was too strong in protest. But the United States helps him by taking such actions in return. He receives sympathy from people who might not give it otherwise. The United States should have done nothing in response."

"The fact that the bombing has stopped around Hanoi and that talks are about to resume has little bearing," said Gunnar Helen, the head of the Opposition Liberal party, as he sat in the futuristic new Parliament building. "Hundreds have changed their position from a sort of balanced silence to a clear outcry against the bombing. And that includes many of the older people who are now divorcing their memories of postwar America from what's going on now."

A History of Tension

The recent history of diplomatic relations between Washington and Stockholf has frequently been marked by tension. Sweden was the first Western country to give full diplomatic recognition to North Vietnam. She has granted asylum to more than 400 American deserters and has repeatedly attacked United States war policy in a spirit that Washington often regarded as one-sided for a nation that has professed neutrality for 150 years.

Moreover, Stockholm has sent large-scale relief and aid to North Vietnam. It does not do the same for South Vietnam, nor does it have a diplomat in Saigon. "We technically recognize the Saigon regime as long as it is in power," Mr. Palme said. "But it would not be acceptable to public opinion to have an ambassador there. We never had one and it's too late now."

The repeated attacks on United States war policy by Mr. Palme hardly surprised Washington in recent months, and it probably would not have reacted so severely had the Premier not implied a comparison between Mr. Nixon and Hitler. In 1968, after Mr. Palme—then a Cabinet Minister—appeared at the antiwar rally with the North Vietnamese envoy, President Johnson called home William Heath, then the American Ambassador. The post was not filled for a year, although Sweden maintained her envoy in Washington.

Tension began building again as the war continued and the statements by Swedish officials appeared to grow stronger. Washington was particularly angered by a speech made in May by the Minister for Education, Ingvar Carlsson, who appeared at a demonstration sponsored by the active liberation-front group here and the Swedish Committee on Vietnam.

"The war is not the only example, although the most brutal one, of the American craving to dominate other countries," he said before a crowd of 5,000. "The same feature, economic and technological supremacy—which easily turns to unmasked physical violence—is evidenced also within the American community in the relations between different groups of people."

As read by American officials, the speech went clearly beyond an antiwar speech and represented strident anti-American sentiments. Mr. Palme has denied that was the intention, but Washington remains unconvinced.

Moreover, there is unhappiness about some of the school workbooks distributed throughout Sweden. The book on Britain features on the cover a double-decker bus and guards at Buckingham Palace. The one on the Soviet Union shows little Russian dolls. The United States cover has black children behind a fence, suggesting a concentration camp.

A Conservative party politician disputes these American objections. "I've always followed the view that the Swedes were antiwar and not anti-American," he said. "But sometimes I do worry about the young generation. They may grow up in an atmosphere where they won't be able to make that distinction. But the sooner the war ends, the better chance of heading off future problems with America's image."

As it is, Americans who have long lived here report that they never encounter unfriendly acts from the Swedes. This is easily confirmed by visiting Americans.

Meanwhile, as the Swedes [illegible] they call their

WASHINGTON STAR
14 January 1973

Americans' Letters to Palme Support Swede's War Stance

By ROBERT SKOLE
Special to The Star-News

STOCKHOLM — Americans are giving Sweden's Prime Minister Olof Palme his staunchest support in his criticism of the United States bombing of North Vietnam.

"I've never received so much mail from abroad — particularly from the United States — and letters are overwhelmingly positive to the stand we have taken," says Palme.

To find out just what kind of mail he was getting, I went to Government House, and there looked through the incoming letters. In Sweden, this can be done: all mail sent to a public office, once it has been "registered" as having been received, becomes a public document. And public documents are readily available to the press.

Palme describes the mail he has been receiving, commenting on his sharp criticism of the Christmas bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong, as "deeply personal and emotional."

"You'll see that they are not just filled with slogans or catch-phrases," he told me.

Frustration Expressed

He was right. I read through about 300 letters — most of them from the United States. If there was any common tone, it was one of deep frustration and anger. And great respect for Palme's speaking out.

Indeed, many of the letters made Palme's now well-known speech — comparing the Hanoi Christmas bombings to "deeds of horror" of World War Two — appear mild. For many years, Palme has said that he and other Swedish opponents to the U.S. war in Indochina have gotten their main arguments from American opponents to the war. He says that his first speeches attacking the American war in Vietnam, delivered in the mid-1960's, were largely based on arguments used by Sen. William Fulbright.

Today, Palme need simply go up a flight of stairs from his office, and there in a foot-high stack of mail, find inspiration.

Palme reads all mail, which will come as a surprise to many Americans who started their letters with the words, "You will probably never get to read this."

Common Theme

The letter on the top of the stack I started through, expressed a common theme found in most letters: "Thank you for speaking out on the subject of the barbaric bombing of Vietnam by the United States," wrote Mr. and Mrs. Philip Augerson of Los Angeles. "We wish other world leaders had the courage and the sympathy for humanity that you have to express themselves as you had."

Mrs. Lester Neuman of Washington wrote, "We welcome expressions such as yours, hoping they will be heeded where we, who should be, are not. In sorrow . . ."

A number of letters expressed anger at the State Department's announcement that Sweden's newly appointed ambassador to the United States, Yngve Moeller, was not welcome at this time. Jerome R. Noss of Columbia, Md., called this "petty, dictatorial diplomacy."

A letter by Stanley R. Rosenberg, a New York architect, was typical of many expressing frustration: "I beg you to continue to make public these outrages against humanity, at the same time letting the world know that there are many here, frustrated and powerless, who deplore these vicious actions."

Only about a dozen letters were sent to Palme protesting his statement. (In 1969 and 1970, when relations between Sweden and The United States were likewise strained over the Vietnam war, most of the letters Palme received from the U.S. were critical of the Swedish stand.) One letter, unsigned, among the "negative" mail, simply said, "Go sell your Volvos to Hanoi." Another, signed by Mrs. R. O'Brien of New York City, said: "Instead of telling lies to the world, why don't you mind your own business? You have a rotten country. Why don't you use your time on doing something for Sweden. You won't get any more tourists from here."

'Not Radicals'

A number of letter writers took special pains to let Palme know they are not "radicals." "This is not a letter from a crack-pot radical as we may be depicted by the administration—I am 53, and vice president of a moderate-sized company," wrote Bernard R. Aronson of Minneapolis, Minn., who added, "I am ashamed to be an American these days."

Irving Schactman of Short Hills, N.J., put it a little more bluntly: "I am not a child. I am 62, and operate a business doing over $2 million in sales annually. I am against all war. Keep on speaking out."

Letters included a number from well-known anti-war leaders. One was from Cyrus Eaton, the chairman of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway. Eaton sent his letter a week after Palme's statement on the Christmas bombing, and urged him to present "a strong public statement of disapproval" which he said would have "World-wide influence and would be especially effective in Washington."

Another letter was from Robert S. Bilheimer, executive director of the National Council of Churches of Christ. There was one from June Eisley of Wilmington, Del., chairwoman of Mothers United For Peace. Jack Baker, president of the student association of the University of Minnesota, sent a cable in Swedish.

A Mayor's Letter

One letter was from Eugene S. Daniell, Jr., mayor of Franklin, N.H., and a member of the state legislature. Writing on mayor's office letterhead Daniell said, "It is satisfying that you should lead the civilized in the condemnation of the most misguided leadership in the history of mankind. As a very small person in this turbulent world, I thank you, as I feel millions of my countrymen wish to."

A number of letters were from people connected with universities. "Despite anything the State Department may say, you spoke for many Americans in likening the bombing of Vietnam to Babi-Yar, Lidice and Kaytn," wrote Prof. Bernard K. Johnpoll of the State University of New York at Albany.

Peter Christian Hausewedell, who works with the Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, wrote : "I want to assure you that your action is well recognized and appreciated here among friends and academic colleagues and that we support you fully."

Nguyen Thai, central committee member of the Movement for National Reconciliation in Washington wrote, "As a Vietnamese, I would like to congratulate you. You have been a source of encouragement to all of us."

Four New Yorkers, Dr. and Mrs. Joel Hartley and Saul and Ruth Lancourt, asked if their names could be added to the national Swedish petition condemning the bombing, and they added "we are four native-born, loyal U.S. citizens."

The national petitions have so far been signed by 500,000

"green winter," one of the unhappiest men in town is Mr. Möller, the Ambassador-designate to Washington. At 60, he was about to start a new career after 25 years as the editor of a suburban Social Democratic daily. He quit his job, resigned his seat in Parliament and worked this week in a fourth-floor office of the Foreign Ministry preparing for his new assignment.

"I'm a little disappointed," he said. "I had hoped to go to Washington and improve relations. And I'm still looking forward to it. I hope to go soon."

Another Ambassador did leave this weekend. Jean Cristophe Oberg said good-by to his wife and children after his Christmas vacation. He returned to Hanoi.

WASHINGTON POST
11 January 1973

Hanoi Says Thanks to Bomb Critics

From News Dispatches

The Hanoi press yesterday thanked the five Scandinavian countries for their criticism of the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam at the end of December.

A commentary in Nhan Dan, the Communist Party daily, singled out Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland.

It said the peoples and governments of the five countries gave "a brilliant example of international solidarity, and of the vigilance and determination of the peoples against American imperialism, mankind's most ferocious enemy."

Observers in Hanoi noted that the North Vietnamese so far have not voiced their gratitude in this respect to any other group of countries, not even those with Communist governments.

In Bonn, meanwhile, West German churchmen applauded five American religious leaders touring Europe to mobilize protests against U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Dr. Harvey Cox of Harvard, leader of the group, asked 300 delegates to a state synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church to "tell our President about the concern with which this war fills you."

In an incident attributed to opposition to American policy in Veitnam, vandals broke into the America House library in Frankfurt, West Germany, and set it afire.

In Lyons, France, a group of anti-Vietnam war demonstrators invaded the U.S. consulate, pulled down the Stars and Stripes, and raised a swastika flag.

persons, as estimated at a meeting of the five political party leaders.

Palme, in looking over the pile of letters, said, "Evidently, a small country must speak out very clearly and plainly in order to be heard. Actually, when I made my statement on the Christmas bombings, I didn't realize the enormous effect it would have. The response from so many Americans supporting the condemnation clearly shows that the point I raised was an enormous human problem."

NEW YORK TIMES
18 January 1973

U.S. Exhibits Stoned in Spain

MADRID, Jan. 16 (Reuters)—Youths stoned windows and threw gasoline bombs at two American automobile showrooms here today in protest against the Vietnam war, police sources said.

BALTIMORE SUN
17 January 1973

Saigon's Political Prisoners

A reasonable guess is that a new Vietnam accord, if indeed one does come, will amount in most of its essentials to the agreement that went bad in October. Among these, it is conjectured, may well be the provision of a Council of National Conciliation and Concord, consisting of representatives from the South Vietnamese government, the Viet Cong and neutralists, who jointly would organize free, internationally supervised elections, and oversee the implementation of the agreements.

Whatever the details, the central issue, as James S. Keat notes in a dispatch to *The Sun* from Washington, is likely to remain in one form or another the issue of "who will retain how much political authority" in South Vietnam. Bearing importantly on this point, and to be watched for sharply in any agreement, is the question of the civilians held as political prisoners by Saigon.

Mr. Keat says they number "uncounted thousands." Some estimates put them at 80,000, others at 200,000. Some are held as suspected Viet Cong agents, and many undoubtedly are. But others, themselves in the uncounted thousands, are detained under laws-by-decree by which is declared unlawful the practice of "communism or pro-Communist neutralism." Since the government of Saigon equates neutralism per se with communism, this means that a great many people whose sentiments are neutral, or who have spoken in favor of neutralism for Vietnam, are confined in prison, along with others merely suspected, by someone, of harboring such sentiments.

A few of the names are well known, belonging to men without whose participation a tripartite council would have little meaning. Most by far are obscure, from hamlets and villages; but if these people also are to be held in prison the chance of a neutral Vietnam, which may be the best of the decent, honorable chances, will have been severely vitiated.

WASHINGTON POST
12 JANUARY 1973

Behind the Rift With Sweden

The current diplomatic rift between the United States and Sweden is disturbing in itself and even more disturbing in what it portends for the leadership role which Mr. Nixon would have this country take after the war. Mr. Palme, the Swedish Prime Minister, has a long record of vigorous open opposition to American policy in Vietnam. To protest one of his gestures, Mr. Nixon did not replace the American ambassador who retired from Stockholm last summer. In response to Mr. Palme's latest outburst, an extravagant statement placing the Christmas bombing of Hanoi among the century's worst "atrocities," the President responded even more sharply. There is no record that he attempted to explain to the Swedes the purpose of the latest bombing, any more than he has to Americans. But he did tell Sweden not to replace *its* retiring ambassador. "We might as well face it," a State Department official thoroughly caught up in the Nixon spirit told Newsweek. "We are dealing here with an unfriendly country."

This is, of course, nonsense. That an American diplomat could apparently believe it suggests just how far the Nixon administration has gotten out of touch with the rest of the world. For Sweden is anything but an unfriendly country. It is, in the natural scheme of things, a close friend sharing the deepest associations and values with the United States. It is also, obviously, a country whose leader, along with a substantial portion of its citizenry, happens to disagree with a particular American policy. But the way to cope with a friend's disagreement is, at the least, to get in closer touch, to try to explain, not to react in pique and close off the symbolic channel of communication between nations, the exchange of ambassadors. Passing off political disagreement as an expression of calculated hostility is simply wrong-headed.

Here we introduce a point so obvious as to be almost embarrassing to have to make. It was not Olof Palme's words that shot almost a score of B-52s out of the skies of North Vietnam during the December raids: it was missiles supplied to Hanoi by the Soviet Union. The two million signatures Mr. Palme is trying to rally for an end-the-bombing petition are not killing South Vietnamese: the bullets sent to the Vietcong by the People's Republic of China are. Yet Mr. Nixon keeps his ambassador in Moscow, and Moscow's envoy stays in Washington. As with the Russians, he continues efforts to broaden ties with the Chinese. How can the President countenance this measure of illogic in his policy?

The Swedish attitude—which is, let it be noted, shared in some more or less considerable degree by practically every *friend* the United States has—expresses essentially, we think, the bafflement with which so many people everywhere view the extended and continuing American involvement in Vietnam. The attitude may not arise so much out of compassion for the Vietnamese, or hostility to Americans, as out of cold self-interest. Mr. Nixon would like the American stand in Vietnam to be seen by friend and foe as a testament to the United States' devotion to an ally and to its dedication to the principle of national self-determination. But many people in many lands see the American stand as evidence that the United States has lost its balance and undermined its own penchant and capacity for a leading world role. Many foreigners—not all, to be sure—look at the United States and see a nation harshly divided within itself, one whose will and readiness to make good on other international commitments have been put in shadow by its costly and disproportionate involvement in Vietnam. From the viewpoint of their own self-interest, they must necessarily wonder if and how the United States has been changed by the war, and whether it is wise to count on the United States in years ahead.

This is to us the real issue involved in President Nixon's reaction to Olof Palme. We cannot conceive how it is to the President's or the country's advantage for him to pursue his particular line of response.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
12 JAN 1973

Viet Economy Crisis Feared if U.S. Cuts Aid

BY JACQUES LESLIE
Times Staff Writer

SAIGON—While Washington lawmakers threaten to cut off military support for the war, another prospect — that Congress will end or reduce economic aid to South Vietnam—is deeply worrying allied officials here.

The economic situation in South Vietnam is already so serious that officials say American aid for fiscal 1974 must be increased substantially if South Vietnam is to avoid severe dislocations. If U.S. aid continues at the present rate, a high-ranking American economist said, "that would be short of total disaster but close to it."

The reason for immediate concern about economic aid is that Congress must make a decision on it within two months, since the present allocation expires Feb. 28. Officials fear that congressmen will be facing the issue at a time when their mood seems unusually antiwar, and when the South Vietnamese economy is feeling the impact of American military withdrawals.

The economic issue is undoubtedly a major reason why President Nguyen Van Thieu has sent a score of emissaries to argue South Vietnam's case in Washington. The government announced Wednesday that a delegation of lower-house deputies and one senator would join five senators and two former ambassadors already in Washington.

Officials Mystified

Some American officials here are somewhat mystified because U.S. congressmen seem to be focusing on legislation to end the war when the officials suggest by simply withholding economic aid they could probably achieve a similar result. While President Nixon can veto any bill passed by Congress, he cannot authorize funds not allocated by Congress.

The officials are preparing for the visit to Saigon next week of five U.S. senators led by Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), chairman of the appropriations subcommittee on foreign operations.

The officials will explain to the senators why they want roughly $500 million in economic aid for fiscal 1974, about $160 million more than South Vietnam will receive this year if the present aid resolution is extended three months to cover fiscal 1973.

It is possible that officials are overstating the gravity of the economic situation here to coax more aid out of Congress. But if that is so, they would be flying in the face of the unofficial policy of optimism which has long dominated American pronouncements on South Vietnam.

In addition, the facts cited by the officials seem convincing.

Withdrawal Blues

The biggest problem now facing the South Vietnamese economy is how to make up for the departure of American troops, who with civilians spent from $300 million to $400 million each year from 1966 to 1971. The influx of this money into the economy enabled the South Vietnamese government to finance an equivalent amount of vital imports.

But in 1972 the figure fell to $220 million, and in 1973 it is expected to fall below $100 million. Thus the government of Vietnam must quickly find a new source of income to continue importing at the same level.

One method would be to enlarge exports. In fact, South Vitnamese exports doubled in 1972 despite the Communist offensive, but the amount ($24 million) is still insignificant compared to imports ($731 million). Economists are hoping that within four years exports will reach $100 million, but even that figure would still be dwarfed by imports.

The other obvious source of funds is American economic aid. Of the $340 million figure for fiscal 1973, $60 million is for programs administered by the Agency for International Development and $280 million is for something called the Commodity Import Program.

Under the CIP, the U.S. government pays American exporters to send products to South Vietnam. But because of inflation the same allocation buys fewer and fewer American products each year.

Inflation Aspect

In the last two years prices of products sent to Vietnam under the CIP increased 15% a year. Officials estimate that inflation of these products will drop to 6% in 1973, but that still means that a 6% increase in CIP funds would be required simply to buy the same quantity of goods.

To avoid inflation-ridden American products, officials here would like to have more aid funds with no strings attached. One American economist said he hoped that $100 million in next year's aid package would not be tied to purchases of American products. Needless, to say, such a measure would not be popular in Congress, since the aid then could not be justified for its buttressing effect on the U.S. economy.

The only other alternative for South Vietnam is to cut its imports. American economists say that at most $100 million in nonessential imports could be cut. A large percentage of imports consists of such necessities as fertilizer and petroleum, the absence of which would have an immediate adverse impact on the economy.

In addition, banning products might only induce smuggling, a problem which recently has been declining in significance.

South Vietnamese people are already suffering economic woes. According to one economist, real personal income dropped 10% in 1972, as both unemployment and inflation increased. Unemployment in the Saigon area is above 10%.

Exchange Rate

In addition, signs of the economy's instability are reappearing. For example, the black market piaster exchange rate, which several months ago dropped below the official rate (now 465 piasters per dollar), has jumped back to about 10% above the official rate. In Hong Kong where speculation is more intense, one U.S. dollar buys more than 600 piasters.

Asked what would happen if U.S. economic aid continued at the same rate, one American offical said:

"You'll have a stagnant economy with a lot of unhappy people in it. Prices will go up sharply, investment will be very small, real wages in the government sector will decline and you'll have a harder time managing the economy. Problems that we've already solved will reappear."

"If imports fell from $700 million to $300 or $400 million, you'd have a gradual decline in output and an increase in unemployment, coupled with a huge increase in inflation," another official said. "With a war going on, it's hard to see any government surviving under those conditions."

Asked to assess the economic situation if aid were eliminated entirely, the official said, "Some things are too horrible to think about. We're still planning on getting the aid because there's nothing else we could do."

NEW YORK TIMES
7 January 1973

CHINESE POKE FUN AT U.S. IN VIETNAM

Comics Ridicule Adviser, but Understanding Is Evident

Dispatch of The Times, London

PEKING, Jan. 6—While the Vietnam peace talks resume in Paris, Chinese children are reading a cartoon strip booklet that portrays the Americans in Vietnam as more pathetic than fearsome.

At a Peking bookstore, a small Chinese girl, her chin barely higher than the counter, surveyed the range of children's booklets and said: "What's new?"

One item she could have bought is called "Southern Blaze of Wrath."

The chief villain in the booklet, published in September, is an American adviser called Jones. He wears the dress uniform of World War II, even when sweatily inspecting fortified villages in South Vietnam, and is perpetually harassed by the demands of his superior officers for better results.

The other villains are the "puppet troops" of the Saigon Government. Jones prevents them from massacring the inhabitants of a village with Vietcong sympathies and says: "Don't shoot up decent villagers. If there are some problems we should sit down and discuss them in accordance with our civilized American custom."

Jones is portrayed as a ridiculous person, but there also seems to be an understanding of the American dilemma in Vietnam.

Meets Vietcong Heroine

Later Jones invites the imprisoned Vietcong heroine for an interview at which a senior officer of the South Vietnamese Army is present.

Jones says: "We have come to your honorable country to promote mutual friendship and security. The United States Government would like to spend large sums of money to help your country to develop the Mekong River."

But the heroine tells him to shut up and she is tortured in an electric chair. The torture scene itself is not portrayed, and she survives the experience, escapes and takes part in a general offensive on Jones's headquarters.

American Phantom jets are shown being shot down by ordinary carbine fire, and a pilot wearing an old-fashioned leather helmet is captured while he pathetically waves a safe-conduct leaflet.

Jones is last shown sitting contrite but unharmed amid a group of angry and victorious Vietcong.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
13 January 1973

Pentagon ban on Viet news stirs press

By Dana Adams Schmidt

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

By explicitly declaring a "lid" on information on the bombing or non-bombing of North Vietnam and the Paris peace talks, the Pentagon has raised some basic issues about freedom of speech and the public's "right to know."

The matter came to light Jan. 5 when Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, during an awards ceremony, volunteered the information that "those negotiations are so important that we are not going to be placed in the position where information from this building could in any way be blamed for the lack of success on the negotiating track."

Pentagon spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim documented this policy on Jan. 9 by disclosing a directive he had issued on Dec. 30, the day President Nixon ordered the end of bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area of North Vietnam and the resumption of the Paris peace talks.

The directive, which some correspondents believe originated in the White House, was angry in tone. It ordered that "there must be no, repeat no, comment of any sorts from any Department of Defense personnel, civilian and military, or whatever rank" concerning "the resumption of peace negotiations and a suspension of some military activities in Southeast Asia."

"There is to be no comment, nor speculation, no elaboration and no discussion on the subjects involved in the White House announcement," the directive said.

It went on to direct all inquiries to the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

The directive was made public as result of inquiries by Aryeh Neier, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, who wrote that he had received complaints about it from Defense Department employees.

Mr. Neier's letter said that "if the Department wishes to limit offical pronouncements to authorized spokesmen that is certainly appropriate, but there can be no possible justification for suspending the civil liberties of millions of citizens who are employed by the Department of Defense."

The Neier letter elicited an answer from J. Fred Buzhardt, the department's chief legal counsel, who effusively thanked the ACLU official for recognizing the proper role of offical spokesmen. He said the department fully recognizes individual rights under the 1st Amendment "and obviously the public affairs guidance message did not apply to unofficial expression of personal views."

Mr. Buzhardt asserted that similar restrictions had been imposed at the time of the SALT I and the beginning of the SALT II negotiations, and previously during Middle East negotiations.

To this Mr. Neier replied when reached by telephone that he would like to see the department's recognition of 1st Amendment rights disseminated to all military commands in the same way as the original ban on comment, speculation, elaboration and discussion.

While this was going on Admiral Isaac A. Kidd and Gordon W. Rule, former Navy procurement official, were appearing before a Senate committee headed by Sen. William Proxmire. The admiral angered Senator Proxmire by refusing to testify about the reasons why he had demoted Mr. Rule following his criticism of President Nixon's appointment of Roy L. Ash of Litton Industries as head of the Office of Management and Budget.

Fulbright rebuffed

Some days earlier, on the congressional scene, Secretary of State William P. Rogers and presidential adviser Henry Kissinger, acting under White House orders, had declined a summons from Sen. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to explain policies related to North Vietnam. Mr. Kissinger also begged off from a commitment to brief Republican members of the House.

Finally Herbert G. Klein, head of the White House Communications Office, on Jan. 7 got after critics of the administration in Congress. "Some of the more irresponsible members," he said, "have been critical in a way which could slow down" peace negotiations.

Some newsmen discern a common thread running through these developments, whether they apply to journalists, Congress, or the bureaucracy.

While the administration, in the light of Mr. Buzhardt's explanation, undoubtedly did not intend to ban low-level, uninformed comment, the newsmen discerned an effort to dry up high-level, informed information and critical comment about much more than the administration's Vietnam policies.

WASHINGTON STAR
16 January 1973

Military Doubts Firm Peace

By ORR KELLY
Star-News Staff Writer

Peace now seems to be "at hand" in Vietnam, but Pentagon officials are frankly pessimistic that it will prove to be a broad or lasting peace.

They expect an agreement in the near future that will provide for the return of all American prisoners of war and an accounting of those missing in action, withdrawal of American military forces from Vietnam within 60 days following the signing and a cease-fire.

But, despite the cease-fire, they do not expect the South Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese to stop shooting at each other for long and they do not expect the contest for control of the southern portion of the country to end.

This generally pessimistic assessment of the chances for lasting peace in Indochina is given by officials who say they are not fully familiar with the terms of agreement now under consideration. But there is every reason to believe that top Pentagon officials fully familiar with the proposed agreement also share this view.

Laird's Earlier Goal

Throughout the first Nixon administration, the emphasis at the Pentagon has been on the Vietnamization "track" as an alternative to the negotiating "track". Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, in congressional testimony last week, emphasized that the Vietnamization program had been successfully completed and that the United States could "terminate" its involvement in the war if the prisoners were returned.

Last night, during an awards ceremony at the Pentagon, Laird refused to speculate on whether he would reach his goal, set several years ago. At that time he said he would consider he had been successful as defense secretary if, when he left the office, no American serviceman was shooting at any one or being shot at anywhere in the world. He expects to leave office at noon on Saturday.

Despite his refusal to comment on the negotiations, he emphasized that the number of Americans in South Vietnam is still declining — and is now well below the number in Korea, nearly two decades after the end of the Korean War.

Pentagon officials feel the President's decision to halt all air and naval attacks on North Vietnam involves little military risk.

"This is obviously not going to go on very long," one official said. "Either there is going to be a deal or there is not. If there is a deal, the North Vietnamese are going to begin rebuilding their roads and bridges so what difference does it make if they get started a week earlier?"

If the bombing halts should continue for several weeks and the planes then be sent against the North again, there would be some risks, according to military officers. Any pause in aerial attacks gives the other side a chance to rebuild air defenses and communications lines. Thus, if the attacks should be renewed, losses in the first few days to the rejuvenated defenses would be expected to be relatively high.

There is much less concern about any "surge" of men or material moving to the South during a bombing pause. After the beating North Vietnam has taken in the last month, it is assumed at the Pentagon that the respite would be devoted to reconstruction rather than to an all out effort to move men and war material south.

As part of its "goodwill gesture," the United States has stopped low-level manned reconnaissance flights, as well as attacks over the north. When RF4 photo planes have been sent over the north, they have normally been escorted by armed fighters prepared to respond with bombs, rockets and machine gun bullets to any attack on the recon plane.

No Land Grabs Seen

But the possibility of such "protective reaction strikes" has been reduced by the decision to rely on information gained by drones dropped from C130 transport planes and SR71 recon planes which streak over Vietnam above the range of anti-aircraft guns and at more than 2,000 miles-per-hour.

In the Laotian panhandle, in Cambodia and in South Vietnam itself, the Communist forces are still under continuing air attack. Pentagon officials say they see no sign at this time of a major effort on either side to seize significant chunks of territory in preparation for a cease-fire.

"What you see on both sides is an awful lot of I-don't-want-to-be-the-last-one-to-die," one general at the Pentagon said.

If the fighting should continue at some level in the future, top Pentagon officials are convinced that the South Vietnamese are now prepared to defend themselves without any direct American military help, including air power. But they do say the South Vietnamese will continue to require replacement military equipment if the fighting goes on.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 January 1973

Defining War Crimes

By Telford Taylor

The North Vietnamese Government has consistently charged that American military operations in Vietnam are "war crimes," and this accusation plays a very important part in the way they describe the war, both to themselves and to others. In 1965 and 1966, when American bombing in North Vietnam began, their Government repeatedly threatened to try captured American airmen as war criminals, under the Nuremberg precedents, but in recent years this intention, if ever seriously entertained, appears to have been abandoned.

However sincerely the North Vietnamese today hold the belief that the American bombing is "criminal," I think it is clear that the practical value of this concept for them is primarily for internal morale and external propaganda purposes, and there is little likelihood that the American prisoners will ever find themselves on trial before a North Vietnamese court.

While the North Vietnamese war-crimes literature covers American military operations in both North and South Vietnam, in recent months, the emphasis has been almost exclusively on our aerial bombardments in the North.

The Vietnamese case does not rest exclusively on the antipersonnel bombs, but rather embraces the entire program of aerial bombardment, with emphasis on the civilian casualties. To assess this charge carries the judge into highly controversial areas in which the "law" is far from clear, and requires that Hanoi and Haiphong be considered not in isolation, but in conjunction with other cities that have suffered the same or worse fates—Coventry, Hamburg, Berlin, Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima and other memorials to the art of war.

The results of our bombing undeniably are horrible, but Hanoi is not the only city that has undergone such horror. Immoral and senseless this bombing may well be, but where is the law under which to call it criminal?

When I put this question to the North Vietnamese lawyers, they gave two answers. The first was that our bombing is part of an aggressive war launched by the United States against their country. Even assuming the truth of the premise, this is not a satisfactory analysis, for if aggression alone is the test of criminality, every military operation carried out by the aggressor would be a war crime — a view put forward and rejected, I believe rightly, at Nuremberg. It would also follow that the North Vietnamese, who on their assumption are not aggressors, would be legally justified in bombing Saigon into bloody ruins.

Their second and more substantial response is that the laws of war cannot remain frozen at the Nuremberg level, but must respond to the march of events, and that by now the futility and inhumanity of "strategic" bombing has been so clearly demonstrated that it must be outlawed, much as poison gas was after the First World War. To this I can only say amen, but objectivity obliges the response that efforts to formulate such a law have failed for over half a century, and that the demand for it has come chiefly from countries that do not have strategic air power at their disposal. I am, I fear, too much of a legal traditionalist to accept this argument in its full sweep.

But surely the bombing of Hanoi does raise serious legal questions under the principle of "proportionality" —the rule that there must be a reasonable relation between the military objective and the damage and suffering which its attainment will entail. A single enemy soldier is a legitimate target whether he is in the front line or on home leave, but to level a city block to kill him at home is beyond the bounds of proportionality.

It is under this principle that our bombing operations at Hanoi appear most vulnerable to the charge of criminality. The military objectives, even as described by the Pentagon, seem so trivial, and so remote from our shores, that the death and destruction we inflict appear as wanton. This impression is underlined by the, to me, inexplicable use of B-52's, with their carpet-bombing technique, to strike at small targets in urban areas.

Confronted with the appalling consequences, a legal approach to these events is bound to provoke impatience. Whether or not Bach Mai and Khan Thien are "crimes" is of small moment to the victims. Why are we doing what we are doing? Both at home and abroad millions are asking that question, and it is the grave responsibility of the American Chief Executive to answer it.

Telford Taylor, professor of law at Columbia and former chief U.S. prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crime trials, was in Hanoi during the recent bombings.

WASHINGTON POST
18 JANUARY 1973

Political Arrests Expected

By Peter Osnos
Washington Post Staff Writer

SAIGON, Jan. 17 — President Thieu has given his province chiefs wide latitude to make political arrests after the coming cease-fire and has also empowered them to "shoot troublemakers" on the spot, reliable South Vietnamese sources said today.

Wherever possible, American sources added, those arrested are to be charged with common crimes instead of political ones because, it is acknowledged, the prisoners are easier to deal with that way. The Communist demand for release of all political prisoners has been a sticking point in the Paris negotiations and the government's intention, sources said, is to keep the number of prisoners down, at least on paper.

Thieu's hard line is in keeping with his conviction that, after the cease-fire, his government will remain at war with the Communists by all means short of big-unit firepower. "The Communists are preparing to destroy the cease-fire," a Thieu aide warned a gathering in Kientuong Province yesterday.

Government officials in the provinces say they have been told the Communists will violate the cease-fire with terrorism and assassinations and they must be ready to protect themselves.

Thieu's response to this danger is evidently to harass and intimidate known and suspected Communist sympathizers, as they have been for years.

The province chiefs have been instructed, South Vietnamese sources said, that the only condition of the arrests is that local prosecutors be informed within 24 hours. Once that is done, the sources said, the suspects can be detained for as much as six months.

Because of the vagueness of the way it is worded and the uncertainty of how the situation after the cease-fire will develop, South Vietnamese officials have no clear idea of how the authority to "shoot troublemakers" will be interpreted.

During his one-man presidential campaign in 1971, Thieu gave police officials permission to shoot anyone causing a "disturbance," but the threat was never carried out. Recently, Thieu authorized police to shoot thieves caught in the act, but that, too, has never been done, as far as is known.

The broad arrest powers given to province chiefs apparently differ from past practice in that there is to be no direct coordination from Saigon, as was the case, for example, with the campaign of arrests after last spring's Communist offensive. Top-level American officials, who say they are informed even on the most sensitive aspects of Thieu's preparations for the period after the post-cease-fire, insist that there is no similar national plan for widespread political arrests.

They did acknowledge, however, the existence of a plan called F-6 that went into effect after the start of North Vietnam's Easter offensive and was again carried out when a cease-fire appeared imminent in October. They said the plan finally expired just before Christmas.

The number of civilians arrested in organized, military-style sweeps was 26,000, according to one senior U.S. intelligence source, of whom 14,000 have been released.

What set F-6 apart from routine political arrests was its scope and the change in the standing practice that had required three separate accusations of a suspect before he was picked up. Under F-6, now ended, only one accusation—a casual denunciation by an aggrieved neighbor, for instance—was all that was needed for an arrest.

Government critics have charged that the arrests were often used as a means of extortion by police, who then sold the prisoners their freedom. There are also recurring substantiated reports of harsh interrogations and even torture.

Phoenix, which was revised by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1967 and is now under the direction of the Vietnamese police Special Branch, will apparently continue unchanged after the cease-fire.

It is not known as yet whether province chiefs will again have to obtain three accusations of Communist links before arresting civilians, but Vietnamese sources believe there will be virtually no restrictions placed on what is done in the name of political security.

The number of political prisoners at present is thought to be around 30,000. The Communists say there are several hundred thousand.

Tuesday, Jan. 16, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST

Saigon Fears Post-Cease-Fire Deserter Surge

By Thomas W. Lippman
Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, Jan. 15—Some South Vietnamese officials fear that once a cease-fire is signed the army could be so decimated by desertions it would have difficulties helping the Saigon government maintain control of the country.

Far from demobilizing, South Vietnam is planning to keep most of its armed forces intact after a cease-fire and is counting on the army to play a major role in running the country.

At the end of October, just after U.S. negotiator Henry A. Kissinger said peace was at hand, the "net desertion rate" reached almost 27,000 men per month—up from 15,000 to 20,000 a month during most of the summer, according to unofficial but well-informed sources.

The net desertion rate is the number of soldiers who leave their units and do not come back, either voluntarily or in custody, and must be replaced through recruitment and conscription to maintain the military at 1.1 million men.

The upsurge in the autumn desertions presumably stemmed from expectations of peace. Some Vietnamese believe the Communists actively encouraged desertion after the 1954 Geneva accords were signed and expect them to launch a similar campaign after a new cease-fire.

This is not to say the South Vietnamese army is melting away. By U.S. standards the figures are staggering, but they must be measured in the Vietnamese context. This is a tired, low-paid army of peasants with strong ties to family and home village, men to whom going home is a natural impulse.

The monthly desertion rate, which is at best an informed estimate, has been in five figures for years. But it is a phenomenon the country has so far been able to cope with.

Vietnamese, American and other Western sources agree enough men volunteer or are drafted to keep the ranks full. All but a handful of the country's military units are at full strength, despite the pounding they took last year.

"When the war is on," one high-ranking military official said, "we have to fight against the Communists to protect our lives and property, but when the cease-fire is declared that seems less important. The soldiers' first reaction is to take a little rest."

A colonel, who was a lieutenant at the time of the 1954 cease-fire, said his men left their units, abandoned their weapons and went home to their families, and "there was no way to prevent them."

"There is no problem finding enough soldiers so long as the war goes on," one Western analyst said, "but if there is a cease-fire that is another matter."

He also said, however, that it will be difficult to make any assessment for some time because of the difficulty in getting accurate statistics. Some deserters, for example, re-enlist under assumed names in other units to obtain an enlistment bonus. Others are never reported as deserters because their commanders continue to draw their pay.

In the absence of any ideological commitment to the war, there is a permissive social attitude toward deserters and draft dodgers that complicates the government's enforcement efforts.

At the moment, the cat seems to have the upper hand in the cat and mouse game played by the military police and the reluctant warriors—a reported 40,000 deserters were seized in Saigon alone over the past year—but what would happen if the shooting stopped is another matter.

Once a cease-fire is signed, family obligations may appear more pressing than military duties—especially for conscripts assigned to units far from their homes.

NEW YORK TIMES
8 January 1973

Solzhenitsyn: A Financial 'Statement'

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has been deprived by Soviet authorities of all normal means of financial support. He is not permitted to publish in the Soviet Union. Funds due from abroad may be transferred only through the Soviet State Bank which pockets a large per cent as "tax." Several American writers who have large sums of rubles due them in Moscow have offered these funds to Solzhenitsyn for his support. The following commentary, by the official Soviet Novosti agency, seeks to counter the facts of the Solzhenitsyn case, painting a picture of him living a life of "luxury and leisure."

■

By Semyon Vladimirov

MOSCOW—A Nobel Prize winner without a roof over his head or a cent in his pocket—such is the pathetic portrait of the writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn drawn by the American writer Albert Maltz. In his letter to The New York Times, Maltz offers to the allegedly starving author of "August 1914" a lump sum of money, true, not from his own bank accounts but from certain "Moscow fees" only he knows about.

Solzhenitsyn promptly responded to the offer. In his statement published in the West the "deeply touched" writer literally makes his readers shed tears over the gloomy picture of his "desperate" financial situation. For he has neither roof over his head, nor personal car, nor any means to buy, as he puts it, "only a modest little house." "I am ready to borrow the money [offered by Maltz] although it is most embarrassing for me," Solzhenitsyn says at the end of his lamentful letter.

Is it not the natural embarrassment that a proud and deprived man must feel?

"No, it isn't," say all those who happen to travel the Moscow highway where, near the town of Narofominsk, the suddenly materialized dream of the "deprived" writer stands on the bank of a picturesque river amidst white birchs stripped of their green coats by cold.

This sturdy, two-storied building with a garage and a garden can hardly be squeezed into the "modestly little house" definition. This building is Solzhenitsyn's property which he calls Borzovka. The photographs of Borzovka were published in Paris Match and Stern, which, obviously, upset and irritated its owner.

At a closer look, Solzhenitsyn's "housing problem" disappears like a soap bubble. If the writer gets bored with his white birch idyll he may leave Borzovka and go to the city of Ryazan, located near Moscow. There his first wife, Natalya Reshetovskaya, is waiting for him in his two-bedroom flat which he received from the state. But if he doesn't feel like staying far from Moscow he may get there in three hours and join his second wife, the 33-year old Natalya Svetlova, in the comfortable four-bedroom flat in Gorky Street, the main thoroughfare of the city.

However, Solzhenitsyn prefers to live in other people's homes and continue to persuade the world that he has "neither house nor home."

Having so many residences, Solzhenitsyn, as it seems, must face the problem of transportation. But he solves this problem with amazing success despite his "desperate" financial situation. The officers of the State Traffic Inspection showed me register cards for three Moskvich cars. One of them (License No. 11-10 RYAI) was recently bought with his money at a foreign-currency shop by his first wife, and the second one (License No. 98-19 MKM)—by his mother-in-law. The writer himself, who claims literary laurels equal to those of Leo Tolstoy, does not ride Tolstoy's bicycle. True to his tactics of dressing up in rags and tatters of a poor man before the West, Solzhenitsyn pretended that he had sold his car (License No. 98-04 RYAI). But, actually, he continues to drive this car which now has the License No. 95-38 MKP.

This fact is most eloquent. Solzhenitsyn deliberately pretends to be deprived tearing his "last shirt" for the public in the West to see. I believe that a sharp fall of his scandalous popularity with the readers in the West makes him do it.

On Dec. 18 the UPI press agency circulated the following information from its Moscow correspondent: "Western diplomats who had a talk with the 54-year-old author several days ago, feel skeptical about his complaints. More than once they met Solzhenitsyn at the Moscow stores which sell goods for foreign currency."

The diplomats did not mistake somebody else for Solzhenitsyn, it is easy to explain why this allegedly impoverished writer often visits such stores. As is known, Solzhenitsyn's capital deposited at the Swiss banks exceeds $1.5 million, according to Western press estimates. Those who would like to have more precise information may address Fritz Heeb, a Swiss lawyer who looks after his capital and sends money orders to Moscow following the instructions of the owner. You may write to Fritz Heeb at the following address: Zurich, Switzerland, 8001, Bahnhof Str. 57C.

It should be pointed out that during the divorce procedure Solzhenitsyn declared to the court that he would pay Natalya Reshetovskaya a lump sum of money he had at the Soviet savings bank, by way of compensation. Later, as Reshetovskaya's friends very well know, he gave her several thousand dollars fearing that she would demand half of his million-worth capital.

In one of his articles devoted to the writer's calling, Albert Maltz said: "Life is not a puppet performance," and spoke with indignation about the superficial observers who studied the reality through thick window panes. It is a pity that Albert Maltz has been drawn into the puppet performance in which a very poor Pierrot is the main character.

Semyon Vladimirov is a commentator for the Novosti press agency.

BALTIMORE SUN
10 January 1973

President Tito's Tightrope

President Tito of Yugoslavia is said to feel that his current methods of trying to hold the country together are misunderstood in the West, and unfairly criticized in the Western press as a partial reversion toward authoritarianism, with an accompaniment of purge. Tito himself insists that his purpose over the past year or so, when he has been quite rough on Communist party leaders in Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia, and on editors in Belgrade, is simply to turn the party again into a "cohesive force" within Yugoslavia's lively mix of republics and nationalities.

The emphasis, it has been said, is on a shifting from republican regional autonomy to interdependence, with an insistence that responsibility does not stop at regional borders; and serious doubts have been raised as to whether cohesion can be achieved in the ways currently employed.

The fact of course is that Tito is walking a tightrope; and viewing him as a veteran tightrope walker it would be a bold critic who could say at this moment that he is any less steady than has been his wont. He has, in the face of vast difficulties, created a country, and so far has held its diverse elements together.

More than that, he has established, to a remarkable if always somewhat frail degree, a position of international independence for Yugoslavia, and an atmosphere of comparative individual freedom unmatched in any other Communist region. It is true that he now grows old, and that the factors that make for division in Yugoslavia may after his departure turn out to be unmanageable by anyone else. But it is true also that he is tough, and canny, and that this is not the first time his methods have come under question, only to have the situation fail to fly apart after all.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
23 December 1972

HAIL HONECKER

EAST GERMANY has now been recognised by Austria, Sweden, Finland and Switzerland, and several non-Communist countries outside Europe had already taken this step. Britain and the other Nato countries, after the signing of the East-West German treaty on Thursday, have lost no time getting into touch with the previous diplomatic lepers in East Berlin with the same objective. The actual exchange of Ambassadors will not take place until the East-West German treaty has been ratified, probably in April. But the actual recognitions may come considerably sooner, as there is pressure from those who fear that delay could have economic and diplomatic disadvantages. Herr HONECKER is not only respectable but courted!

On the other side of the globe China, which is approaching the completion of the process that East Germany is now beginning, is scooping up the few remaining laggards—among them Australia and New Zealand yesterday. The biggest of all, America, must inevitably follow before long. But from the viewpoint of Western interests the recognition of China is a very different matter from that of East Germany, although they are both Communist—yet of different kinds.

China's Communist dictatorship is at least exercised by Chinese. In East Germany an utterly alien tyranny is imposed by Russia and maintained by 22 divisions of Russian troops. China is a welcome asset in the world balance of power against Russia's military superiority, while East Germany is Russia's main springboard. Russia and East Germany are in flagrant violation of agreements over Germany and Berlin—the blood-stained Berlin Wall and the illegal use of East Berlin as the East German capital are examples. Now the Nato countries will further connive in this by appointing Ambassadors to East Berlin—instead of to Potsdam, Leipzig, Dresden, or some other East German equivalent of Bonn.

Western Europe

NEW YORK TIMES
12 January 1973

A Spanish Jesuit's Best Seller Hails Marx and Attacks Rome

By PAUL HOFMANN
Special to The New York Times

ROME, Jan. 11—The current best seller in ecclesiastical bookstores here is a slim volume by a Spanish Jesuit who teaches at the Pontifical Gregorian University and praises Karl Marx as a "prophet."

The author, the Rev. José María Diez-Alegría, also accuses the Roman Catholic Church of "visceral antisocialism," suggests that the Vatican divest itself of its riches, and describes priestly celibacy as "a factory of madmen."

Father Diez-Alegría, who teaches sociology at the church's foremost institution of higher learning, has publicly criticized the conservative Vatican Establishment before. In March of 1970, he and two other Jesuits of the Gregorian University faculty, in a newspaper interview, denounced the Vatican's opposition to the divorce bill that was then before the Italian Parliament as undue meddling in the country's domestic affairs.

Long Close to Leftists

Father Diez-Alegría, who is 61 years old, has long been close to groups of left-wing Catholics in Italy, Spain, West Germany and other countries.

His new book, entitled "Yo Creo en la Esperanza" ("I Believe in Hope"), has been published by Desclee Brouwer, in Bilbao, Spain. The publisher cannot send enough copies to Rome; as soon as a new batch arrives, the books are snapped up by eager buyers, mostly priests.

Although the volume is so far available only in Spanish, there is a waiting list for it in at least one bookstore here. An Italian translation is to be published in a few weeks.

Father Diez-Alegría's book does not carry the imprimatur, the prescribed church authorization for publications concerning faith and morals. The author also did not submit his manuscript to censorship by his order, the Society of Jesus, before having it published.

Order's Leadership Worried

The Jesuit order has not so far reacted, although its leadership is reliably understood to be worried about the impression that the book will make at the Vatican. The Right Rev. Pedro Arrupe, the head of the Jesuit order, who is a Spaniard, and his assistants are known to have read and discussed Father Diez-Alegría's work.

"Our Curia knows that it is sitting on a volcano," a Jesuit scholar said today. "Father Diez-Alegría's book is going to scandalize the Vatican even more than Father Küng did." The Rev. Hans Küng is a Swiss theologian who teaches at Tübingen University in West Germany. In recent books, he has questioned papal infallibility and other traditional church doctrines.

Father Diez-Alegría, in his book, says that he owes much to Marx although he does not subscribe to the materialistic philosophy of Marxism.

With Marx and Jesus

"Marx has guided me to rediscover Jesus Christ and the meaning of His message," he writes. And he contends that the Roman Catholic Church, as it has existed in history, contains little that is Christian."

Father Diez-Alegría says that Christianity must not become a political instrument of Marxist socialism, "but neither must it become a political instrument of anti-Communism, as it has been."

According to the Jesuit, "Acceptance of the Marxist analysis of history, with its elements regarding the historical meaning of class struggle and the necessary overthrow of private ownership of the means of production, is not in any way opposed to faith and to the Gospels."

Father Diez-Alegría adds: "In the present world situation, an increasing number of Christians happen to reach the conviction that they must make common cause with all those who commit themselves to the revolutionary cause of socialism."

A Bourgeois Anti-Christianity

The author charges the church and its "apparatus" with "visceral antisocialism that is not Christian but anti-Christian in a bourgeois way."

Speaking about the Vatican's reputed wealth, Father Diez-Alegría says that no one knows the balance sheet, but referring to estimates that the Holy See has assets of $500-million to $1-2 billion, the Jesuit remarks that such riches in the hands of the successor to the Apostle Peter, the Fisherman, is "unpleasant and disquieting."

If the Pope reduced his own capital base to, say, $50-million, "he surely would not betray either Christ or Peter," the author observes. The present Pope, Paul VI, is never mentioned by name in the book's 197 pages.

'A Certain Extrapolation'

Discussing teachings of the Pope's primacy and infallibility, the Jesuit scholar remarks that they are "founded on a certain extrapolation from various passages in the New Testament." Extrapolation means inference, and is less than certainty.

In a chapter on priestly celibacy, Father Diez-Alegría advocates making it voluntary rather than mandatory, as it is now. For priests to whom chastity means heroic effort and ascetic sacrifice, the Jesuit scholar says, "Celibacy for the realm of God becomes a factory of madmen, and I advise all those who find themselves caught in this trap to free themselves as soon as possible of it."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
15 January 1973

Stalin's final victory

By Laszlo T. Kiss

The Western press almost unanimously welcomed Willy Brandt's success in gaining the approval of the West German electorate for his Ostpolitik. With the exception of C. L. Sulzberger (the New York Times), who had stated that Honecker won the peace "at no price," most of the columnists and editorial writers from Paris, through London to New York, were jubilant. Belying this happy mood is the actual fact that Stalin's dialectic-historical will has prevailed in the heart of Europe (Pankow deliberately chose his birthday, Dec. 21, for signing the treaty of normalization), and that, therefore, these free views and sentiments are neither wise nor justified.

1. A candid analysis of the conspicuously and defiantly totalitarian nature of the German "Democratic Republic" — with the Wall as the scene of an open Brechtian theater, constantly displaying the morbid political reality from within — should lead to the conclusion that its full recognition will be a severe, perhaps ultimate blow to the principle of self-determination in the underprivileged half of Europe. (The precise and profound metaphysical quality of the word principle — as opposed to utilitarian political dealings — must be stressed here.) This dramatic regression has not, however, been a sudden or exclusively German development.

It has become apparent during the '60's that the legacy of FDR and Churchill — the fighting protagonists of "sovereign rights and self-government" — has been quietly rejected by a new generation of sophisticated political pragmatists, who rose to govern the countries of the West. The new men at the top have haughtily dismissed these grand statesmen's lofty political creed — the Atlantic Charter — as "rhetorical," and while they continued to pay lip service to the United Nations Charter, evidently they have become much too impressed by the Soviet Union's might to go on protesting the subtly permanent suppression of its satellites.

Primarily, this cold, calculated change of Western hearts and minds in high places had prepared the way for an unbalanced detente in Eastern Europe and led to the German anticlimax: the formal acceptance of the Stalinist status quo.

(It would be a mistake or a false progressive illusion to assume that Brandt might have made a "leftist" deal, i.e., between Socialists and Communists, at the expense of the historically notorious Prussians. The Junkers are extinct; only the toilers are left — dreaming probably of Bebel and Kautsky and their visions about true socialism.)

* * *

2. The main argument on behalf of this unequal treaty has been that the polemics of the cold war have not brought about meaningful change and that realism dictates a new, more flexible course. However, this new "realistic" approach (with some of its features calling Rapallo to mind) has taken place at the time when the exodus of the Soviet troops to the Chinese frontiers has begun. Therefore, even with a moderate amount of resolution and insight, Bonn and its democratic allies could have achieved

much more than what Honecker and his arbitrary backers have given.

There are ample indications that the intensifying Sino-Soviet conflict will grow into the most colossal and mutually exhaustive great power confrontation in the history of the world. Despite this, the Russians were permitted to clear their Western flank in return for banal concessions, and even without being pressed to restore at least some substantial elements of their satellites' sovereign rights.

* * *

3. Mr. Brandt was right when he said that the acceptance of his Ostpolitik will mean the end of the cold war. However, he failed to add that the end has come with complete Soviet triumph. Stalin's original intentions have been finalized in the eastern half of Europe, and a quarter century of ardent dialectics — based on the implicit Stalinist rule that persistence plus might create unlimited rights — have worn down the West's rhetorical commitment to freedom.

Since these matters seem remote to the average American, one would attempt to bring them closer to home with the following conclusion: Western societies should not delude themselves, that (in hasty retreat from the global totalitarian trend) they can abandon their principles abroad without eventually paying the price of contradictions at home. Terrorists, some of whom are already active within, are thriving on contradictions, which herald a state of untruth and prepare the grounds for anarchy, or worse.

Laszlo Kiss is a Hungarian who was a political prisoner in Hungary during the '50's as a youth activist in the Democratic People's Party. He is a candidate for a doctoral degree in European history at Fordham University in New York City.

WASHINGTON POST
14 JANUARY 1973

East Germany: The Price Of Admission

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN — While East Germany's long drive to win international recognition is finally on the brink of success, the Communist state is likely to find that its new-found respectability carries with it an enormous price tag.

Among the Western countries lining up to begin negotiations on diplomatic relations with East Berlin, many will also be presenting sizable bills for money they claim East Germany owes them. So far, East Germany has tended to dismiss most of these claims as unjustified. But the signs are that the Western governments aren't buying this argument and that East Germany will have to make some kind of settlement as the price for widespread recognition.

The alleged debts fall into two broad categories: claims for war damages and crimes committed by the Nazis under the Third Reich, and compensation for foreign-owned property expropriated by the Communists after the war.

The war-claims issue has long been one of the thorniest legal problems of the Cold War era. Under the 1945 Potsdam Agreement, the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany (later to become East Germany), was to pay reparations to the Soviet Union and Poland, while the Western sectors (now West Germany) were to compensate the countries of the West.

In 1953, after the breakdown of the Potsdam accords, most Western nations gave up their reparations claims against West Germany, pending a final peace settlement with Germany as a whole. Nevertheless, Bonn over the years has paid out approximately $12 billion in individual and other war-related claims.

Payments to Moscow

ON THE OTHER SIDE, East Germany made substantial reparations payments to Moscow, the only one of the four wartime powers to demand payment from defeated Germany. The East Germans also paid some compensation to Yugoslavs used as forced labor by the Nazis.

Despite these precedents, East Germany quickly adopted the position that it is a totally new state rather than a successor to Hitler's Reich. Therefore, the East Germans argue, they bear no responsibility for deeds committed in Germany's name prior to East Germany's creation in 1949.

Any war-related claims, they add, should be directed to West Germany. Unlike the East Germans, Bonn has always regarded itself as the governmental continuation of the German nation and, until recently, claimed that it was the only true German state.

Now, the situation has been complicated by the recent basic treaty that provides for a new relationship between the two Germanys. It is the treaty, with its recognition that the two states are autonomous, that has opened the way for recognition of East Germany by Bonn's allies in the West.

But its acceptance of two separate nations on German soil also implies that there are now two successor states to the Reich under international law. That, in the Western view, establishes a basis for claims against East Germany relating to the Nazi era.

Finally, there is the question of what happened after the war. The Communists seized substantial amounts of property, businesses and bank accounts belonging to foreign nationals and firms, and during the two decades when the West held East Germany in diplomatic isolation, there was no way to press compensation claims.

The United States, for example, is not among those countries with the biggest bill to present, but some experts estimate that Washington has potential claims against East Germany in excess of $50 million. U.S. officials so far will say only that the matter is "under study" and that no decisions have been made about precisely what Washington will do, but the expectation is that the United States eventually will ask for some kind of payment.

The Question of Israel

MOST OF THE POTENTIAL U.S. claims involve postwar nationalization of American-owned businesses, factories and funds. However, there is also the question of property compensation claims on behalf of former German Jews who were forced to flee Germany under the Nazis and who later became American citizens.

The United States is also one of

several countries that in prewar times maintained their Berlin embassies on then fashionable Unter Den Linden (now locked securely inside East Berlin) and that theoretically still either own the property or are due compensation for the lost land and buildings. The United States is not very likely to get the old embassy site back, since it literally juts up against the Berlin Wall.

Another potentially interesting problem involves Israel, which will be seeking compensation on behalf of thousands of German and other European Jews persecuted by the Nazis.

The East Germans have curtly rejected the idea of reparations to Israel on the grounds that the Jewish state didn't exist at the time of World War II and is therefore not entitled to speak on behalf of war victims. In fact, East Germany's ardent championing of the Arab cause in the Middle East conflict will almost certainly cause it to spurn the idea of diplomatic relations with Israel.

However, the Israelis have made clear that they won't be easily put off. Israeli experts are quietly trying to assess the extent of the financial claims that Israel as a state might level against East Berlin and are also accumulating evidence about former Nazis in East Germany to refute the Honecker regime's claim that it has totally purged the country of Fascist elements.

The Israelis have also served notice that they will ask approximately 20 "friendly" governments, which are expected to have relations with the East Germans in the near future, to represent them in pressing their claims.

A Joint German Stance?

NOR DOES THE LIST of potential envoys with bills in their briefcases end there. The Netherlands, one of three NATO countries that have already extended recognition, and Britain want to talk about payment for extensive facilities taken away from their jointly owned Royal Dutch Shell and Unilever companies.

Switzerland will demand more than $25 million for property and capital confiscated by the Nazis. Finland is asking both Germanys for an unspecified sum to cover damage done by the German army during the war.

In the case of Finland, the East Germans have offered to negotiate. But here Bonn has demurred, pleading that it is bound by the 1953 agreement to put off settlement of national reparations claims until completion of a World War II peace treaty.

This attitude points up the interesting fact that West Germany, for its part, is not exactly enthusiastic about its friends in the West making restitution claims against East Germany. Bonn officials fear that it could establish a precedent and prompt the Communist bloc countries of Eastern Europe to make similar demands on West Germany.

Within recent days, there already have been calls from Poland for West German compensation to former Polish prisoners of war and resistance fighters. Now, with all of the Western demands against East Germany, Bonn is nervously expecting increased pressure from Nazi victims in the East.

The West German government would like to reestablish the old Potsdam principle that, in general, claims by Western countries should be handled by Bonn, and those from Eastern Europe addressed to East Germany.

Some officials here even think that Bonn and East Berlin should actively cooperate in working out a joint stance toward reparations claims. If that happens, it would mark the first instance in Europe's postwar history where the two Germanys found themselves on the same side of an international argument.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
6 January 1973

Immigrant defends life she left behind in the Soviet Union

Distressed by West German politics, she says:

'It is better to have only one party, as in Russia'

By David R. Francis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Bonn

According to the usual stereotype, the new emigre from the Soviet Union is panting for freedom.

Many probably are. But not all.

Take the case of Mrs. Strauss, who recently moved from Estonia to West Germany. Strauss is not her real name. But she did not want that used for fear of hurting her brother's chances of getting an exit visa from Soviet officials and joining her.

Mrs. Strauss watched and took part in the Nov. 19 election in West Germany, voting for Chancellor Willy Brandt.

One party better

She says: "I think it is not good to have three big parties as you have here. I saw how they were discussing issues before the election, also on television. That's not good. It is much better to have only one party, as in Russia."

Speaking in heavily accented German, she told of attending an election rally of Chancellor Brandt.

"I was shocked at what I saw," she said. "Brandt had to be guarded by four men. In Russia the politicians can go freely on the street."

Mrs. Strauss further held that after the earlier postwar years, she felt free in Estonia. "We said what we wanted," she said.

"After the war," she added, "we had to suffer very much because we were Germans. At that time we were suppressed. It was very difficult, because Hitler caused the war."

Work camps, prison

Indeed, her husband spent years in prison and work camps.

But under the present government, holds Mrs. Strauss, "everybody has a good living. What they say here that the people in the Soviet Union do not live well is not true. We were having a good life. We had our own house."

She also owned a television set, a radio, a washing machine, and a refrigerator.

Mrs. Strauss's comments are a reminder that even in a tightly controlled regime like the Soviet Union, different individuals have varied experiences.

It shows that those accustomed to one-party politics do not necessarily find free debate a pleasant, stimulating affair.

Possibly Mrs. Strauss also found annoying the exaggerations and half-truths that politicians use in an election campaign. Those who have long lived in a democracy have become somewhat immune to the hyperbole. But it may bother newcomers.

Quality area

A Soviet expert further pointed out that Mrs. Strauss comes from the Soviet "republic" with the highest standard of living of all. Because of its history as an independent nation, it also has a somewhat freer atmosphere than some other areas within the Soviet Union.

What is more, the Strauss family was entirely nonpolitical, she a bookkeeper, her husband a building craftsman. The state should have had nothing to fear from them speaking openly with a few friends.

The Strauss family are five among 3,294

ethnic German immigrants from the Soviet Union to come to West Germany this year (up to just before Christmas).

It is customary to think of the United States and Canada as homes for migrants. But perhaps it is not so well known just how many "foreigners" now are living in West European countries.

Foreigners in Germany

West Germany, for instance, has more than 2.2 million foreign workers, plus about 1 million of their dependents, mostly children. The workers make up 10.3 percent of Germany's total working population.

Then there are another 400,000 foreign self-employed individuals, pensioners, and students here, giving a total foreign population in the region of 3.6 million.

That total, it is estimated, could swell to 5 million in a decade because more families are joining their bread earners here. More of the foreign workers are putting their roots down in Germany. In addition, the arrival of new foreign workers continues.

Switzerland has about 817,000 foreign workers, comprising about 28 percent of its total number of workers.

Comparative figures for France are 1,254,000 and 6.27 percent; for the United Kingdom, 1,543,000 and 6 percent; for Sweden, 191,952 and 5 percent; for Belgium 181,555 and 5 percent; and for the Netherlands, 83,500 and 2.2 percent.

Special classification

The Strauss family is not classified as "foreign," but as returning Germans. But Mrs. Strauss, like probably many of the returning Germans, does not really feel at home here.

She, like many of those classified as foreigners, has a problem of loneliness.

Mrs. Strauss was born in the Ukraine, came to German territory during the war, and then settled in Estonia. In the German community there, she spoke "our German" as learned from her mother. It is an antique German, dating back several generations to the time when German settlers were invited to the Ukraine to farm.

Mrs. Strauss finds modern German difficult to use.

In Estonia her older boy had a German lesson once a week at school. The family spoke German at home. But Mrs. Strauss wanted to come here "to live with the Germans and raise our children in Germany."

Others migrate

Besides the ethnic Germans coming from the Soviet Union, 13,120 have migrated from Poland, and 2,070 from other countries in 1972.

Altogether, Germans returning from the "East" have totaled 18,484 this year as compared with 28,828 in 1971. The main reason for the decline is the drop in the number getting permission to leave Poland.

Poland has used administrative procedures to brake the number leaving. For instance, those wanting to go must draw up a list of all their property, indicating what they plan to leave, what they plan to take. The officials now find more grounds for refusing permission to leave.

Since the re-election of Mr. Brandt, the Soviets have slowed the flow of German-speaking emigrants. But at least those who do get an exit visa have more time to prepare their move — about six weeks instead of approximately a week earlier.

Few belongings brought

Mrs. Strauss had to leave "from one day to the other," as she put it. "The family came with only two suitcases each full of belongings."

But as the family of a Heimkehrer, a returned soldier, the Strauss family has received considerable financial assistance from the German Government. Not all of those coming out of the Soviet Union receive quite so handsome subsidies.

"I always weep when I am at the office for refugees," she says. "They are so good to us and help us with anything we need."

Mrs. Strauss's remarks on religion may be a little surprising to Westerners.

"In the Soviet Union," she said, "only the old people are going to church. We have always heard that there is no God, so we have believed it."

Hard to adapt

Since coming here, Mrs. Strauss has gone to a church service once. She sends her boy to confirmation lessons.

"He was asked if he believed in God and replied 'no.' So he had some trouble. But he can't adapt so easily and just say, 'now I believe in God.' Just because he isn't in Russia anymore.

"We will also baptize our baby and send our girl to the Lutheran Church."

Evidently the tendency for many people to conform to their society — free or not — is strong.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
13 January 1973

Relations with Europe: U.S. is in the doghouse while Russia's opportunities appear bright

By Joseph C. Harsch

Is 1973 to be the year of Russia's golden opportunities rather than President Nixon's "year of Europe"?

Any appraisal based on today's pattern of relationships among the Western powers and Russia would have to conclude that never since World War II has the United States been so unpopular with its European friends and allies and the opportunities for Russian diplomacy and trade with them so promising.

It is almost as though the West European perception of its two great flanking neighbors had been reversed.

Less than five years ago Russia had ravished Czechoslovakia and appeared in the eyes of people to the west of that unfortunate country to be the primal monster, red in tooth and claw, ready to devour. West Europe was so shocked by the repetition in Czechoslovakia of what had previously been done to Hungary that even Communists in France and Italy were alienated, and the Italian Communist Party publicly condemned what Moscow had done.

Sharp contrast fades

At that time the United States was the benevolent friend, ally, and protector whose sturdy right arm held a bright, pure shield over the good peoples of Western Europe and kept the monster at bay.

No Western artist would paint the neighbors in such contrasting colors today. Not since Czechoslovakia has Moscow done anything comparable to alarm or seriously worry the peoples of Western Europe.

On the contrary, Moscow has come to terms with the West Germans, has accepted the present enlargement of the European Common Market, has turned some of its nuclear weapons and its divisions away from Europe and faced them instead against China, and, just this past week, was treating the President of France like an old family friend.

By-product from Peking

Among sophisticated diplomats this benign behavior in Moscow was recognized as a by-product of an American act of initiative. Moscow's "love Europe" posture dates from Richard Nixon's visit to Peking.

Moscow has ever since been investing in a West European insurance policy to balance off the implications of the great reconciliation between Washington and Peking. At the moment of that reconciliation Moscow was in danger of becoming the most isolated of the great powers.

But the fact that Russia's benign posture of the moment was won by American diplomacy is obscured from West European eyes by the

Pattern of diplomacy

continuation of the Vietnam war and the still vivid memory of the bombing of Hanoi. That one deed substantially equalized the pictures of America and Russia as perceived in Europe.

The contrast between the ravenous monster and the good protector is forgotten. For the moment at least Russia almost seems once more to be a European country with which the Europeans can deal on a friendly and neighborly basis.

Where will all this lead? Can the men of Moscow capitalize on their opportunities?

They have had similar moments of opportunity in the past, and spoiled it by heavy-handedness. They could blow this as they have blown so many previous opportunities. And there is no damage to the America-European relationship which could not be repaired by a swift end to the war and a true turn of American interest back to Europe.

Yet the ties that have bound the United States to Western Europe have been coming gradually unraveled. The process of weakening started way back. The closeness of the early "cold war" period was damaged by the Suez crisis (1956) when Washington sided with Moscow against London and Paris. The old Anglo-American "special relationship" never fully recovered from the shock of that event. And the American-French relationship was hurt by the American refusal to come to French aid in Vietnam at Dien Bien Phu.

The unraveling has continued of recent weeks and months. The process has reached the point where something inconceivable a year ago is conceivable today.

The Western alliance, essentially that close relationship between the United States and Western Europe which is formalized in NATO, is no longer to be taken for granted. It can be saved and revived if all concerned do their part. Yet, it could also fall apart and disappear into the pages of history. The year 1973 will probably see which way it goes.

Near East

THE WASHINGTON POST

Sunday, Jan. 7, 1973

Egypt: Squaring The Circle

By Edward Luttwak

An Israeli writer on strategic subjects now studying in the United States, Luttwak is author of "Dictionary of Modern War."

THEY HAVE DONE IT so many times that the whole elaborate maneuver has become a well-practiced routine. At the United Nations, in talks with complaisant diplomats and responsive journalists, Egyptian officials are once again unveiling their plans for the forthcoming campaign season, which invariably follows the annual General Assembly debate on the Middle East. After quickly conceding that Israel retains a crushing military superiority in all dimensions of military power, Egyptian spokesmen go on to say that Arab patience is at an end; they will go to war, and soon, and in a big way—even though they fully expect defeat. "We will lose, but you (Europeans or Americans or simply 'the West,' depending on the audience) will also lose, since we will set the Middle East on fire, and your interests will suffer in the conflagration."

Minor variants of this rationality-of-the-irrational strategy introduce the well-worn theme of internal political pressure: "We are reasonable and prudent, but our soldiers are straining at the leash. So far we have managed to hold them back but unless you force Israel to . . ." Dark hints that U.S. oil companies will be expropriated are routine, as are threats to cut off the flow of oil.

The typical news story that carries the message invariably ends with the moral: The Arabs are about to go to war (irrationally), and the only way we can stop them is to extract some major concessions from those rational but stubborn Israelis. Caught as they are in a multi-year leadership contest that makes an American presidential race look like a brief picnic, the Israelis obligingly supply all the wrong diplomatic noises by allowing ministers such as Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan to voice their competitive annexationist claims. For Israeli intransigence is a vital part of the Egyptian script.

All things considered, Arabs and Jews have done very well in keeping up Western interest in the perpetual Middle East crisis, with help from the media men who manage to retell the same old stories with remarkable freshness year after year. Nevertheless, behind the flow of words there are only more words; there is no significant action in sight.

Those who would have us believe that the Egyptians are eager to repeat the catastrophe of 1967 in an even more painful form assume or pretend that President Sadat and his followers are fanatical desperadoes, totally irrational or just plain mad. In reality, the Egyptian ruling elite is as reasonable as any, entirely disillusioned and without a spark of fanaticism. Every year since 1967 they have said that they were about to set the Middle East on fire, but even during the 1969-70 "war of attrition" the Egyptians were in fact very careful to control their escalation in order to avoid provoking an all-out Israeli response. As for the sub-theme of "the soldiers straining at the leash," this is, of course, a fabrication. Egyptian soldiers have never yet exhibited any trace of the kamikaze spirit and their officers are as prudent a group of men as one could hope to meet anywhere.

Replaying Suez

IN THE ABSENCE of a genuine readiness to go to war, the war scares orchestrated from Cairo are a vital ingredient of Egyptian diplomacy. Its goal—to recoup the losses of 1967 without either military success or diplomatic concessions—is unique in the annals of diplomacy. Refusal to negotiate with a hostile party is of course quite common, but it does imply a renunciation of all attempts to extract concessions from that party, unless by means of war or the threat of war. Such a refusal is entirely inconsistent with the combination of diplomatic activism and military weakness, and it is a great tribute to Egyptian diplomacy that its attempts to square the circle have gained such wide credibility.

Egyptian diplomatic strategy since 1967 has been to stage a reenactment of the aftermath of the 1956 Suez crisis, when Israel surrendered her territorial gains under diplomatic pressures from third parties, including both the Soviet Union and the United States. But since 1967 there has been no third party with the will and leverage to replay 1956, although the Russians did their very best in 1969-70, with valiant help from Washington.

While the State Department played its part by giving well-timed "backgrounders" to remind all concerned that the U.S. commitment to defend Israel did not extend to its occupied territories, the Russians staged a classic threat maneuver, sending in air force squadrons complete with point defenses, air conditioning and a four-star general.

The Israelis at first behaved as the Russians had expected. They pulled back their own air patrols as Russian air patrol coverage gradually expanded towards the Suez Canal. But before the critical canal line was reached, the Israelis turned to fight. For the Russians it was their first air battle since May, 1945, and, as one Egyptian account put it, "Five of their premier Mig-21Js were shot down in less than a minute."

For a while it seemed as if there was real danger of Russian escalation, but within two weeks the bureaucrats who now run the Kremlin had instead accepted the U.S.-sponsored cease-fire, and by Aug. 7, 1970, the canal was quiet again, as it has been ever since.

Israel Sits Tight

FROM THIS devaluation of Russian military support in Arab eyes to the erosion of Soviet influence in the Middle East and the Russians' expulsion from Egypt, the path was downhill all the way—and a direct repetition of the collapse of the post-war Anglo-Arab alliance.

But the failure of the 1956 re-run did have at least one significant effect: It solidified Israeli resolve to see the crisis through until the Egyptians finally give up their strategy of avoiding a directly negotiated settlement.

Not too much should be made of the annexationist claims voiced by Allon, Dayan and whoever else is seeking Mrs. Meir's job. The tough old men and women who hold the reins of power in Israel, whose entrenched position in the party secretariat has no parallel outside the Soviet Politburo, have yet to make any formal territorial claims except for East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights; if only for social reasons, they oppose the integration of Arab-inhabited areas.

Having lived through two generations of conflict, including the last five years in which the cyclical nature of American diplomatic support, the short-sighted pragmatism of the Europeans and the ephemeral quality of Russian military adventurism have all been exposed, the veteran politicians who run Israel have become more determined than ever to stick it out: in other words, no territorial concessions without a settlement, and no settlement without direct Arab-Israeli negotiations.

THIS POSITION is not so oblivious of Western interests as it has sometimes been made out to be. The last five years have proved that the threats of expropriation of U.S. oil interests emanating from Cairo are hollow. The Algerians, Libyans and Iraqis have indeed expropriated U.S. oil companies, and will do so again if the move is to their advantage, regardless of what the U.S. secretary of state says, or does not say, about Arabs and Jews. When oil industry conditions are such that expropriation is a poor bargain, they will not expropriate.

For the Libyans, whose rate of interest on discounted future income is only 4 to 5 per cent, it makes perfect sense to curtail oil production, since prices are expected to rise and their reserves are not infinite. For the Algerians it has also made sense to expropriate the pro-Arab French while signing a major natural gas contract with U.S. interests that includes solid and tangible guarantees against any politically motivated interference.

As for the truly important oil producers in the Persian Gulf, it is obvious that Egyptian influence on their policies has now declined to the point where calls for retaliatory action against U.S. oil interests would simply be ignored. After all, an American oil company has operated Egyptian oil fields for a decade, enjoying the most cordial relations with the Egyptians, regardless of all the anti-American fulminations out of Cairo.

Difficult as it is to accept the fact, after endless statements to the contrary, the inescapable truth is that there is no linkage between the conduct of foreign policy and the oil situation in the Middle East—though there may be reverse linkage.

The French were awfully popular with the Arabs after 1967, but they paid $1.40 per barrel of crude just like the unpopular Americans. De Gaulle earned much Arab praise for having ditched Israel, but French gains in the oil sector have been insignificant: an exploration permit for a part of Saudi Arabia long since given up as dry by the U.S. Aramco company and a coproduction deal for a small Iraqi oil field, which makes U.S. Savings Bonds look like a racy investment. As against this, at the height of their popularity, the French lost their valuable Algerian oil concessions, as did U.S. oil companies, which nonetheless received better compensation for their much smaller investments.

If there is no real linkage between U.S. policy towards Israel and the fortunes of the oil industry, why is it that U.S. oilmen regularly preach the need for a more "even-handed" policy? For one thing, some of them still retain a charmingly simple view of the Soviet Union as bent on physical expansion; but perhaps the main reason is that on their next trip to Beirut or Jidda their Arab friends will be grateful.

We all like to please our friends, and we all want to be liked, but the fact remains that unless there is direct military damage to the wells, pipelines and tanker terminals—which is most improbable—the oil industry will remain unaffected by the political situation in the area—or even by a new war. If the Russians want to buy oil, they too will pay the going—and rising—price, and the oil business is too well organized to allow deft operators to make a killing, as the Russians did on the U.S. wheat market.

A Low-Risk Policy

THIS BEING SO, in the Middle East U.S. policy need only to pursue its traditional goals: to preclude a recovery in Russian influences in the region, to guard the political flanks of NATO, and to avoid entanglements in Israeli military gambles or Arab political maneuvers. The days when foreign service officers set out to play politics in the drawing rooms of Arab potentates are over; it may be a pity that all those desirable assignments to Baghdad, Cairo and Damascus have been lost, but it makes no concrete difference to U.S. interests.

To play a straightforward and low-risk balancing game, the U.S. already has reliable allies, including Jordan and the most efficient state in the area, Israel. Even if it had no stronger ethnic connection into domestic policies than Ruritania, American support for Israel would be still a worthwhile investmest. The survival of the pro-Western Arab regimes in the Middle East has ironically depended on Israeli military power; Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states would have all been drawn into the anti-Western orbit of Egyptian policy had Nasser won even a qualified defensive victory in 1967. Similarly, in the absence of a powerful Israeli air force, the Russian adventure of 1970 could have been successful, thus providing the basis for an inclusion of the area in the Russian sphere of influence.

In fact, U.S. policy toward Israel should be guided by the same hard-headed considerations that have guided U.S. policy toward Turkey and Iran. If so, genuine American interests will be served, while Israel will receive its due without having to undergo the electoral cycles in U.S. support that were such an undignified feature of U.S. politics in 1968 and 1972.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
3 January 1973

UPHILL WORK FOR SADAT

EGYPT began the New Year inauspiciously with further signs of malaise and uncertainty. President SADAT's announcement of preparations for the final battle sounded less convincing and fell flatter than ever before, which is inevitable in view of excessive repetition and non-fulfilment. Another familiar aspect of the depressing cycle of futility is the demonstrations by frustrated war-eager students which have been going on for the past few days. As before, the police took vigorous action and made some scores of arrests, with the result that the students are now demonstrating for their colleagues' release—albeit in the university precincts, which is safer than on the streets.

The rift caused by Mr SADAT's expulsion of 20,000 Russian military helpers last July is very far from healed. The numbers that have since returned are altogether smaller than was expected. Mr SADAT is still "shopping around" for foreign arms and backers. It was announced yesterday that during the next few weeks half a dozen countries in Asia and South America will be sending their Foreign Ministers to Cairo. The fact that China is among them seems calculated to needle Russia, but she gives no sign of reacting. Much more important is the belief that America will shortly start a fresh attempt to persuade the two sides to reach an agreement for the reopening of the Suez Canal and a partial Israeli withdrawal in Sinai. Mr SADAT, while rattling his somewhat rusting sabre, may well be scanning rather more eagerly the Western horizon for signs of President NIXON's emissaries.

GUARDIAN/LE MONDE WEEKLY
Manchester, 30 Dec. 1972

Sadat's indecisive year

ARAB WORLD by David Hirst

Last year, 1971, was to have been President Sadat's "year of decision." By the end of it he was to have settled the Middle East crisis by military or diplomatic means. It turned out to be another year of indecision and — although, apart from an occasional "zero hour", he has steered clear of setting more deadlines — 1972 has proved quite as indecisive too.

The taking of a real decision implies a real measure of control over the political environment. In the Arab world only a ruler of Egypt, as the local great power, can ever aspire to mould events in the area as a whole. Nasser, in spite of his immense prestige, eventually lost his grip. Sadat never really had one. Unquestionably the great event of 1972, and ostensibly the great "decision", was Sadat's expulsion of 20,000 Russian experts. As a result of it, he is no better off, diplomatically, at the end of the year then he was at the beginning. Militarily, he is far worse off. The expulsion was largely triggered by the Russians' refusal to supply Egypt with the "offensive" weapons which the army considered they needed and deserved. But it left Egypt not only without offensive weapons but without a reliable defensive system which is the indispensable prerequisite for a renewal of fighting across the Suez Canal.

It was to be expected that such a move — one of the most dramatic changes of course in modern Egyptian history — would have formed part of a grand design meticulously planned, carried out and followed up, and that the whole ruling apparatus would have been geared to securing the maximum payoff. In forfeiting the military support of the Russians Sadat should logically have sought the diplomatic — the hopefully much more effective diplomatic — support of the Americans and the West Europeans. But this was not to be. For it had not been so much a bold decision, maturely thought out, as a desperate gamble. It turned out to be an another lurch on Sadat's zigzag course, another landmark on his slide into incoherence. Sadat rules from day to day, gimmick to gimmick, promise to false promise. He cannot decide from strength; he only reacts from growing weakness.

On this occasion the pressures came from inside Egypt. They were the natural consequence of his failure to keep his "year of decision" pledge. Student riots in January were the first of a series of internal convulsions. In July getting rid of the Russians was the only way to appease his army commanders, openly chafing at what they regarded as the Russians' contemptuous ways, or even to head off an army coup. It did buy him a certain popularity; but he himself foresaw that it would not last long, for even as he basked in a little meretricious glory, he passed his draconian "national unity" law which was designed to cow the regime's growing army of critics.

Of course he did try to give his gamble some kind of coherent follow-up. He launched into a bid to win friends and influence in Europe. But his European offensive suffered a grave setback, not this time from disruptive forces in Egypt itself, but from a quarter which can always be counted upon to foil others' ambitions even if they are quite incapable of achieving their own — the Palestinians. True, 1972 saw a further decline of the Palestinian guerrilla movement. Yasar Arafat and the Fatah leadership continue to dominate the Palestinian scene. But, once hailed as a break with the old Arab order, he and his colleagues look and behave more and more like just another Arab regime. Arafat has shown, like Sadat, that he is incapable of putting through the real structural reforms that alone can ultimately save him. In October this year, after a number of rumblings through the year, he faced what nearly became a full-scale mutiny in the Fatah rank-and-file.

But out of the decline of conventional guerrilla action, Black September, and its brand of pure, anarchic terrorism, has arisen. The idea that the world is going to be engulfed in an ever-expanding wave of Arab terrorism can be ruled out. In spite of all the investigatory efforts, not much was learned about the organisational identity of Balck September. In the nature of things, operations like Munich — which was just the most "successful" of a series during the year — suffer from a law of diminishing returns. However, designed to achieve maximum effect with minimum resources, they have so far managed to produce an emotional backlash which amply ensures that they fulfil their strictly negative purpose: to foil the peace-seeking efforts of Arab regimes and the "liquidation" of the Palestinian cause which they inevitably foreshadow. Sadat's European offensive would probably have failed anyway, and his American one never got off the ground, but Munich pre-empted both.

It is not only the guerrillas, by definition outside the framework of "official" inter-Arab relations, who foil Sadat's purposes and wreck his decisions. All of a sudden, Syria, Egypt's partner in the tri-party Federation of Arab Republics, began in the second part of the year to take a disruptive, wilful course of its own. Partly it was the effect of Munich. The Israeli retaliatory raids had gone on regularly during the year, but after Munich they turned into the more destructive "strike-first" strategy. Hundreds of civilians died in raids ostensibly aimed at guerrillas in Syria and Lebanon. President Asad came under strong pressure to retaliate. Partly, too, it was the effect of the Russians' expulsion from Egypt. Asad began to fear that Sadat will go it alone in an American-sponsored partial settlement which will leave him high and dry without the return of the Golan. Evidently with Russian encouragement, Asad sought to demonstrate to Sadat that he could not hope for a settlement at Syrian or Russian expense. After years of caution, Asad began to warm up the Syrian front with Israel in a way which reminded people that it was the self-same Baathists who did so much to trigger the war of 1967.

Jordan, the third Arab country; with territory to recover, continued to seek its own salvation. King Hussein, having apparently decided that a "military solution" is out of the question, bent over backwards to prove himself Israel's good neighbour. Alone among Arab leadership he denounced Black September — the work of "sick minds." He continued his all-out opposition to the guerrillas. He kept his army deployed against Syria. He inaugurated a three-year development plan in which the Jordan valley, devastated in the guerrillas' heyday, will have a key place.

Sadat has had little more success in the rest of the Arab world. King Faisal, leader of the conservative Arab camp, has shown, in his quiet way, that there are definite limits on what Sadat, who has tried so hard to cultivate his good will, can expect of him. Throughout the year Cairo constantly returned to the old refrain — an admission of military weakness — that the Arabs should use their oil weapon against the Western backers of Israel. But the emergent American energy crisis offers Saudi Arabia, holder of the world's largest oil reserves, an opportunity Faisal apparently intends to seize with both hands. Oil Minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani announced that his country was planning to increase production to a fantastic thousand million tons a year by 1980, and he urged the United States to offer Saudi oil a "special place" in the U.S. market. This would bind Saudi Arabia to the United States, more effectively than any Russian-style "treaty of friendship and cooperation", with indissoluble bonds of economic and commercial self-interest.

The Sudan, once a candidate for membership of the Federation of Arab Republics, has reasserted its African identity; this has brought the end of its long and bitter civil war in the south, but helped bring President Numeiri into open conflict with Sadat and

Colonel Gadafi, who resent the "ingratitude" of the man they rescued a year ago from the jaws of a Communist conspiracy. Numeiri has had the effrontery to re-establish relations with the Americans. So has North Yemen, another country in which Egypt once had a powerful influence. Iraq, whose Baathist rulers have more or less turned their back on the Arab world since 1970, continued to keep very much to themselves, deeply preoccupied with their partial nationalisation of the Iraqi Petroleum Company, their menacing Iranian neightbour and their renewed troubles with the Kurds of North Iraq.

Only Colonel Gadafi sticks faithfully by Sadat — but at the price of what promises to be a difficult union of relatively advanced, populous Egypt with backward, oil-rich Libya. This was Sadat's only real success of the year. But how long will that last?

In October, Sadat, driven from pillar to post, was already going back on his great "decision", seeking a new modus vivendi with the Russians. As the year drew to a close, faced with growing internal unrest and the newly militant Syrians, he is in danger of having to take the supreme "decision", the decision for war, just at a time when, as a result of earlier "decisions," he is least prepared to wage it.

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
5 January 1973

Sadat adrift in the fog

As one year ago, Egypt is troubled. Then as now Cairo's students were demonstrating and being arrested. Then as now the pressure of a prolonged situation of no war and no peace in the Middle East was having its divisive effects on Egyptian society. A scurrilous placard carried in last year's demonstration asked, "What did you do in the war, Father? I got lost in the fog." The reference was to President Sadat's unfortunate explanation why he had failed to make true his promise that 1971 would be the year of military or political decision. He claimed the decision had been taken but had become lost in the fog of the Indo-Pakistan war. The student protests exemplify a widespread feeling that foggy policies persist.

It must be admitted that President Sadat has been operating on a narrow margin. During 1971, he went farther than his predecessor in his offers for making peace with Israel. Israel brushed these aside. Sadat was further disappointed by the US overestimation of its ability to coax a more flexible position out of Israel over an interim settlement centred on the Suez Canal. But within these circumstances, Sadat forgot the basic rules of the gamesman under pressure—the fewer errors the better.

The decision taken in July to expel the Soviet advisers serving with the Egyptian armed forces in the short term took the wind out of opposition to Sadat. But this largely personal decision (taken under pressure from General Sadek, the War Minister until his dismissal in October) was ineptly timed in relation to the US presidential elections and thus to the US ability to do anything about the Middle East. Egypt presumed too much that Europe would be able to take up even in part the burden of the Soviet arms or political support for Egypt. Its hope sank without trace under the repercussions of the killings at the Munich Olympics. The only resort was for Egypt to somersault back to Moscow. In military terms, the expulsion exercise had left Egypt in a still weaker state facing Israel.

The student demonstrations by themselves do not constitute a direct challenge to Sadat's position. They essentially reflect divisions induced in a society erratically governed and under stress. These strains have shown elsewhere in the conflicts between Copts and Moslems. But the warning that others may follow the students is there already. Journalists, lawyers, and workers are also reported to have been arrested. There have been student disturbances at Zagazig in the Delta, and at the industrial centre in Helwan. Yet others could take up the warning, aggravated by the use of force against the students, that a year adrift in a fog is enough.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
12 January 1973

Afghanistan's war on poppies

By the Associated Press

Kabul, Afghanistan

Afghanistan's new Prime Minister, Mohammed Musa Shafiq, says he wants a "crusade" to stop the growing of opium poppies and drug smuggling in this land-locked kingdom.

Mr. Shafiq has declared he will not let traditionally backward power groups block changes designed to bring the 20th century to Afghanistan. Only eight years ago it began to experiment with a system of representative government.

Not a war

In referring to the power groups, tribal leaders, landowners, and mullahs — Muslim preachers with a grip on the countryside — Mr. Shafiq, himself the son of a mullah, observes: "But you do not have to declare war on them."

Mr. Shafiq, a dapper diplomat who affects long hair and wide, mod ties, says about poppy cultivation and smuggling: "This is something I consider our crusade here."

He notes the United States, West Germany, and the United Nations have offered money to help, but the amount can not be determined until the government, consulting with UN experts, can produce a blueprint. The United States and West Germany are working with Afghan officials on checking the flow of narcotics.

Referring to the U.S. program to buy the opium crop of Turkey, Mr. Shafiq said: "You just cannot distrubute money to peasants to ask them not to grow opium. You have to make a program for them."

Previous prime ministers have avoided comment on the growing drug trade in Afghanistan. Until two years ago, the government refused to admit that opium poppies were even grown here.

Drug control experts believe from 150 to 300 tons of opium are produced illegally here every year.

WASHINGTON POST
11 January 1973

Pakistanis See Chill in U.S. Ties

By Arnold Zeitlin
Associated Press

RAWALPINDI—Pakistani President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto is showing anxiety about an apparent chill in his country's relations with the United States, just as Washington and New Delhi seem to be preparing to mend their relations.

In conversations with American diplomats, he has questioned U.S. intentions toward his hostile neighbor, India, especially after President Nixon appointed his former adviser, Harvard sociologist Daniel Patrick Moynihan, as ambassador to New Delhi.

The appointment prompted one Pakistani official to refer to a celebrated Moynihan recommendation concerning American attitudes toward blacks. "I hope this does not mean we are in for a period of benign neglect," the Pakistani remarked.

Bhutto has complained about Nixon's delay in filling the U.S. ambassador's post in Pakistan. There has been no official American envoy for six months, and virtually no effective representation since Bhutto took office in December 1971.

He also has complained publicly and privately about the amount of American economic assistance to Pakistan and the lack of American response to requests for the resumption of the supply of military equipment.

According to authoritative American sources, Bhutto has been told that the United States regarded India as the "pre-eminent" power on the Subcontinent and sought normal relations with New Delhi. It was American backing for Pakistan in its war with India one year ago which cooled already strained U.S. relations with the government of India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

The Americans assured Bhutto that the United States did not regard India as "dominant." This distinction was important because Bhutto has said it would not accept Indian insistence that it dominates the region.

The U.S. sources said the United States would not permit itself to be "blackmailed" by India over an eventual decision to give economic or arms aid to Pakistan. But high American officials here said that dealing with the problems between the United States and Pakistan would take months and indicated that these problems did not have immediate priority in Washington.

The Pakistani anxiety contrasts with the ardor of a year ago when President Nixon sent the 7th Fleet to the Bay of Bengal as an apparent warning to India to halt the war.

Bhutto said several times last year that he wanted to make no demands on the United States until after the November presidential elections but he indicated what

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
15 January 1973

Mass trial in Turkey draws concern in Europe

By a staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Beirut, Lebanon

Europe and the Middle East observers are watching with anxiety the new mass trial that has just opened in Turkey.

It appears to be yet another sign of the power of the Turkish armed forces in the nominally parliamentary regime.

Even before this latest military trial of scores of alleged leftists began Jan. 10, there had been increasing criticism in the Council of Europe of the repression of nonviolent dissenters in both Greece and Turkey. Both countries are members of NATO, and both would like to exchange their present association with the European Common Market for full membership.

On the other side of the Turkish coin is the frequent eruption of urban and rural guerrilla violence. One example was a Jan. 3 incursion of guerrillas from Syria into Hatay Province.

Hostages taken

Like other guerrillas active in Turkey since 1970, these may have been members of the Turkish People's Liberation Army. This group has taken hostages among American, British, and Canadian personnel serving in Turkey and in 1971 killed the Israeli consul general in Istanbul.

The concern in Western European opinion about Turkey, however, stems not from Turkish Army action against guerrillas but against what it regards as the arbitrary arrests of nonviolent critics and the subordination of democratic rule to orders from the military.

Last month the Council of Europe's Netherlands delegate, Pieter Dankert, was invited by the Ankara government to undertake an investigation in Turkey after Turkish Foreign Minister Hayuk Bayulken denied published charges of the frequent torture of political prisoners.

Unfavorable reaction possible

Sicco Mansholt, the outgoing chairman of the Commission of the European Communities, said last month that the commission might react unfavorably to Turkey's application for EEC membership if Mr. Dankert's findings back the charges of torture and other arbitrary acts.

For this latest mass trial in Ankara, 267 alleged members of the extreme leftist Turkish Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Party were indicted. Some 185 of these are reportedly expected to stand trial on charges ranging from the capital offense of seeking to overthrow the government to merely insulting officials.

Since the Turkish armed forces moved into a more active role behind President Cevdet Sunay in running the country in March, 1971, and imposed martial law in 11 provinces a month later, about 3,400 people accused of terrorism, subversion, or "propagating Communist ideology" have faced military courts.

Severe sentences given

Unusually severe prison sentences have been imposed on many of the hundreds of intellectuals, lawyers, writers, journalists, and students arrested.

Last month a mass trial in Ankara jailed 52 teachers for periods ranging up to eight years for "transforming their union into a clandestine Communist cell."

Another conviction was that of Prof. Ugur Alacakaptan, a respected Turkish jurist, who was sentenced to six years and three months in prison and an additional 23 months' exile.

Eight other defendants convicted with Professor Alacakaptan had taken part in a protest march in Ankara in June, 1970, after shooting between leftist and rightist university students. Turkish liberals alleged government agents had provoked the trouble.

Examples reported

Professor Alacakaptan also was convicted of "insulting military authorities" during his court defense of Prof. Mumtax Soysal, now serving six years for having included explanations of Communist forms of government in a standard text on constitutional law. The book was used for three years in universities before the military authorities filed charges.

Many newsmen have been arrested and at least 10 imprisoned for their writings. The mass circulation Istanbul newspaper Hurriyet was suspended for 10 days recently in two southern provinces for describing a guerrilla attack by infiltrators from Syria in which three persons were killed and nine wounded.

he had in mind when he said—partly jokingly—that he hoped to finance his home reforms by "milking Uncle Sam."

The lack of an ambassador since the departure of Joseph S. Farland for the post in Iran last June has rankled Bhutto. Now Mr. Nixon has made a prestige appointment to New Delhi and even named an ambassador to Bangladesh, although the appointment was withdrawn because of the illness of the diplomat.

WASHINGTON STAR
14 January 1973

JAMES J. KILPATRICK

Raising the Double Standard Over Greece

A House subcommittee filed a bitchy little report two weeks ago, complaining petulantly of the Navy's decision to homeport a part of the Sixth Fleet in Greece. But the thrust of the report wasn't directed at American admirals; it was directed at Greek colonels instead.

The authors of this report agreed that the United States has legitimate military and security interests in Greece, relating both to NATO and to the Middle East. They could not convincingly challenge the Navy's choice of Athens in terms of the city's housing facilities and the like. This was their point:

"The circumstances of that choice indicate that our government is more concerned about obtaining the minor advantages and conveniences of homeporting in Greece (instead of Italy, for example) than about expressing our opposition to the Greek dictatorship through a policy of minimal and cool relations until democracy is restored in that country. The world looks to the United States to stand up for democratic principles and if we shirk that responsibility, we are negating the most important principle on which this country stands."

Members of the subcommittee, headed by Benjamin S. Rosenthal of New York, took a lugubrious view of the present government in Greece. It is not, they believe, "stable." There may be some short-term advantage in the homeporting decision, but "our long-term need is for a stable Greek government which will come through a democratic restoration." The Navy, they insist, should have chosen Naples, Livorno or Taranto instead.

The authors' conclusions, viewed on their merits, have no merit. Whatever else may be said of the government in Greece, like it or not, it is stable. The colonels have been firmly in power for nearly six years. Their opposition is divided, disorganized, and impotent. Restoration of what is euphemistically known as "democratic rule" would invite a return of the chaotic conditions that obtained prior to 1967. If forces of the extreme left wing should gain power, it could well mean a swift end not only to democratic rule, but also to Greek participation in NATO.

By contrast, if "stability" is the desideratum, one may recall that Italy has had 34 governments since World War II.

Never mind the merits. What is baffling to the observer of foreign affairs is the double standard one constantly encounters. Indeed, when it comes to our relations with the rest of the world, we seem to have double standards for double standards.

Surely this is true in the matter of Communist regimes. This past year saw the President of the United States toasting the Communists of China and Russia, and bombing the Communists of North Vietnam. It is equally true of dictatorships. Rosenthal and his colleagues despise the dictatorship in Greece. They never cease to mourn the absence of democracy in Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa. But you will not see them standing up for democratic principles in Zambia, Tanzania, and the Sudan.

We see the same double standard in the matter of moral outrage. When U.S. bombs fall on Hanoi, it is barbarism; when Soviet missiles fall on Quang Tri, it is no more than the fortunes of war. The history of the bloody conflict in Vietnam is in part a history of the torture, mutilation and murder imposed by terrorists from the North upon peasants of the South. This part of the history seems to affect congressional liberals not at all.

We ought to weep for the dead of war, whoever they are, however they die. And when it comes to dealing with governments we find distasteful, we ought in charity to give some account to the taste of others.

In some millennium, all nations will be as democratic as the Eighth Congressional District of New York; meanwhile we ought to work with governments as they are. We ought to tolerate Greek colonels, Spanish generals, African despots, and everyone else. After all, they tolerate us—or most nations do—and that in itself is no easy job.

BALTIMORE SUN
7 January 1973

Greek regime lacks effective opposition

By STEPHEN J. LYNTON
Sun Staff Correspondent

Athens — A former politician with a conservative rural constituency, who bitterly detests the military-backed regime, groped for a word in English with appropriate Greek overtones to describe his own pessimistic outlook. Finally, he said he was a "fatalist."

"It's a kind of a Greek drama," he remarked. "What we need is an anti-event that would initiate catharsis. What he meant was that nothing on the political horizon — except perhaps an unforeseeable act of fate — could remove the present rulers from power and open the way to parliamentary-style democracy.

From him and other opponents as well as from a government spokesman, from a man who quit the regime and now criticizes it as well as from a politician who once opposed the regime but now who supports it, from diplomats and from journalists — from almost every political direction — there is one refrain: The regime will retain power as long as it wants because there is no alternative.

Critics say they expect no free elections in Greece unless Premier George Papadopoulos quits, dies or is overthrown. More detached observers say that, in any case, there is no evidence to suggest any will be held soon. A supporter of the regime predicted elections might occur in two years, but Byron Stamatopoulos, the government's chief spokesman, would go no further, when pressed, than to say they would take place within five years.

Mr. Papadopoulos, a retired Army colonel who led a military coup that seized power April 21, 1967, remains in many respects an enigmatic ruler who seldom tips his hand. His occasional public decisions are often open to conflicting interpretations — as miniscule steps toward democracy or as mere ploys to allay criticism, as signs of weakness or of strength, as indications that he will some day step down or that he means to rule for life.

In November, the regime allowed students to elect their leaders for the first time since the 1967 coup. But critics and more neutral observers view the polling as rigged and say that government supporters swept the votes in all the faculties except for two — the only two where impartial

judges watched the balloting.

Last month, Mr. Papadopoulos announced the lifting of martial law in the northern district of Salonika. But his opponents and most observers say the shift means little so long as Athens itself remains under martial law and they add that, even if it were lifted in Athens, the change would be slight since a military-supported regime rules the country.

In November, in what was viewed as a deliberate government leak, the Athens newspaper *Acropolis* reported that Mr. Papadopoulos would announce limited elections for 1973 in a pronouncement either last month or next April. His speech last month omitted any such declaration and, although observers here now think he may proclaim elections in a speech on the sixth anniversary of the coup, the rumored elections are expected to be contrived to choose only government-approved candidates for a rubber-tamp Parliament.

Intimidate critics

Mr. Papadopoulos is believed likely to make occasional public appearances in the rural sections of the nation this year similar to his visit to Crete last month. These apparently would have the makings of a preliminary political campaign. His supporters say he was warmly received in Crete but opponents dispute this, calling the response a facade.

Aside from such limited developments as these, the regime has permitted little political change. The former political parties remain outlawed. A constitution ratified in 1968 has not been put into effect. newspapers operate under a vague press law designed to intimidate the government's critics.

The government acknowledges holding about 250 political prisoners — although it objects to describing them as such — as well as about 15 others imprisoned pending trial. Observers here say, however, they know of at least 20 jailed without trial since August. The government disputes allegations that political prisoners are tortured.

The Greek political opposition remains in disarray, and the regime seems largely indifferent to criticism from other nations, such as the mild pressure for moves toward democracy from the Nixon administration, sharper attacks from two U.S. House of Representatives subcommittees last month, Greece's forced withdrawal from the Council of Europe and its partly curtailed dealings with the European Common Market. Both European organizations acted on political grounds.

"Our course is not going to be influenced by anything," Mr. Stamatopolous, the undersecretary of state for information and the press, said in an interview, calling outside pressure "political blackmail." Mr. Papadopoulos had also denounced similar "blackmail" last month in his most recent major address.

The regime still rests its claims to success on grounds of economic progress and internal security. The economy has grown at a healthy pace—although inflation hasrecently become a problem, some economists view the regime's current economic policies as misguided and many attribute the economic growth to steps already begun before the military takeover.

The consumer price index, which had been growing at a rate of about 3 per cent previously, jumped to 5.9 per cent in November, and the more sensitive wholesale price index rose to 8.2 per cent. Fresh meat has been in short supply and a form of black market has appeared for meat and veegetables.

Inflation is a touchy issue both with the regime and the public, which remembers a drastic devaluation of the drachma to half its worth in 1953. Some economists say recent government moves to curb inflation may actually accelerate it.

Greece's internal security—though it has been accompanied by a curtailment of political freedom—has helped attract foreign investment.

Despite the Nixon administration's complaints about the absence of democratic features under the Greek regime, the United States continues to provide about $70 million a year in military grants and credit to Greece as well as additional excess weapons.

Stock American exports to Greece are rising rapidly, U.S. officials here are "targeting" Greek markets for further American exports, and they say they expect considerable U.S. investment in an airport and subway that have been proposed for Athens.

WASHINGTON POST
3 JANUARY 1973

Turks Said to Torture Dissidents

By Laurence Marks
London Observer

LONDON — Amnesty International is convinced that political prisoners have been tortured in Turkey and that there is no evidence that torture has ceased.

This announcement by the international organization which campaigns for "prisoners of conscience" contradicts the statement made by the Turkish foreign minister, Haluk Bayulken, to the Council of Europe in Paris that prisoners had not been tortured.

A mission from the British section of Amnesty International visited Turkey in November to investigate allegations of torture. It was composed of Muir Hunter, a prominent lawyer, and two magistrates, his wife Mrs. Muir Hunter and Sir Osmond Williams.

Hunter said that Amnesty decided to make the visit after receiving written assurance from the Turkish embassy in London that they would be permitted to visit prisons and talk to prisoners.

The day after they arrived in Ankara, they met with Minister of Justice Fehmi Alpaslan and other officials. The mission handed over a list of prisoners whom they wished to interview. Alpaslan said they could do so. He also appeared to agree that they should receive a copy of the Turkish government's own report of its inquiry into torture allegations.

Two days later, they were told by the Turkish foreign ministry that all but one of the prisoners on their list were under the control of the Turkish general staff and that the ministry of justice had no jurisdiction over them. (Eleven provinces of Turkey have been under martial law since the middle refused access to these prisoners.

At Sagmalcilar women's prison, the mission had a two-hour interview with Mrs. Ilkay Demir, 26, medical student at Istanbul University, the only prisoner on the list now said to be under the ministry's jurisdiction.

She corroborated a statement made by her husband, Necmi Demir, 28, an economics student at the university accused in May, 1971, of "trying to change the Turkish constitution by force." The statement had been taken from the files of the Third Extraordinary Military Court. It alleged that he was beaten on the soles of his feet for six hours in a cell in the Istanbul police headquarters on May 28, 1971.

Mrs. Demir also signed a copy of her own statement, taken from the same court files, that she had been forced under threat of torture to accuse her husband falsely of having taken part in the kidnaping and murder of the Isaeli consul-general, Ephraim Elrom, and that she had seen her husban in police headquarters on May 28, 1971, when he was carried out of the cell in which he had been tortured and laid on a desk.

The mission said she confirmed that on this occasion she tended her husband's wounded feet and those of another prisoner, Irfan Ucar, 25, an engineering student at the Technical University of Ankara, accused of refusing to give information about a resistance organization. She said that the floor of the cell in which they had been tortured was covered with blood.

She also told the mission about tortures of other political prisoners. She said electrodes had been applied to the head and body, including the genital organs, and a police truncheon trust into the vagina or anus. She believed that it was because she alone had not been tortured that the mission had been allowed to interview her

Members of the mission said that throughout the interview she was quite com-

posed, and answered questions only after consideration. If she had any doubt in her mind, or if her knowledge was from hearsay, she said so, according to mission members.

The mission later tried to obtain permission to interview the prisoners said to be under military control, but they were refused. They were told that, under a law passed about six months ago, all these prisoners (although mostly civilians before their arrest) are now considered to be soldiers. The mission was unable to obtain a copy of the Turkish government's own inquiry report.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 January 1973

U.S. and Greece sign port pact

Athens spokesman says facilities on par with other NATO aids

By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Athens

United States and Greek naval officers have signed a new "technical agreement" on home port facilities used by the U.S. Sixth Fleet here.

Byron Stamatopoulos, Greek undersecretary for the press, specified that Greece, under arrangements already begun when six destroyers of U.S. Destroyer Squadron 12 arrived here last fall, "is granting the same kind of NATO facilities as France, Italy, and others grant to the United States.

"The agreement has no other significance. This will not be an operational base or a naval arsenal," Mr. Stamatopoulos insisted.

No ownership involved

Official U.S. sources here stress that the United States is not acquiring ownership or title to any facilities in Greece. The ships are using existing anchorage and berthing facilities. Later, a mobile naval pier may be provided at Elevsis, about 10 miles west of Athens.

Procurement of food, fuel, and other supplies and services is by local contract.

Some 1,700 officers and men of the destroyer squadron, about 450 American families in all, including some 1,000 dependents, are already living in private houses and apartments rented in the Athens area. This number is expected to rise eventually to 6,000 military personnel and 3,100 dependents.

They are to be joined here later by an aircraft carrier that will also use Piraeus, the port of Athens, as home port. There is speculation here that the carrier and its personnel may be covered by the new agreement.

Press is critical

Last Oct. 14, the Greek alternate foreign affairs minister, Phaedon Anninos-Kavalieratos, said negotiations beginning in January, 1972, led to signing of "minutes of understanding" in August, 1972, covering the destroyer squadron.

The home porting accord, signed Jan. 8, is under fire in the Greek newspapers. Almost daily, they play up incidents between U.S. sailors and Greeks. Opposition columnists take the U.S. to task for supporting the authoritarian, Army-backed regime of Prime Minister George Papadopoulos.

Two subcommittees of the U.S. House of Representatives said in a joint report released in Washington Dec. 29, that the decision does "serious disservice to American relations with the Greek people, our ties to our NATO allies, and to our own democratic institutions.' 'Six subcommittee members dissented from the majority and supported the accords.

Danger seen

A typical comment from the Greek opposition is that of John Pesmazoglu, a liberal, pro-Western economist and former governor of the Bank of Greece. He was released last month after seven months of forced banishment in a mountain village.

In an interview here, he told this reporter: "It is an extremely dangerous and definitely harmful action by the U.S. to discuss, negotiate, and conclude such an agreement with the present regime.

"The regime has no representative character in Greece. By all criteria and evidence it is strongly opposed by the overwhelming majority of the Greek people.

"The fact that the U.S. relies on making such arrangements with non-representative rulers who exercise power in violation of their own Greek legislation is an extremely dangerous and inimical action."

Africa

WASHINGTON POST
17 JANUARY 1973

Racial Collision: Rhodesia and Zambia

Guerrillas based next door in Zambia have now provoked the uptight white minority government of Rhodesia to partially close its border with Zambia; only Zambian copper, on which Salisbury earns important hard-currency revenues, is to be let through. But whether these "sanctions in reverse" will put enough economic pressure on Zambia to make it alter its deep political commitment to the guerrillas, and to leash them, is dubious. The example of Rhodesia, which itself has managed to endure international sanctions for more than seven years—though not without cost—would seem to be relevant.

President Kaunda of Zambia has given hospitality, training grounds and sanctuary to the three main guerrilla groups operating in Rhodesia. No doubt he once hoped to postpone a full showdown with Rhodesia until completion (expected in 1975) of the railroad the Chinese are building him to Tanzania's Dar es Salaam—this is a project undertaken precisely to give land-locked Zambia a port outlet not dependent on white good will. Even so, Mr. Kaunda says he will stop using the Rhodesia rail link. The alternatives are limited but they exist. Trucks already carry some Zambian copper to Dar es Salaam; other Zambian copper goes out by rail to Portuguese Angola's Atlantic port of Lobito. Rhodesia will surely press Portugal to join the blockade but Lisbon has its own reasons to equivocate and spin out its response.

The new collision is a prime example of racial tightening in southern Africa. Though small in number and literal effect (their victims are counted only in twos and threes), the guerrillas have forced Rhodesia to a far-reaching step. Imposition of sanctions by Rhodesia has already stirred some public white doubts in the country. Moreover, it mocks Salisbury's objections to the sanctions which the United Nations voted against it in 1965 when it broke from Britain without offering guarantees of eventual majority rule. Some Rhodesian whites even have acknowledged that the guerrillas, far from being the outside provocateurs portrayed in official Salisbury propaganda, have been given aid and comfort by blacks in Rhodesia. It has been one of the energizing myths of white minority rule that blacks liked it that way. Salisbury's sanctions, then, seem bound to intensify the already pressure-laden atmosphere in which the Salisbury government is trying to prolong and legitimize its rule.

Let it be clearly understood that it is the whites' continuing refusal to take gradual legal steps towards majority rule that has brought into being the guerrilla movement based outside Rhodesia in Zambia—and in Botswana, to the west, and Mozambique, to the east, now as well. No other legal political avenues have been open. Indeed, recently the Smith regime in Salisbury began introducing certain "apartheid" measures. These can hardly fail to stir further black opposition and to ensure that such opposition is expressed in increasingly militant ways. So far the United States has not been called upon publicly to take sides in the Rhodesian-Zambian collision. But something like a Zambian request for trucks in which to carry out more copper to Dar es Salaam could force the issue. It would be interesting to see the Nixon administration's response.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 January 1973

Churches Press Businesses on Africa

By ERNEST HOLSENDOLPH

Six Protestant church organizations are renewing a campaign for full disclosure and close scrutiny of American corporate investments and activities in southern Africa, it was announced yesterday.

The organizations, all institutional investors, are trying to exercise their privilege as shareholders to compel 13 corporations to disclose their dealings in South Africa and other countries where what they consider "oppressive conditions" prevail for blacks.

The groups, which include the National Council of Churches, have filed stockholder resolutions to be included in corporate proxy statements.

At a press conference yesterday at the Church Center for the United Nations, 777 United Nations Plaza, spokesmen stopped short of threatening to withdraw their investments in the companies doing business in southern Africa, but said they hoped to change company policies through public pressure.

'Huge Profits' Are Seen

The United States companies "have made huge profits there while paying their black workers pitifully inadequate wages," the Rev. W. Sterling Cary, president of the National Council of Churches, said.

"They have provided products for the white government and military, thereby strengthening white control," Mr. Cary said. "They have helped create a flourishing economy — for whites."

The religious organizations, described as "substantial institutional investors," include boards and agencies of the American Baptist Churches, the Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S.A., the United Methodist Church, the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. and the Unitarian-Universalist Association as well as the National Council.

Burroughs Said to Agree

The targets of the groups are the Burroughs Corporation, the Caterpillar Tractor Company, the Chrysler Corporation, the Eastman Kodak Company, the First National City Bank of New York, the General Electric Company, the International Business Machines Corporation, the International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation, the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, Texaco, Inc., and the Xerox Corporation.

The Burroughs Corporation has already agreed to supply the information requested, a spokesman said. In a separate action, the Unitarians have filed a resolution asking the Exxon Corporation to set up a special committee to investigate the implications of a proposed investment in the Portuguese African territory of Angola.

Sums Up Position

Last year a group of religious organizations made demands for disclosure upon the Gulf Oil Corporation, the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, the General Motors Corporation, International Business Machines Corporation and the Mobil Oil Corporation.

Spokesmen yesterday claimed credit for disclosures and "some policy changes" by Gulf and General Motors, but they criticized Goodyear as having flatly refused to cooperate.

Summing up the church groups' arguments, Dr. Gene Bartlett, president of the American Baptist Churches, said: "If our corporations make some of the highest profits in the world while doing business there, and we as institutional investors benefit from those profits, we then directly profit from apartheid."

Spokesmen said they did not know the value of combined church investment portfolios, but estimated that church organizations control less than 3 per cent of company shares.

It is estimated that there are 18.5 million members among the six organizations in the campaign.

Appearing with Mr. Cary and Dr. Bartlett for the announcement were the Rev. Stewart MacColl, chairman of the Committee on Mission Responsibility through Investment of the General Assembly Mission Council, and Miss Florence Little, treasurer of the Women's Division of the United Methodist Church.

Western Hemisphere

NEW YORK TIMES
11 January 1973

American Ex-Nun Held By Bolivia as a Guerrilla

By DEIRDRE CARMODY

A former American nun, arrested in Bolivia for belonging to a subversive organization, has been held in jail for more than five weeks because she will not reveal the identities of other members of the clandestine group.

The 40-year-old woman, Mary Harding of Fairhaven, Mass., has admitted that she is a member of the Army of National Liberation, a guerrilla organization that grew out of the movement founded by Ernesto Che Guevara in 1967. According to the State Department, Miss Harding, told by the Bolivian authorities that she would be released as soon as she gave information about members of the terrorist organization, replied that she would never do so.

Friends of Miss Harding, here from Bolivia to try to stir interest in her case in the hope that it will expedite her release, say that she told a priest who visited her that she had been beaten with a hard rubber mallet during the first 72 hours after her arrest on Dec. 5.

Account by a Visitor

Juan José Loria, Minister Counselor of the Bolivian Embassy in Washington, said in an interview that reports that Miss Harding had been beaten were "clearly not true." He confirmed that she was being held "because she has to conform to our laws as any citizen," but he said he had no information on the possibility of her release.

"We have no information to substantiate that she was beaten," said Jack R. Binns, Bolivia desk officer in the State Department. "Our consular officer asked her if she had been mistreated and she said she had not."

According to a man who has just arrived from La Paz and who does not want to give his name for publication for fear he will not be allowed to reenter Bolivia, Miss Harding is being held in the city jail in a small, damp room that has little other than a mattress on the floor. She is visited about once a week by someone from the embassy. Two nuns were allowed to see her on Christmas and a few people have managed to see her unofficially.

Miss Harding went to Bolivia in 1959 as a member of the Maryknoll order. She worked as a teacher in the tropical northeastern section of the country until 1962, when she was transferred to La Paz for parish work.

In 1967 she and another Maryknoll sister, without disclosing their affiliation, took jobs in a factory in one of the poorest areas of the city to try to help people there. They lived on $20 a week in a small room with no running water, electricity or heat.

Lost Her Factory Job

In 1970 Miss Harding left the sisterhood, telling a friend, Gail Kelley, that she had become involved in political activity and "did not want the Maryknoll order compromised." Later she lost her factory job because she had failed to change her status on her passport when she left the order and was working illegally. She then got a position as an English teacher in the American Cultural Institute, a United States Government agency.

On her way to work on Dec. 5 she was arrested for being a member of the liberation army, which is known as E.L.N.

According to Dr. Loria, the organization is "planning to overthrow our Government and is trying to create a Vietnam in South America." Sources in the State Department describe it as a terrorist organization.

It has actively mounted guerrilla campaigns against the three military Governments since then. According to the State Department, it apparently switched its strategy from rural insurgency to urban terrorism about two years ago, and recently officials uncovered an attempt to assassinate President Hugo Banzer Suárez, whose right-wing Government has been in power since a coup d'etat in August, 1971 the 181st coup in the turbulent 147-year history of Bolivia.

On Nov. 23 President Banzer imposed a state of siege throughout the country, asserting that there was an open conspiracy to overthrow his Government. As a result certain individual rights were suspended under the Constitution and a modified form of martial law is in effect for the population of more than five million.

It is this that has complicated the Harding case. State Department sources say that under the martial law both nationals and foreigners may be held in "indefinite detention" for interrogation, if they are suspected of terrorist activities. Charges do not have to be filed.

According to Miss Kelley, also a former nun, who lives here now, more than 1,000 Bolivians are being held as political prisoners in Viacha, Achacalla and Coati. She said that prisoners were being tortured and others had been shot "while trying to escape."

Miss Kelley said her information came from a document published in exile and another document that had probably been written by priests and was smuggled out of Bolivia.

Asked about political prisoners, Dr. Loria said that he did not have a figure but that it was nothing like 1,000. Several hundred were freed last month, he added. He acknowledged that prisoners were being detained in the areas cited by Miss Kelley.

In a letter to a friend here in July, Miss Harding said the situation in Bolivia was "fear everywhere—and there's reason for fear everywhere." She spoke of "arrests without authorization, suppression of habeas corpus, tortures—at least two cases I know of personally: a man and a young woman have died under torture—and how many more there must be; inhuman conditions in the concentration camps where people are held."

"Please, we are desperate," she wrote. "I try not to say too much in my letters home, but I want my mother to be a little prepared psychologically 'just in case.'"

Both Miss Harding's friend who is here from La Paz and Miss Kelley said they felt that the United States Embassy had not tried hard enough to win Miss Harding's release.

According to the State Department, she has requested neither deportation nor counsel. During the weekly visit by an American from the embassy, she is asked if anything can be done for her.

A State Department spokesman said that as far as he knew Miss Harding was the only American being detained as a political prisoner in Bolivia.

WASHINGTON STAR
14 January 1973

Ex-Nun Placed In U.S. Custody

LA PAZ, Bolivia (AP) — Mary Elizabeth Harding, a former U.S. nun arrested last month and accused of guerrila activities, was released yesterday to the custody of the U.S. consul.

Interior Minister Col. Mario Adett Zamora said she would remain in the custody of Donald Mudd, the consul, until her expulsion. He did not say when she would be ousted.

Adett Zamora said Miss Harding, 40, from Worcester, Mass., had confessed to being a member of the National Liberation Army, a guerrilla group founded by the late Ernesto (Che) Guevara. She was arrested Dec. 5 by the political police.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
17 January 1973

Latin America wary on U.S. envoy

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor

Latin Americans are casting somewhat wary glances at Washington these days over the imminent vacancy in the State Department's top Latin-American post.

At a time when United States-Latin-American relations are none too warm, one of the few bright spots in the relationships, as far as Latin Americans are concerned, has been the role of Charles Appleton Meyer, who currently occupies the post as assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs.

Mr. Meyer is held in warm esteem throughout the hemisphere, in rather sharp contrast with most of the post's previous occupants.

A onetime Sears, Roebuck executive, Mr.

Meyer's resignation was not unexpected. When he took the job in 1969, he did so with the understanding that he would stay only four years and then return to business.

Actually Mr. Meyer has held the post longer than anyone else since it was created after World War II. For a long time, the assistant secretary's job looked something like a revolving door, with one occupant after another serving a few months and then resigning.

The fact that Mr. Meyer remained in the post as long as he did impressed Latin Americans. But it was his way of dealing with them that impressed them the most.

Fluent in Spanish, he has enjoyed the role of a personal diplomat — which was important in a period of "low profile" adopted by President Nixon, who is personally not too warmly received by Latin Americans. Many Latin Americans equate the "low profile" strategy as a euphemism for a do-nothing policy.

Throughout the past four years, Mr. Meyer was able to get across the message that he, at least, cared about Latin America — and this proved of tremendous value in many hemisphere conferences where he was able to tone down Latin-American criticism of United States policy.

Now the Latin Americans are wondering just who will take over the post and what the new occupant will do for relations between the United States and the rest of the hemisphere.

"We're none too hopeful, given the past record of assistant secretaries and the lack of interest President Nixon has shown for this part of the world," a leading Latin-American diplomat in Washington said. "But then we do have the record of Charlie Meyer — and so perhaps there is some reason for hope."

A number of names have been mentioned. Joseph S. Farland, onetime ambassador to Panama, and John M. Hennessy, an international affairs specialist at the Treasury Department, are most frequently suggested as top candidates for the post.

But all indications suggest the White House has not made a decision and indeed, in the view of several Latin Americans in Washington, there is a feeling that the post could go vacant for some months before being filled, if past performance is a criterion. Mr. Meyer, for example, was not tapped for the job until several months after Mr. Nixon's first inauguration.

There will be other changes in the Latin-American team at the State Department. John Crimmins and Robert A. Hurwitch, the two top aides to Mr. Meyer, are expected to receive ambassadorial appointments.

The new team members, headed by whoever is named to succeed Mr. Meyer, are important. But Latin Americans also watch with interest for signs of Latin America being accorded a greater priority in the White House. Despite past promises that Latin America is top on the White House list, most hemisphere diplomats say that this has not proved to be the case.

Over the long pull, improved trade relations and increased economic aid are, in the view of Latin Americans, the key to better relations between the United States and the rest of the hemisphere. Still, they are very concerned about who occupies the assistant secretary post.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 January 1973

Brazil Bans Sale of Picasso's Erotic Prints

By MARVINE HOWE
Special to The New York Times

RIO DE JANEIRO, Jan. 9— Brazil has banned the sale of Picasso's erotic engravings in what appears to be a new wave of cultural puritanism.

Brazilian intellectuals expressed general dismay today over the Government's action, which they felt would only tarnish this country's image abroad.

There has been increasing concern here over official censorship of the arts. Rio de Janeiro's leading daily, Jornal do Brasil, published a devastating report Sunday on cultural censorship.

The ban on the Picasso prints by the federal police follows the seizure of the Christmas issue of Playboy and refusal to authorize the sale of Playboy's new magazine, Oui.

Bookstores Surprised

The Picasso engravings are "contrary to public morals and good behavior," according to the Ministry of Justice.

This judgment came as surprise to bookstores where the $5 Picasso portfolios have been on sale for three years.

"It's absurd and ridiculous and quite incomprehensible," said Dilze Soares, a leader of Brazil's erotic-surrealist school of painting.

Miss Soares, who is known as Zama, said that she had had no trouble with the censors but that other members of her school had not been allowed to exhibit their works in Belo Horizonte on the ground that the paintings were a threat to the traditions of the family.

"The erotic is part of nature; pornography is a human interpretation and I make a distinction between the two." Miss Soares said.

Brazil's television programs, she said, were much worse in their way but the censors neglected "that kind of commercial pornography that isn't even artistic."

Movies have been hard hit by censors, according to Jornal do Brasil. New political films, particularly from Italy, as well as films from the United States, based on sex and violence, were threatened here.

Recent banned films include Stanley Kubrick's "A Clockwork Orange," Michelangelo Antonioni's "Zabriskie Point," Pier Paolo Pasolini's "Decameron" and Ken Russell's "The Devils." Other films have been released after heavy cuts.

In 1971, censors prohibited the showing of 35 films—13 Brazilian and 22 foreign—for containing "matter subversive or contrary to public morals and good behavior."

There has been an increase in censorship in the theater, according to a successful playwright and director, Flavio Rangel.

"The censors want to reform humanity and so they exert a dual action, preventing any analysis of the Brazilian situation and exerting an excessive control over morals," Mr. Rangel said in an interview.

The ban on the Picasso engravings did not surprise Rio's artistic community, which is becoming accustomed to the rigors of censorship, the playwright said. He said that last year censors banned a poster of a painting by Michelangelo.

Book publishers also testify to new intimidation by censors. Most publishers prefer not to invest time and money in works that run the risk of being seized for political or erotic content.

NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 1973

U.N. Council to Go to Panama in March

By ROBERT ALDEN
Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATINS, N.Y., Jan. 16 — The Security Council decided today to hold a series of meetings in Panama City beginning March 15 on matters concerning Latin America.

The action was taken without a formal vote and despite serious reservations expressed by the United States and Britain. Neither, however, was prepared to exercise its veto to block what was clearly the will of the 15-member body.

Sir Colin Crowe of Britain said he did not feel it was wise of the Council, in the event of a sudden world emergency, to be separated from its base, its records, its communications and other facilities unless ther were other overriding reasons.

These reasons do not exist in the case of the proposed meetings in Panama City, Sir Colin said.

Strong support for the Panamanian proposal came from the Soviet Union, France, China, Guinea, Peru, India, Keny,a the Sudan, Yugoslavia and Indonesia.

The United Staes was particularly vehement in its oppos-

sion of disapproval of the holding of the meetings in Panama City, since it will bring about what is expected to be abrasive airing in a hostile atmosphere of the dispute between Panama and the United States over the matter of the Panama Canal Zone.

Aquilino E. Boyd of Panama, who extended the invitation for the meetings in Panama, said today that a "semi-colonial" situation existed in all of Latin America and that it existed in particular in "the so-called Panama Canal zone" where "a colonial situation divides Panama into two parts preventing the political, economic and social integration" of his country.

Mr. Boyd called the zone "a hotbed of international tensions, where a dangerous situation, potentially explosive, exists."

"Panama claims effective sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction over the area involved," he said. "A power foreign to the territory of Panama occupies the area and the Council is needed to eliminate conflict" regarding the canal.

Speaking for the United States, George H. Bush replied that it was essential for the proper functioning of the Council that a meeting not be conceived as a means for bringing pressure on bilateral issues not currently before the Council.

"Ambassador Boyd," Mr. Rush said, "has raised such an issue in mentioning the Panama Canal, the status of which is under active bilateral negotiations. With due reference to the history of the area and the issues, we, of course, do not accept the contention that the Canal Zone is an 'inner colonialist enclave.'"

Mr. Bush recalled that members of the Council had earlier expressed concern about holding meetings where public opinion could affect the work of the Council.

"In this case, it is already evident that the prospect of this meeting is stimulating a heated propaganda campaign in Panama, which will not be conducive to the kind of atmosphere needed for Security Council meetings or be helpful for the future course of bilateral negotiations," he said.

Meetings of the Security Council away from United Nations headquarters in New York have been rare. In 1948 and again in 1951 meetings were held in Paris, concurrently with the General Assembly, which was also in session there.

Early last year, the Council met in Addis Ababa to discuss matters of concern to Africa as the result of an invitation from the Organization of African Unity.

LONDON OBSERVER
7 January 1973

Chile run by computer

by NIGEL HAWKES, our Science Correspondent

THE FIRST computer system designed to control an entire economy has been secretly brought into operation in Chile.

The system has been designed for Chile's Marxist Government by a British management expert, Mr Stafford Beer, a former Research Director of the International Publishing Corporation and president of the Operations Research Society. For the past year he has been commuting between London and Santiago to advise the Chileans on the design of the system.

This is the first time that futuristic schemes for controlling a country's economy by computer have been put into operation. The system has been assembled in some secrecy so as to avoid opposition charges of "Big Brother' tactics.

The system works by gathering information daily from Chile's factories and copper mines, and processing it in a central 'control room' in Santiago. The information reaching the control room is processed through the computer to work out automatically whether production in any sector of the economy has varied significantly from pre-set norms.

In the control room, Chile's economic controllers watch projectors and visual displays that show the results of the computer's analysis. Any anomalies can quickly be detected and corrected by issuing instructions to the industrial sector involved.

Mr Beer was asked to help Chile by the young Minister of Finance, Sr Fernando Flores, an admirer of his work. He jumped at the chance of putting his ideas into practice, after years of official neglect in Britain. By June last year, he says, 60 per cent of Chile's economy was being monitored by the system.

The computers used are American IBM 360 machines, plus some French and British hardware. At its simplest level, the system provides up-to-date information about how the Chilean economy is performing. Production figures are fed into the computer on a daily rota, so economic Ministers always have at their fingertips information only one day old. In Britain, the industrial data used by the Treasury in making decisions are eight months old.

The system also makes it possible to test economic policies by feeding them into the computer and watching their effects on the screens. This has already paid off, Mr Beer says, in the recent 'bosses' strike,' when owners of lorries tried to bring the country to a halt in protest against the Government's policies.

Although the control room was then incomplete, the Government was able to use the system to see clearly what was happening and to work out the effects of possible anti-strike measures. The computers also showed that there were more United States dollars floating about in the economy than there should have been—evidence of a still-flourishing black market in dollars.

Although no public announcement of the system has been made, its existence was disclosed last week by an underground science newsletter, *Eddies*, published in London. Mr Beer, somewhat taken aback at the disclosure, says he will be giving further details of the system in a lecture in Brighton next month.

He is trying hard to avoid the charge that the system is élitist or technocratic by trying to develop ways in which ordinary people can use it. Whether it will work is perhaps a more valid criticism—similar systems on a much smaller scale in industry have varied enormously in effectiveness, from highly efficient to almost useless. And Chile, despite the idealism of its Government, is scarcely the ideal laboratory for testing Dr Beer's ideas, exposed as it is to unfriendly influences from the US, the multinational corporations and the World Bank.